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The Western political landscape is becoming increasingly extreme and po-
larized. Scenes like those of Trump supporters besieging Capitol Hill, the
quintessential symbol of contemporary democracy, will remain in our mem-
ory for a long time. On the European front, radical parties such as the Alter-
native für Deutschland (Afd) in Germany, the Rassemblement National (RN)
in France, Lega in Italy and, ultimately, Vox in Spain have seen their support
grow substantially over the last years. Many argue that the wave of extremist
parties poses an existential threat to the liberal world order, democracy, open
markets, protection of minorities, civil liberties, and constitutional checks
and balances (Guriev & Papaioannou, 2021). What is observable is that the
surge in support for radical parties has been matched with a dramatic fall in
levels of trust in European Institutions (Algan et al., 2017) and a spike in hate
crimes against immigrants and minorities (BBC, 2020; ECRI, 2020). The
phenomenon is highly recent and, consequently, so is its related literature.
On the demand side, various are the possible reasons behind the upsurge of
these radical political forces.1 Some of them are related to economic factors
(Guiso et al., 2017, 2020). Support for extreme parties is more widespread
among the so-called “losers of globalization” and in areas of industrial de-
cline (Barone & Kreuter, 2020; Colantone & Stanig, 2018; Dippel et al.,
2021). Similar arguments have been raised for the role of the Great Reces-
sion and subsequent austerity policies (Dehdari, 2018; Gidron & Mijs, 2019).
Economic explanations such as cross-border trade, automation, crisis, and
austerity cannot, however, fully explain the boost of radical parties (Margalit,
2019). Society is increasingly raising its voice to demand more women em-
powerment and greater protection for minorities. As a reaction, members of
the current dominant group – white men – fear that their identity is under
attack (Guriev & Papaioannou, 2021). Therefore, it is no wonder that people
with traditional values support authoritarian political parties, who promise
to fight the expansion of liberal values and political correctness (Fukuyama,
1For a recent review, primarily focusing on populist parties, see Berman and Kundnani
(2021), Guriev and Papaioannou (2021), and Noury and Roland (2020).
1
2018; Noury & Roland, 2020).
On the supply side, extremist leaders have proven incredibly good at ex-
ploiting and magnifying citizens’ fears. From this perspective, it is no coin-
cidence that a key topic on these parties’ agendas is immigration. This does
not come as a surprise since this subject embraces both economic and non-
economic related concerns. Extreme parties’ leaders have intensively used
anti-immigrant rhetoric, either in an explicitly violent way or by recurring to
the so-called “dog whistle effect” – i.e., using speeches with a hidden message
that is only understood by a targeted subgroup and that activates threatening
stereotypes (Grosjean et al., 2021; Haney-López, 2015).
According to the last estimates, the number of international migrants is
around 272 million globally, which equates to 3.5 percent of the univer-
sal population (IOM, 2020). This figure has been almost stable in the last
decades (in 1990 it was equal to 2.9%). However, an increase in the portion
of people moving toward developed countries has been recorded in recent
years. For example, from 1990 to 2015, the share of foreign-born in the EU
increased from 6% to 11%. The growth of the immigrant population in de-
veloped countries reflects both “push” (supply) and “pull” (demand) factors
(Guriev & Papaioannou, 2021).
Migration flows to Europe suffered a severe and unprecedented crisis in
2015-2016 when thousands of people, mainly Syrians fleeing war, attempted
to reach European countries by sea and land. The number of refugees who
managed to enter Europe is small, both in relation to the European population
and the total number of people who escaped recent conflicts.2 However, the
so-called refugee crisis has extensively dominated the political debate at the
European and national levels.
Europeans have proven that the immigration topic is a strong source of
concern for them. In a large survey conducted in the spring of 2018 by the
European Commission, nearly 40 percent of respondents said immigration
2Among the 7 million Syrians who have been forced to flee abroad since the war began,
11.6% of the total Syrian refugee and asylum seeker population in the world is in Europe,
while 87% is in the Middle East, North Africa, and Turkey. Besides, more than 6 mil-
lion Syrians are internally displaced within their own country, accounting for about half
of the Syrian refugees that the civil war has produced (Sources: Internal Displacement
Monitoring center (2018), UNHCR. (2017, November)).
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was the main issue facing the EU (Eurobarometer, 2018). In the same year,
the EU27 countries received overall an inflow of immigrants equal to 0.54%
of their population (Eurostat, 2018). Besides outliers such as Malta, Cyprus,
and Luxembourg, other countries where the inflow of immigrants was above
average were Ireland, Spain, and, to a lesser extent, Germany (2.01% 1.38%
and 1.08%, respectively).3 In Italy, the figure was 0.55% of its population.
In terms of stock, the number of people residing in an EU Member State
with citizenship of a non-member country was 23 million, representing 5.1%
of the EU27 population. In addition to the outlier Luxembourg, a high pro-
portion of foreign citizens (more than 10% of the resident population) was
also observed in Malta, Cyprus, Austria, Estonia, Latvia, Ireland, Germany,
Belgium, and Spain.
The level of concern that citizens attribute to immigration varies consider-
ably among the EU 27 states and, as displayed in Figure 1.1, it is not corre-
lated with the presence of foreigners in the country.
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3Note that these shares refer to the inflows of migrants, not to the countries’ net migration
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One reason why individuals place so much emphasis on immigration may
be that they have misperceptions about the topic. Using large surveys in
France, Germany, Italy, Sweden, the UK, and the US, Alesina et al. (2018)
show that migrants’ stocks are perceived to be two or three times as large
as the actual levels. Similar results are found when IPSOS4 data are used in
other developed countries (Duffy, 2018). Natives overestimate the presence
of immigrants and have distorted beliefs about their characteristics, such as
gender, origin, and religion. Furthermore, they are likely to think that for-
eigners are economically weaker than they are – i.e., less educated, more
unemployed, and more reliant on and favored by government transfers.
Although studies on the topic are growing, much is still unknown about the
relationship between immigration and electoral support for the far-right. This
dissertation aims to contribute to this recent but growing literature. What hap-
pens to natives’ attitudes toward foreigners (and their electoral preferences)
if they are more informed about immigration dynamics? What are the con-
sequences of electing far-right leaders on the protection of foreigners? Does
welcoming foreign refugees increase support for anti-immigration parties?
Or, conversely, are there reception systems that, if well managed, can dis-
mantle the rhetoric of extremist politicians? This dissertation sheds light on
these questions by applying different empirical methodologies and leveraging
detailed and unique datasets.
A common thread among the chapters of this dissertation is the focus on the
role played by the Internet in the research questions outlined above. Indeed,
the ability to go online has radically changed voters’ habits and how they in-
form themselves. Concurrently, the Internet and social media have drastically
reshaped the way politicians communicate with their potential voters.
There are several and divergent ways in which the Internet might impact
the relationship between support for extremist parties and immigration. On
the one hand, the Internet could be helpful in bridging the information gap on
the migration dynamics pictured above. More informed individuals should,
in turn, decrease their negative sentiment toward migrants, as proven by re-
cent experiments (Facchini et al., 2016; Grigorieff et al., 2020). However,
by its nature, the Internet has many potential drawbacks related to attitudes
toward immigrants, and some features of the online environment can be very
4A leading global survey and market research company.
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beneficial for extremist politicians (Zhuravskaya et al., 2020). The Internet
increases the general salience of the immigration issue, which, in turn, gen-
erates more support for radical parties. This effect has been proven to be true
even when individuals realize that what extremist politicians say about im-
migration is not true (Barrera et al., 2020). Another very sensitive issue is
linked with fake news, which, when circulated online, can have remarkable
impacts on election outcomes (Allcott & Gentzkow, 2017). The online be-
havior of extremist politicians can have significant offline repercussions, as
evidenced by the relationship between Donald Trump’s anti-Muslim tweets
and hate crimes against Islamists (Müller & Schwarz, 2020). More generally,
the Internet and social media can be an ideal arena for the generation of echo
chambers of extremism that can turn into attacks against minorities in real
life (Müller & Schwarz, 2020; Petrova et al., 2020).
Given what has been outlined above, the effect of being exposed to the In-
ternet on the natives’ attitudes toward immigrants and, consequently, on their
electoral behavior is, a priori, ambiguous. The second chapter of my dis-
sertation, “Does the Internet change attitudes toward immigrants? Evidence
from Spain”, seeks to answer this question empirically. In this analysis, I use
a confidential and unique dataset that allows me to link at the micro level both
attitudes and broadband coverage. I thus investigate whether people living in
areas with higher early Internet penetration are characterized by a different
level of information on the migratory phenomenon and by distinct attitudes
toward immigrants. In the second part, I analyze how voting decisions are
affected by Internet availability.
The setting for the analysis is Spain, a particularly interesting country in
conducting a study of this nature for several reasons. Indeed, in the early
2000s Spain experienced an exceptional inflow of migrants comparable, at
least in quantitative terms, to the numbers recorded during the most recent
European refugee crisis.
The paper exploits an exhaustive and representative multi cross-sectional
survey (N=19,293) on attitudes toward migrants carried out by the “Center
of Sociological Investigations” (Centro Investigaciones Sociológicas - CIS).
From this dataset, it is possible to understand how informed Spaniards are on
immigration, their opinion about foreigners, and the main concerns related
to immigration, from different points of view. The restricted version of the
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survey I could access allows me to identify the municipality of the respon-
dent, which is very uncommon in the literature. Lastly, and crucially for the
identification strategy, the data also enable me to compare natives’ attitudes
before and after the Internet’s arrival.
To address the endogeneity of Internet availability, I look at pre-existing
voice telecommunication characteristics at the very local level, and I use out-
come variables before and after the Internet’s arrival. Put differently, the
paper combines a difference-in-differences (DID) with an instrumental vari-
able (IV) approach. Specifically, I instrument the availability of the Internet
with the number of traditional telephone landlines recorded in 1996 in each
municipality. Since the number of landlines was not randomly distributed,
similarly to Campante et al. (2018), the empirical strategy relies on interact-
ing the instrument for Internet availability with the time variation between
the two periods (pre- and post- Internet). The identification assumption is
that the only factor that changed the relationship between the number of fixed
telephone lines and some unobserved characteristic was the introduction of
broadband technology.
Results show that Internet availability is associated with a better knowledge
of the (national) migration dynamics and leads to an overall improvement in
attitudes toward immigrants. Additionally, I find that access to the Internet
generates a decrease in the political support for the traditional Spanish right-
wing party. This decline is found both when using survey data and looking at
actual election results.
Although the political success of far-right parties is growing in all West-
ern countries, little is known about the consequences of having these radical
forces in power. Anecdotal evidence suggests that support for these parties
has been matched with a sharp surge in discrimination and violence against
minorities. However, there is no empirical research that establishes a causal
relationship between the appointment of far-right politicians and an increase
in the episodes of hate crimes. Focusing on the role played by local politi-
cians, in the third chapter of this dissertation, “Do far-right mayors increase
the probability of hate crimes? Evidence from Italy”, I test this hypothesis
empirically.
As (and perhaps even more significantly) in other European states, the po-
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litical support for the far-right in Italy, especially for the League, has soared
in recent years, both at the national and local levels. In this context, I can
exploit a unique and detailed dataset on hate crimes against immigrants – an
issue that suffers from a severe problem of lack of data in several countries.
Besides, the high number of municipalities in Italy – and, therefore, local
elections – is ideal for using a Regression Discontinuity (RD). This method-
ological approach allows me to assess a robust causal effect of the far-right
mayors’ victory on the likelihood of hate crimes. Empirically, I assemble a
dataset of local elections in the period 2008-2018. I then compare the prob-
ability of hate crimes in municipalities in which far-right candidates won or
lost with a narrow margin of votes.
Results show that in municipalities led by far-right mayors, the likelihood
of a hate crime occurring is significantly higher. The effect of the far-right
persists when considering the most severe acts, including physical assaults.
Reassuringly for the credibility of my results, I do not find any effect in the
lagged hate crimes, namely the episodes that happen in the same municipal-
ities before the election of the far-right mayors. The effect resists to several
robustness checks that the level of detail of the dataset allows me to perform.
I find two mechanisms that are particularly relevant to explain the effects
that I document. First, I demonstrate that the election of extreme right mayors
generates an erosion of social norms. This behavioral change does not occur
only in the municipalities where the mayors are elected: using a staggered
difference-in-differences approach, I find evidence of spillover effects on hate
crimes in the surrounding municipalities, especially in areas where the far-
right presence is recent. Second, I explore the Internet’s role, and I show that
municipalities with higher Internet penetration drive the results. This result
is confirmed even when I instrument the broadband availability.
A further relevant question in this framework is what are the factors that
lead voters to support far-right parties. A natural explanation is precisely the
presence of immigrants and refugees. Recent political economy studies have
investigated the role of immigration on voting behavior. Results, however, are
contradictory, and further research is needed to understand the divergence of
these findings better. Indeed, not all migration flows are equal; similarly, not
all refugee reception policies are characterized as having as their ultimate
goal the integration of asylum seekers.
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The fourth chapter of this dissertation – “Is this the real-life or just fan-
tasy? Refugee reception, extreme right voting, and broadband internet”5 –
attempts to contribute to this literature by studying the effect of a refugee
reception program in Italy, “The Protection System for Asylum Seekers and
Refugees” (SPRAR), on support for far-right parties.
This program is based on the opening of medium-small centers in which
the refugees are offered language courses and training; in many cases, the
guests are also engaged in public utility work. Put differently, the program
aims to integrate asylum seekers into the community in which they are settled.
Given these features, the contact generated by SPRAR centers seems to fulfill
the conditions of the contact theory developed by Allport (1954), which can
lead to a reduction in prejudice and anti-immigrant attitudes.
Indeed, the empirical analysis shows that opening a SPRAR center reduces
support for far-right parties. This result is confirmed when we instrument the
endogenous decision to open a center in the municipality with the presence
of so-called group accommodations. These facilities, including homes for
the disabled, the elderly, or drug addicts, were built before the refugee cri-
sis. However, these constructions were particularly useful in hosting asylum
seekers during the peak of the migration inflow of 2015-2016. In fact, the
presence of these structures very well predicts the opening of a SPRAR cen-
ter in the years of the analysis.
In addition to the main result on the support for the far-right, two others
are the main takeaways of the chapter. The first is that the number of refugees
brought into the community matters. Indeed, our analysis suggests that small
centers drive the result: as the number of guests in the center grows, the effect
fades (and support for far-right parties becomes positive when big centers are
open). This could be because natives perceive the arrival of so many refugees
as an invasion or, conversely, that the integration policies described above are
inefficient with high numbers of asylum seekers.
The second is related, once again, to the role played by the Internet. We
find that the reduction in voting for anti-immigration parties is more signif-
icant in communities with low Internet access. This result suggests that the
macro-level impact of an increase in the salience of migration in the media
5Joint with Matteo Gamalerio, Marco Luca and Max Viskanic.
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can potentially reduce the micro-level impact that works through direct con-
tact between natives and migrants.
Overall, this dissertation contributes to the recent literature studying the
causes and consequences of the success of extremist parties (Berman & Kund-
nani, 2021; Guriev & Papaioannou, 2021; Noury & Roland, 2020), with a
particular focus on the relationship between the far-right and immigration.
It also speaks to the literature that analyzes the effects of media on social
and political outcomes (DellaVigna & La Ferrara, 2015; Zhuravskaya et al.,
2020). The last section provides a general conclusion highlighting the main
takeaways of the dissertation and potential directions for future work.
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2. DOES THE INTERNET CHANGE ATTITUDES
TOWARD IMMIGRANTS? EVIDENCE FROM SPAIN
2.1. Introduction
International migration is a highly controversial issue both in political are-
nas and in the media. However, anecdotal and academic evidence suggests
that individuals are often poorly informed about immigration’s basic facts. A
transnational survey carried out in 2014 by Ipsos MORI6 revealed that pub-
lic estimates of the level of immigration were more than twice actual levels.7
Alesina et al. (2018) confirm this bias in natives’ perceptions of both the num-
ber and the characteristics of immigrants: in all countries included in their
analysis, respondents greatly overestimated the total number of immigrants;
additionally, natives believe immigrants to be culturally and religiously more
distant from them and to be economically weaker than they actually are.
Ensuring these figures are reported correctly is crucial because, if better
informed, citizens are more likely to support more open immigration policies
and higher levels of redistribution (Facchini et al., 2016; Grigorieff et al.,
2020). Thus, the role the media play in informing citizens about immigration
and shaping their beliefs and attitudes toward immigrants is critical (Benesch
et al., 2019).
In this paper, I empirically assess the effect of early exposure to one of
the main sources of information – the Internet – on attitudes toward immi-
grants. Specifically, taking advantage of a confidential dataset that allows me
to link at the micro level both attitudes and broadband coverage, I investigate
whether people in areas with higher rates of Internet penetration are charac-
terized by a different level of information on the migratory phenomenon and
by distinct attitudes toward immigrants. In the second part, I analyze how
voting decisions are affected by Internet availability.
6https://www.ipsos.com/ipsos-mori/en-uk/perceptions-are-not-reality-things-world-gets-
wrong
7On average, people estimated 24% of the population to be made up of non-natives, when
in reality it was only 11% (Duffy, 2018).
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It is well documented that, over the last decade, the Internet has become
one of the main sources of news for Western citizens.8 However, its effect
on attitudes toward immigrants is by no means a foregone conclusion. On
the one hand, providing people with the possibility of going online is po-
tentially an opportunity for making them better informed: indeed, Internet
users can consume and produce information without restriction and at a rea-
sonable cost. However, having access to more sources of information is not
necessarily synonymous with greater transparency. This is particularly true
in the context of the Internet, in which the almost unlimited possibilities of
supplying information generate the risk of information overflow. As a reac-
tion, people may concentrate their attention on a limited number of topics
and areas that they want to hear and read about, which may foster a degree
of segregation and ideological polarisation (Mullainathan & Shleifer, 2005).
A second and related concern associated with the diffusion of the Internet is
that this technology may crowd out traditional (and potentially more infor-
mative) news sources, the experience suffered by newspapers following the
introduction of television (Gentzkow, 2006).9
The setting for my analysis is Spain, a country that is particularly interest-
ing for conducting a study of this nature. First and foremost, the case of Span-
ish immigration is unique due to both its magnitude and timing (Vázquez-
Grenno, 2018). During the first decade of the twenty-first century, Spain
experienced one of the largest migration waves in European history and saw
its share of immigrant population increase from 1% at the beginning of the
1990s to around 12% in 2008. Second, among European countries, Spain is
the one in which the correlation between press coverage and the salience of
immigration is highest (Hatton, 2017). This means that the degree of impor-
tance that Spanish people attribute to immigration as a policy issue is highly
related to the attention that the media dedicate to the topic. Finally, particu-
larly appealing data are available for analyzing this issue empirically.
On the one hand, I am able to track the diffusion of broadband Internet
in the country at a very high level of geographical detail. On the other, this
paper exploits an exhaustive and representative multi cross-sectional study
8For instance, in 2013, 30% of European citizens reported that their first source of news on
political matters was the Internet (Eurobarometer, 2013).
9In this regard, both Gavazza et al. (2019) and Falck et al. (2014) find that Internet avail-
ability reduced the use of traditional media, especially (local) newspapers.
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on attitudes toward immigrants carried out by the “Center of Sociological
Investigations” (Centro Investigaciones Sociológicas - CIS). The access to a
restricted version of this survey allows me to geolocalize the respondents and
investigate in detail how well informed Spanish people are about the level of
immigration in their country and how they perceive the immigrants present in
their territory. Pivotal to the identification strategy, the data also enable me to
compare natives’ attitudes toward immigrants before and after the Internet’s
arrival.
Identifying a causal effect of Internet exposure, however, is far from straight-
forward. Indeed, there may well be unobserved factors correlated with both
changes in Internet diffusion and attitudes toward immigrants. In such a sce-
nario, a simple OLS regression with Internet coverage as the main explana-
tory variable would suffer from endogeneity problems. I tackle this issue in
two ways. The inclusion in the analysis of local fixed effects, with observa-
tions drawn from both pre- and post-Internet periods, allows me to address
estimation biases due to unobserved time-persistent factors. In a similar way
to Campante et al. (2018) and Falck et al. (2014), I address the endogeneity
of Internet availability resulting from time-varying factors by looking at pre-
existing voice telecommunication characteristics. More specifically, I instru-
ment the availability of the Internet with the number of traditional telephone
landlines recorded in 1996 in each municipality.
The Internet’s diffusion is strictly correlated with the pre-existing level of
development of landlines, given that ADSL technology relies on data trans-
mission over the user’s copper telephone line. In this sense, a higher number
of fixed-lines is associated with lower costs in providing Internet availability.
At the same time, the wide diffusion of landline telephones in 1996 and the
fact that the national provider (Telefonica) at that time was public – which
meant the ultimate objective was to offer telephone lines to as many citizens
as possible – allow me to address any selection bias in households provided
with fixed-line telephones. Clearly, the number of landlines was not ran-
domly distributed: following Campante et al. (2018), the identification strat-
egy relies on interacting the instrument for Internet availability with the time
variation between the two periods (pre- and post- Internet). The assumption is
that the only factor that changed the relationship between the number of fixed
telephone lines and some unobserved characteristic was the introduction of
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broadband technology. In other words, my identification strategy depends
on the change in the impact of the number of landlines on the outcome vari-
ables, assuming that whatever correlation existed between these elements did
not change when the Internet was introduced.
The results show that, between 2008 and 2012, Internet availability gen-
erated distinct and quantitatively important effects on immigration-related is-
sues. First, it changed the perception of Spanish people about the number
of immigrants present in the territory (level of information). Interestingly,
the effect of broadband exposure on natives’ estimates differs remarkably be-
tween national and local patterns. On the one hand, Spaniards living in areas
with higher Internet coverage are more likely to estimate the percentage of
foreigners present in the country correctly. Specifically, they are less prone to
overestimate immigrants’ presence at the national level. On the other hand,
the Internet is associated with a misperception of local migration dynamics
and, if anything, with an upward-biased estimation (although not significant)
of non-natives living in the respondents’ municipalities.
When asked their attitudes toward immigration, an increase in the number
of natives claiming that “immigration is good for the country” is observed in
areas with high Internet coverage, despite the absence of any difference in the
pre-Internet era (1995-1996). This result is stable when relevant personal and
municipal controls – including the share and origin of the immigrant popu-
lation in the respondent’s municipality – are introduced and holds to several
robustness checks. Interestingly, this effect is found to be more strong among
young respondents, i.e., those individuals that are more likely to obtain in-
formation online. Other measures of attitude – related to concerns about the
job market and public goods competition and worries about cultural distance
– are in line with this result. Overall, these results suggest that the possibil-
ity of going online is responsible for an increase in positive attitudes toward
immigrants.
This effect is not without political consequences. Indeed, the CIS question-
naires report which party the respondent voted for in the last election. In this
regard, in the second part of the paper, I show that the Internet reduces the
number of individuals that report having voted for Spain’s traditional right-
wing party, Partido Popular (PP). This effect is confirmed when real electoral
outcomes are analyzed.
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This paper can be associated primarily with three strands in the economics
literature. A large body of studies has analyzed the main channels via which
natives’ perceptions of immigrants are shaped (see Hainmueller and Hopkins
(2014) for a review). The pioneer works looked at the impact of immigrants
on the labor market and public transfers (see, among others, Dustmann et al.
(2005), Facchini and Mayda (2009), and Preston (2014)) as well as at the
racial factor (Dustmann & Preston, 2007; Mayda, 2006). A more recent de-
velopment in the literature has identified another important factor that might
impact support for immigration: the role of information. By conducting on-
line experiments, Grigorieff et al. (2020) show that individuals provided with
figures about immigrants (the proportion of legal and illegal immigrants in
the U.S., the unemployment rate of immigrants, their incarceration rate, and
the proportion of immigrants who cannot speak English) update their beliefs
and develop a more positive attitude toward immigration and look more fa-
vorably on an increase in the number of legal immigrants. Similarly, in the
Japanese context, Facchini et al. (2016) find that providing individuals with
information about the potential social and economic benefits of immigration
led to a substantial increase in support for a more open immigration policy.
Lastly, Alesina et al. (2018) show that specific treatments of respondents’
perceptions of the number, origin, and “hard-working” nature of immigrants
make them more favorable to redistribution. Using a representative survey
database that covers different periods in time, in this paper, I seek to gen-
eralize the external validity of the experimental results. Moreover, the high
level of detail of the CIS study allows me to identify the channels via which
attitudes are impacted by new information.
Some studies have sought to determine whether the media can shape atti-
tudes toward immigrants and, if so, how. For instance, using data from the
European Social Survey, Héricourt and Spielvogel (2014) find that individ-
uals who spend more time informing themselves about social and political
matters by reading the press or listening to the radio have a better opinion of
the economic impact of immigration. By contrast, in a recent paper explor-
ing the link between mass media coverage and immigration worries, Benesch
et al. (2019) show that the number of media reports dedicated to migration
issues is positively associated with concerns about immigration among the
German population. In the Italian context, Mastrorocco and Minale (2018)
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find no effect of the development of digital television on attitudes toward im-
migrants (but a reduction in support for Silvio Berlusconi’s right-wing party).
The studies reviewed above investigates the role of the traditional media. Dif-
ferently, my paper focuses on digital media and, more specifically, on the
Internet, which has established itself as a source of news for an increasing
number of citizens. Besides, most of the studies conducted to date are only
able to detect a correlation between the variables; here, I attempt to address
the endogeneity associated with the demand side of media using a more rig-
orous econometric approach. Moreover, the relationship between attitudes
toward immigrants and media coverage I can analyze is much more precisely
defined in geographical terms.
Finally, in terms of methodology (and, in part, of outcome variables), this
paper is similar to recent studies that evaluate the impact of the Internet on
political outcomes.10 In analyses of respectively German and Italian political
elections, Falck et al. (2014) and Campante et al. (2018) report a negative
effect of Internet availability on voter turnout in parliamentary elections. A
decrease in political participation is also found by Gavazza et al. (2019) in a
study of UK local elections. In terms of party preferences, an increase in the
vote share for a new, web-friendly party (Five-Stars Movement) is observed
in areas with higher Internet diffusion in Italy (Campante et al., 2018); by
contrast, no evidence that the Internet systematically benefits single parties
was reported in Germany (Falck et al., 2014). However, despite the obvious
importance of the influence of digital media, still little is known about other
politically relevant outcomes that the Internet might impact. Indeed, attitudes
toward immigrants can be especially malleable, and they constitute a highly
controversial issue in recent political debates: rigorous and detailed studies
of how they are formed and how they can be changed are therefore necessary.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2.2 describes the Span-
ish context, examining the development of the Internet and analyzing the
country’s migration dynamics and political situation; Section 2.3 reports the
data used, focusing above all on the novel, confidential dataset provided by
CIS; Section 2.4 and 2.5 outlines the empirical strategies used and analy-
ses the effects of Internet availability respectively on the level of information
10For a detailed literature review of the impact of the Internet and Social Media on political
outcomes, see Zhuravskaya et al. (2020).
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about migration patterns and different attitudes toward immigrants; Section
2.6 studies the impact of the Internet on political outcomes; and, Section 2.7
concludes.
2.2. Spanish context: Internet, migration and political background
2.2.1. Internet in Spain
Compared to other European countries, the diffusion of broadband Internet
in Spain has lagged behind. The first Internet connections officially arrived
in Spanish homes in 2000, while in 2004, the first ADSL subscriptions (1
Kbps upstream rate) were offered. However, according to Eurostat11, in
2012, broadband Internet was available in just 67% of Spain’s households,
far fewer, that is, than in many other European countries, including France
(77%), the UK (80%) and Germany (82%) and even below the EU27 average
(72%). Moreover, according to a 2013 report by the European Commission12,
broadband access costs in Spain were the second most expensive in Europe.
Nonetheless, during the period that concerns the analysis, the share of
households supplied by broadband (ADSL) technology rose dramatically at
the national level. Figure 2.1 reports the evolution of the Internet coverage in
Spain between 2006 and 2015: as shown, in this period, the share of house-
holds supplied by broadband Internet increased from less than 30% to almost
80%. Importantly for my identification strategy, this variation is apparent not
only across time but also spatially: the differences in the coverage of ADSL
technology between Spain’s provinces is displayed in Figure 2.2.
Internet applications may be multiple, ranging from gaming to providing
access to online services and platforms. The literature examining the effect
of the Internet on electoral participation posits that one of the main reasons
why the Internet makes citizens less likely to vote is that, by having access
to the Internet, individuals consume more entertainment at the expense of ac-
quiring political information (Campante et al., 2018; Gavazza et al., 2019).
11http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/documents/3433488/5585460/KS-SF-12-050-




Thus, it is critical to analyze how broadband technology is used when consid-
ering whether it might change attitudes toward immigrants. In this regard, the
annual “Survey on Equipment and Use of Information and Communication
Technologies in Households”, whose principal aim is to investigate the on-
line habits of Spanish people, provides an interesting picture: as Figure 2.3
shows, the percentage of Spaniards using the Internet to read online news-
papers surged in the period considered, rising from 42% in 2008 to 64% in
2012. This time spent by Spaniards to obtain online news might potentially
change the level of information they had about politics and immigration.
2.2.2. Migration in Spain
As indicated above, the case of Spanish immigration is unique in both its
magnitude and timing (Vázquez-Grenno, 2018). Compared to Greece and
Italy, Spain was much less involved in the 2015 refugee crisis: of the one
million sea arrivals registered in Europe in 2015, only a few thousand reached
Spanish shores. This can be attributed mainly to its geography, that is, located
considerably further than Greece and Italy from the hotspots of Syria and the
Middle East, from where the refugees were fleeing. Despite this, immigration
has been very much an issue in the country in recent years.
During the first decade of the twenty-first century, Spain experienced one
of the largest migration waves, relative to its population, in European history.
Between 2002 and 2014, Spain received an accumulated immigration inflow
of 7.3 million and a net flow of 4.1 million, making it the second-largest
recipient of immigrants in absolute terms among OECD countries, after the
United States (Brugel, 201513). This demographic surge is clearly evident in
Figure 2.4, which shows the total stock of foreign people living in the country
over time.
Most immigrants came to Spain to work, attracted by the vigorous eco-
nomic growth that characterized those years, while a small percentage was
composed of asylum seekers (Jofre-Monseny et al., 2016). In terms of their
country of origin, the immigration wave was highly heterogeneous, with
the most significant inflows originating from Ecuador, Morocco, Romania,
and Colombia. According to the National Statistics Office, in 2017, the
13http://bruegel.org/2015/12/the-remarkable-case-of-spanish-immigration/
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largest share of non-Spanish people were Moroccans (16.4%) and Romanians
(15%), followed by the English (5.3%), Italians, and Chinese (both 4.6%).
Table 2.A1 shows the change in the make-up of Spain’s foreign population
over the last twenty years. The average immigrant arriving in this period
was relatively high-skilled: according to the 2011 census, 55% (20%) were
reported to have at least a secondary (tertiary) education, a figure not that
distant from the figure for the native population – 64% (31%). Moreover, this
relatively skilled supply of immigrants has been shown not to have damaged
the native labor market, in terms of the employment rate or wages (Carrasco
et al., 2008), and to have increased both native women’s labor supply (Farré
et al., 2011) and the per capita income of provinces with high immigration
flows (Conde-Ruiz et al., 2008). Furthermore, with respect to other European
countries with a smaller share of immigrants, Spain recorded lower growth in
criminal activity in this period (Alonso-Borrego et al., 2012).
2.2.3. Spanish political context
Traditionally, in Spain, the votes cast at the general elections were distributed
among a very small number of political parties. Until 2011, the two main par-
ties, the right-wing conservative Popular Party (PP) and the leftish Spanish
Socialist Workers’ Party (PSOE) split more than 70% of the vote.
Although it can hardly be described as xenophobic, the PP implemented
anti-immigrant policies in response to the exceptional waves of immigration
described above. The neatest example is the introduction in 2021 of the con-
troversial Real Decreto-Ley 16/2012. This law, approved by a PP govern-
ment, deprived access to healthcare to undocumented immigrants. This anti-
immigrant stance is further confirmed by quantitative content analyses of the
party’s manifestos, which highlight a relatively high proportion of references





Despite the subject’s importance, detailed national-level data describing at-
titudes toward immigrants are not common. Where they do exist, they are
usually recent and not representative of a whole country but just of its main
cities. Additionally, questions regarding attitudes toward immigrants are of-
ten part of broader (often multi-country) surveys, typically about citizens’
main concerns or problems, with no specific focus on the immigration topic.
In this regard, Spain is an exception; here, a long, (almost) annual cross-
sectional study has been entirely dedicated to the attitudes toward migrants.
In the survey, carried out by the Sociological Research Center - CIS (Centro
Investigaciones Sociológicas)14, Spanish respondents are asked several ques-
tions related to their opinion about the country’s immigrant population, their
relationship with immigrants and their fears in relation to immigration. From
this survey, it is also possible to estimate the level of information – at both
the national and local level – about the immigration phenomenon by looking
at the respondents’ perceptions of the share of foreign people present in the
country and in the municipality where (s)he lives. Finally, political prefer-
ences are also detectable, as participants must indicate whether they voted in
the last elections and, if so, for which party they cast their vote.
Importantly, this paper leverages a restricted version of the survey, from
which it is possible to discern the respondent’s municipality. This allows me
to identify the relationship between Internet access and attitudes toward im-
migrants with a level of geographical detail that is very rare in the literature.
In my analysis, I use five waves of the survey from 2008 to 2012, the same
span of years for which data on Internet penetration are available. Addi-
tionally, and pivotal to my identification strategy, I use the (only) two waves
carried out before the arrival of the Internet, namely in 1995 and 1996. These
two waves are largely comparable to the more recent ones – both in terms of
geographical representation and in terms of questions asked – and they allow




Once I combine the seven waves, the dataset comprises 19,293 observa-
tions, of which 13,110 belong to the post-Internet period (from 2008 on-
wards). Each wave includes at least 2,500 observations and, overall, 866
different municipalities are represented. Apart from the outcome variables of
the analysis, I am also able to identify the (self-reported) personal and social
characteristics of the respondents, including gender, age, profession, social
class, employment status, and level of education. Table 2.1 provides the main
statistics of the survey by year. Table 2.A2 reports the personal character-
istics of the sample, while Table 2.A3 reports those of the municipalities in
which the respondents live. All interviews were carried out in person in the
respondent’s house.
2.3.2. Internet availability
Data on Internet availability are drawn from the “Anuario Economico de Es-
paña - La Caixa” (Economic Yearbook of Spain), in which records of the
number of broadband lines are provided for 2007, 2008, 2009, and 2012 at
the municipal level for around 3250 municipalities.15 To address the lack of
data on broadband lines for 2010 and 2011, I interpolate them using the re-
cent ipolate Stata command (see Cox (2015) for a comprehensive guide and
Cobham and Jansk (2019) for a recent application).16 Dividing the number
of broadband lines by the total population in the municipality, I obtain the
share of Internet penetration. The same database also reports the number of
landlines in 1996 at the municipal level: as explained in more detail below,
this information is used as an instrumental variable for Internet availability.
An additional source related with Internet data is the aforementioned “Sur-
vey on Equipment and Use of Information and Communication Technologies
in Households”. This source, however, has the drawback of being limited to
the provincial level. However, since it well captures the online behaviour of
Spaniards, it is useful for undertaking a descriptive analysis of these habits.
15They provide data for all the municipalities with more than 1,000 inhabitants, accounting
for 96.8% of the population.
16However, results are consistent both in terms of magnitude and significance if I exclude
from the analysis the years for which I use this command.
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2.3.3. Electoral and demographic data
Data on the results of national elections at the municipal level for the years
1996, 2000, 2008, and 2011 are public and downloadable from the Spanish
Ministry of the Interior.
Data for municipal controls (time-invariant and variant), including popula-
tion size and density, population composition by age bracket, unemployment
level, the share of people with a high level of education, number of household
members, area, and altitude of the location, come from the INE (National
Statistics Office) and from the 2001 and 2011 Spanish Censuses. Other rele-
vant controls at the municipal level, including the number of cars, banks, and
commercial activities, as well as the number of offices and cultural venues per
capita, are provided by “Anuario Economico de España - La Caixa”. Finally,
data about the immigrant population, in particular the share and origin of im-
migrants, come from Padrón Continuo, the main official Spanish register of
foreign people living in the country.
2.4. Empirical Analysis: Information on Migration Patterns
2.4.1. Perceived number of immigrants
Overall, people tend not to be well informed about the migration patterns in
the territory where they live. They show a lack of knowledge about more ad-
vanced facts, such as immigrants’ characteristics and composition, and more
basic statistics, such as the number of foreigners present in their territory.
Having citizens well informed on this issue is critical. Indeed, as experiments
show, individuals change their opinion about migration policies once they are
provided with these data (Facchini et al., 2016; Grigorieff et al., 2020).
Thus, a first important analysis concerns how informed Spanish citizens
are about the migration dynamics in their country. To test their level of in-
formation, I exploit the fact that, between 2008 and 2012, respondents were
asked to report the perception of the proportion of non-Spanish people liv-
ing in the country.17 Figure 2.5 shows the average share of non-natives that
Spaniards thought were present compared with the actual percentage. The
17“Out of 100 people living in Spain, how many do you think were born outside Spain?”.
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graph stresses that Spain is no exception to other European countries, as re-
spondents widely overestimated the proportion of immigrants.
If respondents answered “I don’t know” to the open question about the
perceived share of foreign-born living in Spain, they were offered a battery
of ranges from which they were asked to pick the one they thought to be
the most likely: 0%; from 1% to 5%; 6-10%, 11-15%; 16-20%; 21-25%;
26-30%; above 30%. To maximize the number of answers for the analysis,
I transform the open question into a categorical one – following the ranges
above – and I then add the perceptions of the respondents that answered the
categorical question.18
In addition to the share of immigrants at the national level, the respondents
were also asked to report the perceived percentage of immigrants present in
their municipality. The geographical distribution of immigrants varies deeply
in Spain, as displayed by the map in Figure 2.6. This question on the per-
ceived presence of immigrants at the local level was asked in the same way
as the question on the fraction of non-Spaniards at the national level – i.e.,
first, the respondent was asked an open question to the perceived percentage
of immigrants present in the municipality and then to those that answered “I
don’t know”, the ranges above were proposed.
Taken together, these two questions allow me to identify respondents who:
i) Have correct information on the share of immigrants at the national level;
ii) Overestimate the share of immigrants at the national level; iii) Have cor-
rect information on the share of immigrants at the local level; iv) Overesti-
mate the share of immigrants at the local level.
As far as national dynamics are concerned, Table 2.2 reports the distri-
bution of the answer by year (both in level and in share of respondents).
Throughout the timespan considered, the real percentage of immigrants in
Spain fluctuated around 13% (see the columns in red of Figure 2.5). As is ev-
ident from the last two rows of the table, this implies that, when all the years
are considered, just 1,469 out of the 13,110 respondents (which represents
11.21% of the sample) were able to report the share of immigrants in Spain
correctly.
18Approximately 20% of respondents did not answer the open-ended question about esti-
mated immigrant share. Once the variable is transformed from continuous into categori-
cal, 13.87% of the responses were blank (See Table 2.2).
23
Table 2.3 analyzes the personal characteristics of the respondents that have
a correct perception of the migration patterns and those who instead overes-
timate immigrants’ presence – both at the national and the local level. Men
have a more accurate picture of migration dynamics and are less likely to
overestimate the presence of non-natives. Another element linked to a less
biased view of the migration phenomenon is the level of education; on the
contrary, people who are unemployed and have a (self-reported) bad eco-
nomic situation are more likely to report higher percentages than the actual
presence of foreigners. Similarly, people who declare their political ideology
to be right-wing are more likely to believe that the number of immigrants is
higher than the actual figure.
2.4.2. Role of the Internet on the perceived number of immigrants
To determine whether the Internet is associated with a different awareness of
immigration patterns, I run the following equation:
MigrationIn f oi,m,t = β1InternetS harem,t+β2Xi,t+β3Wm,t+τt+ψp+ϵm,t (2.1)
where the dependent variable is a dummy equal to one if the individual i,
living in municipality m, has a correct level of information on the immigration
phenomenon at time t. As explain above, I specifically attribute a value equal
to one to the dependent variable if individual i, among the ranges offered,
– 0%; from 1% to 5%; 6-10%, 11-15%; 16-20%; 21-25%; 26-30%; above
30% – thinks that the percentage of immigrants is between 11 and 15%. I
also run the same equation where the dependent variable is equal to one if the
respondent reports that the share of immigrants is above 15% – i.e., if (s)he
overestimate the immigrants’ presence.
The main explanatory variable, Internet Share, is the share of Internet cov-
erage at the municipal level in year t. X is a vector of individual controls of
the respondent’s self-reported characteristics, including gender, age, social
class, working status, economic condition, level of education, and political
preferences. At the same time, W controls for the characteristics of the loca-
tion in which the individual lives, including the population, the surface area,
the population density, and the altitude of each municipality. These features
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are relevant, as they capture the level of urbanization and any infrastructural
difficulties in installing the Internet. Importantly, W also includes the share
of immigrants present in the municipality as well as their origin. Indeed,
the cultural and ethnic composition of the immigrant population is a critical
element when natives are surveyed about non-natives (Lind, 2007; Luttmer,
2001). To address this issue, I also introduce in vector W the share (over
the total population of foreign-born) of EU15, (Non-EU15) European and
Sub-Saharan immigrants.
τt and ψp represent, respectively, time and area fixed effects. Specifically,
I add to the equation year and province fixed effects.19 The choice to in-
troduce fixed effects at the provincial rather than municipal level is related
to the empirical strategy developed in the section on attitudes toward immi-
grants.20 Finally, ϵ represents a robust error term clustered at the municipal
level. Throughout the analysis, I weight the observations for the level of rep-
resentatives in the survey of each municipality per year.21
Table 2.4 reports the results. Specifically, the first two columns refer to
a correct perception of the national immigration dynamics, while columns 3
and 4 examine the effect of Internet availability on the probability of overesti-
mating the number of immigrants. The coefficients show that greater Internet
availability is associated with a higher probability of answering the ques-
tion correctly. In other words, having access to the Internet is reported as
being associated with a better knowledge of immigration patterns in Spain.
Simultaneously, the last two columns display that, between 2008 and 2012,
respondents living in areas with higher Internet penetration are less likely to
overestimate the share of non-natives in the country. Both results are stable
when municipal and personal controls are introduced.22 Table 2.5 confirms
the results when a logistic regression is run.
As mentioned, from the survey, it is also possible to assess whether the
Internet is associated with a different level of information when the local pat-
19Spain is made up of 50 provinces, with populations ranging from 95,258 to 6,458,684.
20See Section 2.5 and in particular Subsection 2.5.2 for a discussion regarding this choice.
21In the robustness checks, I provide results for the unweighted regressions and when alter-
native weights are used, i.e., the (log of the) population of the municipality.
22Results are stable when controlling for municipality or respondent characteristics only.
Besides, results on overestimation are consistent when a higher threshold (20%, instead
of 15%) is used.
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terns are analyzed. Indeed, one of the potential effects of Internet diffusion
is that it may have accelerated the decline of newspaper distribution, most
notably of the local press. These patterns have been found in Germany and
the UK, respectively by Falck et al. (2014) and Gavazza et al. (2019). News-
papers are the most important source of information on local issues and local
politics (Bruns & Himmler, 2011). Thus, it may be the case that the Internet
generates different effects on the level of information about national vs. local
immigration dynamics.
This idea is confirmed by Table 2.6 (and by Table 2.7 when a logit model
is used). The tables show the results for Equation 2.1, where the dependent
variable is a dummy equal to one if the respondent perceives the share of im-
migrants living in their municipality correctly or if (s)he overestimates their
presence.23 As evident, a completely different picture emerges when local
immigration patterns are investigated. Spaniards living in areas with high In-
ternet penetration are less likely to correctly estimate the share of immigrants
living in their municipality, as observable from columns 1 and 2; although, as
reported in columns 3 and 4, the Internet does not seem to be associated with
a higher probability of overestimating this share.
Together, Tables 2.4 and 2.6 provide evidence that the Internet might have
a differential impact on the level of users information. On the one hand, it
makes people better aware of global/national issues; yet, on the other, they
suffer a loss of information regarding local dynamics.
2.5. Empirical Analysis: Attitudes Toward Immigrants
2.5.1. Variables of interest
In this section, I analyze the effect of the Internet on different attitudes to-
ward immigrants. Individuals’ perception over the migration topic can be
shaped by different sources, among which, the media represent one of the
most important (Vliegenthart et al., 2008). Doubtless, the media constitute
a major channel of information and, as such, a key determinant of beliefs.
However, a priori, it is not clear in which direction access to news content
23The dependent variable is constructed following the same ranges used for the national-
level analysis.
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might impact citizens’ views on immigrants, especially if we consider the
highly self-segregated news platform provided by the Internet.
As mentioned, the CIS questionnaires are entirely focused on Spaniards’
attitudes toward immigrants. From them, the respondents’ generic attitudes
toward immigration as well as specific concerns on this subject can be cap-
tured. The most general question from which is it possible to evaluate the
overall attitudes is formulated as follows: “Overall, do you think that immi-
gration is bad, good, or neither bad nor good for the country?”. Figure 2.7
displays the distribution of the answers of the whole sample. In the empirical
analysis, I focus on respondents who report immigration to be good for the
country. Another question helpful for catching the general attitudes is “Do
you think there are too many immigrants in the country?”.
Besides, in the questionnaires, participants were required to express the
level of agreement with a series of migration-related statements.24 For exam-
ple, respondents were asked whether they agreed with the assertions “Immi-
grants steal jobs from natives” and “Immigrants force natives’ salaries down.”
Similarly, interviewees were demanded if “Immigrants should not receive un-
employment subsidy”, “Immigrants should not be able to vote”, “Immigrants
should not be able to obtain Spanish nationality”, and whether “Immigrants
should renounce their own culture.”
From these more specific questions, is it possible to discern if respondents’
potential concerns about the immigration topic stem from competition in the
labor market, the quality and availability of public goods, or whether they are
more related to a cultural and identitarian issue. In the empirical analysis, I
use as dependent variables a dummy equal to one if the respondent (strongly
or somewhat) agrees with the statements mentioned above. Table 2.8 reports
the summary statistics of the variables of interest.
2.5.2. Empirical strategy
In Section 2.4 a simple association between the Internet and the level of in-
formation about the migration phenomenon is described. Importantly, in this
part of the analysis, I move from a correlation analysis to a causality anal-
24Possible answers: 1) Strongly Agree; 2) Somewhat agree; 3) Somewhat disagree; 4)
Strongly disagree.
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ysis. In fact, unlike the questions on the natives’ level of information on
migration patterns, that were absent, the above-mentioned questions about
attitudes were also asked in two waves carried out in 1995 and 1996 – i.e.,
before the arrival of the Internet. These two earlier waves are comparable
to those conducted between 2008 and 2012, both in terms of geographical
representation and issues covered.
By leveraging the fact that I have information on attitudes before and af-
ter the arrival of the Internet, I can implement the following difference-in-
differences analysis:
AttitudeImmigrantsi,t =β1InternetS harem,t + β2LandlinesS hare1996m
+ β3Xi,t + β4Wm,t + τt + ψp + ϵm,t
(2.2)
where the dependent variable is a dummy equal to one if the respondent
agrees with the different statements related to attitudes toward immigrants
described in Section 2.5.1. As in Equation 2.1, the main explanatory vari-
able, Internet Share, is measured as the ratio between the number of broad-
band lines and the population living in a municipality and is equal to 0 in the
pre-Internet period.25 X and W are vectors of relevant personal and municipal
characteristics (see Subsection 2.4.2).
τt and ψp represent, respectively, time and area fixed effects. Specifically,
I include a set of fixed effects catching the year of the interview and the
province in which the respondent lives. Note that fixed effects at the mu-
nicipal level cannot be included since they would be too demanding. Call
“Sample A” the set of municipalities observed before the introduction of
ADSL technology and “Sample B” the set of municipalities observed after
the introduction of ADSL technology: the introduction of fixed effects at the
municipal level would imply focusing exclusively on individuals living in
municipalities present in both samples. Since the overlap of these samples is
25In this regard, it should be pointed out that broadband access is a slightly better mea-
sure than penetration because the latter is obviously the result of endogenous individual
decisions (Campante et al., 2018). Additionally, in a robustness check, I run the same
regressions using the total number of households in the municipality as the denominator
rather than the population.
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small,26 municipality fixed effects are not feasible in this analysis.
Broadband diffusion is, of course, far from being random. Internet sup-
pliers are more likely to invest in places where demand is potentially higher,
given the characteristics of the location and its inhabitants. These unobserv-
able characteristics might potentially be correlated with local perceptions of
immigrants, and the results derived from OLS regressions might suffer from
problems of endogeneity.
In line with the recent literature examining the impact of broadband tech-
nology on political outcomes, I address this issue in two ways. The introduc-
tion of local fixed effects, with observations from both before and after the
introduction of Internet technology, allows me to overcome the estimation
bias attributable to unobserved time-persistent factors. However, there may
still be some unobservable time-varying factors that affect both attitudes to-
ward immigrants and Internet availability. To address this issue, I instrument
for Internet availability as follows:
InternetS harem,t =γ1(LandlinesS hare1996m ∗ PostInternet)+
γ2LandlinesS hare1996m + γ3Xi,t + γ4Wm,t + θt + ζp + ηm,t
(2.3)
where LandlinesShare1996 is the time-invariant share of fixed-telephone lines
(over the total population) in municipality m recorded in 1996.
Especially in the early phase of its expansion, the diffusion of the Internet
was strictly correlated with the pre-existing level of development of landlines,
given that ADSL technology relies on data transmission over the user’s cop-
per telephone line. In this sense, a higher number of fixed-lines is associated
both with a smaller cost in providing Internet services and greater proximity
to the local telephone exchange (or Main Distribution Frame - MDF).27 Fig-
ure 2.8 confirms the high correlation between the share of landlines in 1996
26This is related to the fact that, in order to be nationally representative, survey respondents
were typically selected in different cities each year.
27One of the most commonly used instruments for Internet availability in the literature is
the location of MDFs - which connect the central office switches to lines that go into
people’s homes (Campante et al., 2018; Falck et al., 2014). However, data on their
position in Spain are not available. Other instruments include the location of backbones
(Miner, 2015) and rainfalls (Gavazza et al., 2019).
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and Internet penetration, while the spatial correlation is demonstrated by the
maps in Figure 2.9.
Simultaneously, another relevant point related to this identification strategy
should be highlighted. In 1996, the use of the home telephone was largely
widespread. In this sense, low telephone network coverage should be associ-
ated with difficulties in bringing the telephone service into the municipality
and not with the individuals’ choice of not having a telephone in their home.
Moreover, the national company responsible for the telephone service – Tele-
fónica – was public at the time, which clearly suggests that the ultimate goal
was to provide a telephone service for the largest number of citizens, even in
areas where it was not economically viable to invest. This fact reinforces the
idea that low telephone network coverage should be associated with technical
difficulties (due, for instance, to the nature of the terrain or the presence of
mountains) in providing the service and not with selection bias in households
provided with fixed-line telephones.
The demand for fixed telephones in 1996 preceded the development of the
Internet. However, it is, of course, also related to certain municipal charac-
teristics, which, in turn, might be associated with the municipality’s view of
immigrants. To mitigate this concern, I introduce in all regressions the time-
invariant LandlinesShare1996 baseline. Additionally, similarly to Campante
et al. (2018), to “net out” the correlation between our outcomes of interest
and these municipality characteristics, the instrument used in Equation 2.3 is
constructed by interacting the share of landlines with a dummy equal to one
for the post-Internet observations.
In essence, I implement a differences-in-differences approach, “turning the
instrument on” when the observations come from the post-Internet era. The
identification assumption is that any change in the impact of the number of
fixed telephone lines on the dependent variable occurs only through Internet
availability. In other words, I am “netting out” the change in the effect of
the number of landlines of the variables of interest, under the assumption that
any change in that effect occurs exclusively through the new technology.
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2.5.3. Main results
To investigate whether the Internet has an impact on attitudes toward immi-
grants, I begin my analysis by looking at responses to the generic question:
“Overall, do you think that immigration is bad, good, or neither bad nor
good for the country?”, focusing on individuals with positive views.
Figure 2.10 displays the share of respondents that claim that immigration
is good, over internet penetration and by Internet era. The figure highlights
two interesting patterns. First, the left-hand side of the figure, which reports
Spanish attitudes toward immigrants before the arrival of the Internet, reveals
no differences in the rates of positive views between the municipalities with
(future) high and low Internet coverage. In 1995-1996, 41.3% of respondents
living in areas with future low Internet penetration in 2008-2012 reported
having positive attitudes toward immigrants: a very similar percentage to
that recorded in areas with future high broadband diffusion (41.2%). This
provides suggestive evidence that the parallel trend hypothesis holds and,
reassuringly for the identification strategy, that the results are not picking
up some underlying trend in attitudes that just happened to be correlated with
the diffusion of broadband. Second, as displayed on the right-hand side of the
figure, in municipalities with a higher level of Internet share, the percentage
of respondents reporting that immigration is good for the country increased,
while a dramatic drop is observable in the “low-Internet” areas.
This pattern is confirmed by Table 2.9, which shows the econometric re-
sults. The OLS coefficients, both with and without municipal and personal
controls, are positive and significant, showing that access to the Internet is as-
sociated with a higher probability of having a positive view of immigration.
Columns (3) to (5) present the results when Internet availability is instru-
mented as described in Equation 2.3. First, it should be noted the relatively
high values of the F-Statistics and the strong significance of the first stage,
whose coefficient has the expected positive sign. The IV coefficients are pos-
itive, and the introduction of personal and municipal controls does not alter
the result. In the most complete specification – i.e., when controlling for both
personal and local features as well as for year and province fixed effects –
the result is positive and significant; additionally, the IV coefficient is higher,
highlighting a downward bias of the OLS coefficient. In terms of magnitude,
31
the difference between OLS and IV coefficients is similar to that found in
studies that use similar identification strategies (Campante et al., 2018; Falck
et al., 2014; Gavazza et al., 2019). Table 2.A4 reproduces the full OLS and
IV specifications (i.e., those displayed in columns 2 and 5), also reporting
the effect on the dependent variable of the controls (municipal and personal
characteristics).
Another potentially interesting outcome variable to explore is the responses
to the question: “Do you think there are too many immigrants in the coun-
try?”. Here, too, the question was asked both before and after the arrival of
the Internet, and, thus, the same identification strategy can be applied. Table
2.10 reports the results (as before, the dependent variable is a dummy equal to
one if the respondent answered the question in the affirmative). Although not
as robust statistically, the results are qualitatively similar to those in Table 2.9,
indicating a negative impact of the Internet on the probability of considering
there to be too many immigrants in the country.
The results found so far point to a number of interesting patterns. Internet
penetration is associated with a better knowledge of immigration dynamics,
although this is limited to the national context; by contrast, if anything, a
negative relationship between broadband technology and awareness of immi-
gration dynamics at the local level is found. When analyzing feelings toward
immigration, I find that the Internet is responsible for a change for the better.
Indeed, the Internet increases the probability that respondents believe immi-
gration to be good for the country, while it decreases the share of respondents
claiming that there are too many immigrants in the country. In the follow-
ing subsections, I check the robustness of these last findings, and I explore
potential channels behind this main result.
2.5.4. Reduced form and robustness checks
Reduced form analysis. Table 2.11 presents the results of the reduced form.
Specifically, the first three columns display the results when the equation is
run for the post-Internet era, while columns (4) and (5) show the results for
the pre-Internet era. When the municipal share of landlines in 1996 is used
as explanatory variable, a positive and significant effect on attitudes toward
immigrants is still generated in the 2008-2012 period. While the coefficient
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values are smaller, they remain comparable to the OLS in Table 2.9. Reas-
suringly, no effect is found when the same equation is run in the 1995-1996
period: indeed, the coefficients in columns (4) and (5) are not significant, and
they are close to zero.
Additionally, Figure 2.11 reports the coefficients of the reduced form equa-
tion estimated separately for each year, including the complete set of controls.
As is evident, in the two years before the arrival of the Internet, the coeffi-
cients are close to zero and relatively similar to each other. By contrast, a
significant increase in the coefficients can be observed from 2008 onwards.
Together, Table 2.9 and Figure 2.11 assert that the instrument started to corre-
late with the dependent variables only during the years in which the Internet
was started to be developed. Put differently, these findings confirm the valid-
ity of the IV exclusion restriction.
Robustness Checks. Tables 2.12 to Table 2.16 provide robustness checks
on the results presented in Table 2.9. First, given the dichotomous nature of
the dependent variable, Table 2.12 presents the results using a Probit and an
IV Probit approach. As is evident, the coefficients are comparable in terms
of direction and level of significance. However, in my analysis, I prefer to
implement an OLS / IV approach because the results can be interpreted more
readily.
Furthermore, Table 2.13 shows the coefficients when the weights are not
used. Taking advantage of the local representativeness of the inquiry, I weight
the observation by the number of respondents for each municipality in each
year throughout the analysis. However, it is essential to check that the results
are not driven by the weights, as confirmed by Table 2.13. Similarly, Table
2.14 presents the results when using an alternative weight, namely the (log
of) population of the municipality. Indeed, when it comes to survey data,
weighting the population observations is helpful so as to increase the level of
national representativeness (Johnson, 2008). In this case too, the results are
confirmed.
The main explanatory variable gives rise to a potential concern since it
might suffer from a measurement error. In fact, the variable Internet Share
is calculated by dividing the number of broadband lines by the total popu-
lation of the municipality. A potential more accurate measure should take
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as a denominator the number of households. The housing censuses of 2001
and 2011 are partially helpful for addressing this issue since they provide this
information; the drawback to these sources is that the number of households
is only provided for these two years. Table 2.15 reports the results when the
Internet penetration is calculated by dividing the number of broadband lines
by the number of households in 2011. In the same line, in this analysis, the
instrument is calculated as the share of the number of telephone lines in 1996
over the total number of households in 2001. As is evident, results are almost
unchanged when this Internet measure is used, despite a clear reduction in
the magnitude of the coefficient. On the one hand, this approach has the ad-
vantage of providing a measure closer to the actual Internet penetration rate.
By contrast, it suffers from a measurement error linked with the fact that it
does not capture the change in the population. Given that the relevance of this
measurement error is unknown, throughout my analysis, I prefer to calculate
the Internet penetration rate by looking at the time-varying population.
Finally, another source of concern might be that my instrumented explana-
tory variable, Internet Share, is calculated at the municipal level, while the
dependent variable and the personal controls are at the individual level; this
mismatch may weaken my identification strategy. However, when collaps-
ing the analysis at the municipal level – i.e., using as a dependent variable the
share of individuals with a positive view over the total number of respondents
in the municipality, the results remain stable (Table 2.16).
2.5.5. Channels
This section explores potential mechanisms that might drive the results found
in Table 2.9. A large body of literature has studied the main channels via
which natives’ perceptions of immigrants are shaped. Overall, natives seem
to be concerned about immigration as they fear competition in the labor mar-
ket (Mayda, 2006) and reduced access to public goods (Facchini & Mayda,
2009). Cultural and ethnic differences in the immigrant population are an
additional source of worry (Dustmann & Preston, 2007). The CIS survey is
particularly suitable for studying the mechanisms that shape respondents’ at-
titudes, given that questions related to the above concerns are asked. These
three sources of worry – related to the labor market, public goods, and cul-
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tural distance – are likely to correlate with the general attitudes expressed and
studied up to this point.
This intuition is confirmed by Table 2.17. In this analysis, I regress the
probability of having a generally positive view of immigration over the prob-
ability that the respondent agrees with other (negative) feelings linked with
the fears mentioned above. Put it differently, I attribute to the dependent
variable a value equal to one if the respondent reports believing that immi-
gration is good for the country, while I use as main explicatory variables
different potential attitude-related mechanisms. Columns (1) to (5) show
the results. Specifically, columns (1) and (2) investigate job market com-
petition concerns, assigning a value equal to one if the respondent agrees,
respectively, with the statements: “Immigrants steal jobs from natives” and
“Immigrants force natives’ salaries down”; column (3) examines concerns
related to competition for public goods, by attributing a dummy equal to one
if the respondent believes that “immigrants should not obtain unemployment
subsidies”; finally, in columns (4) and (5), cultural distance is examined, by
determining whether the individual agrees, respectively, with the following
statements: “Immigrants should renounce their own culture” and “Immi-
grants should not be able to obtain Spanish nationality”. As is evident, all the
coefficients are negative and strongly significant, stressing a strong correla-
tion between a generally positive attitude toward immigrants and the negative
concerns mentioned above. The results do not change if all the dummies are
introduced simultaneously (column (6)).
To understand the Internet’s impact on these channels, I run the model
proposed in equation 2.2, using as dependent variables dummies equal to one
if the respondent agrees with the above-mentioned statements. Since these
questions were asked both before and after the arrival of the Internet, also in
this part if the analysis I can instrument internet availability by looking at the
presence of landlines in 1996, following equation 2.3. Tables 2.18 - 2.21 re-
port the results, following a similar structure to that employed in Table 2.9 –
i.e., reporting the OLS and the IV coefficients with year and province fixed ef-
fects, with and without controls, and controlling for the LandlinesShare1996
baseline.
When concerns related to competition in the labor market are analyzed,
the Internet reduces the percentage number of Spaniards believing that immi-
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grants steal jobs from natives and that their presence drives natives’ salaries
down (Tables 2.18 and 2.19 respectively). Moreover, the Internet plays a
role in relation to concerns about increased competition for public goods:
broadband technology generates a reduction in the probability of respondents
claiming that immigrants should not obtain unemployment subsidies, as re-
ported in Table 2.20. Finally, although the coefficients related to this chan-
nel are statistically weaker, the Internet alleviates natives’ fears attributable
to cultural distance: indeed, a decrease in the number of people claiming
that immigrants should renounce their own culture once they settle in Spain
as well as of those believing that immigrants should not be able to obtain
Spanish nationality is observable, as is evident from Tables 2.21 and 2.22,
respectively.
Taken together, these additional results are significant and consistent with
those presented in Tables 2.9 and 2.10, confirming that Internet availability is
responsible for an improvement in attitudes toward immigrants.
2.5.6. Heterogeneity analysis
Finally, it is interesting to determine whether the Internet may have a dif-
ferent impact on attitudes toward immigrants depending on the respondents’
characteristics. Specifically, an important element that is worth investigating
is the age of the interviewee. Indeed, anecdotal evidence suggests that Inter-
net usage is more frequent among the younger generations. In this regard, I
expect to find some heterogeneity in my results when comparing young vs.
old respondents.
Table 2.23 reports the most complete specification of Table 2.9 by age
quintile (i.e., instrumental variable approach with personal and municipal
controls). As expected, the magnitude and statistical significance of the coef-
ficients are, overall, higher for younger respondents. Indeed, the effect is par-
ticularly strong for individuals aged between 31-40 and 41-52, namely those
who are more likely to use the web for consuming information. By contrast,
the coefficient becomes non-significant for individuals over 53 years old and
nearly equal to 0 for even older respondents (over 66 years old).
36
2.6. Impact on Political Preferences
In this section, I evaluate the impact of the Internet on political outcomes. In-
deed, if voters consume online news according to their political preferences,
this should not alter support for the parties Campante et al. (2018). At the
same time, if the diffusion of the Internet affected voter opinions on politi-
cally relevant issues – as demonstrated in the previous section with attitudes
toward immigrants – this might also lead to a change in political behaviour.
To evaluate this issue empirically, I use a twofold approach. First, I con-
tinue to look at the responses from the CIS questionnaires. Second, I gener-
alize the results of the survey by looking at actual election results.
2.6.1. CIS survey
As mentioned, in the CIS questionnaires, including those conducted in the
pre-internet era, respondents were asked which party they voted for in the
last election. Thus, I am able to analyze: i) the relationship between voting
behavior and attitudes toward immigrants, and ii) whether the arrival of the
Internet has generated a change in voting behavior. I focus this analysis on
the Spanish right-wing conservative party, the Partido Popular (PP).
First, Table 2.24 produces evidence that the attitudes of PP voters toward
immigrants are different. Controlling for personal and municipal character-
istics, individuals who report having voted for this right-wing party are less
likely to say that immigration is good for the country (Column (1)). Similarly,
the other measures of attitude analyzed above strongly correlate with political
behavior. PP voters are more likely to be concerned about immigrants due to
fears concerning the job market and competition for public goods (Columns
(2) and (3), respectively). Furthermore, they are more likely to believe that
immigrants should not be allowed to obtain Spanish nationality (Column (4)).
Overall, these results are in line with those reported by Barone et al. (2016)
in the Italian context; however, my sample is more extensive and, arguably,
more representative.
So far I have established a relationship between conservative party vot-
ers and attitudes toward immigrants and a relationship between the Internet
and these attitudes. An additional question I seek to address is whether and
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how the Internet has impacted voting behavior. To do so, I implement an
identification strategy similar to the one employed so far – i.e., combining a
difference-in-differences with an instrumental variable approach.
Specifically, I run the instrumented version of Equation 2.2, where the de-
pendent variable is a dummy equal to one if the respondent reported having
voted for the PP in the last election (excluding those respondents who re-
ported not having turned out). Table 2.25 displays the results. Among the
individuals that took part in the CIS survey, the Internet seems to have a neg-
ative effect – which proves to be significant when the IV approach is used –
on the probability of voting for the PP.
This result is certainly interesting. However, questions about political iden-
tity obtained from surveys are often considered sensitive (this explains the
high rate of non-respondents to this question), and the related results should
be interpreted with caution. For this reason, it is worth widening the scope of
this research question by looking at actual election data.
2.6.2. Electoral data
To generalize the result found in Table 2.25, in this section, I make use of
the actual electoral data downloadable from the Spanish Interior minister. In
particular, I look at the electoral performance of Partido Popular (PP) in a
battery of elections before and after the arrival of the Internet: the congres-
sional elections in 1996 and 2000 (pre) and 2008 and 2011 (post).28
The main equation I estimate is the following:
PPVoteS harem,t = β1InternetS harem,t + β2Xm,t + τt + ψm + ϵm,t (2.4)
where the dependent variable is the share of votes – in municipality m in the
election year t – obtained by PP.
28Given the lack of precise data about Internet diffusion in 2004, I do not consider the
election round that took place in that year. An additional source of concern that led me
not to consider in my analysis the 2004 elections is the terrorist attack that took place
few days before the vote.
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As usual, Internet Share is measured as the ratio between the number of
broadband lines and the population living in a municipality and is equal to 0
in the pre-Internet period.
Since, of course, I cannot control for personal characteristics, in this part of
the analysis, the controls related to the municipalities of the voters, captured
by the vector X, are expanded. The time-variant local controls I use for this
part of the analysis are the (logarithm of the) population, the number of banks,
of commercial activities and cars present in the municipality. X also includes
some topographic features, such as the extension and altitude of the munic-
ipality. Additionally, I consider other relevant municipality characteristics
coming from the 2001 Census, like the share of people below 25, the share of
people aged 65 or above, the percentage of people with a higher level of ed-
ucation, the number of offices and cultural venues per capita and the average
number of child per family. Moreover, I also control for indexes present in the
Census, which capture the municipality’s development of tourism, economic
activities, education, and the third sector. All those relevant, time-invariant
demographic features are interacted with a year dummy variable to allow for
any effect to varying across election years. Last but not least, I control for
regional dummies29 interacted with election-year dummies, which allows me
to tackle any effect of unobservable regional factors over time.30 This allows
me to take into account the possibility of pre-existing or underlying trends
that could confound the causal interpretation of my estimated coefficients.
τt is a set of year fixed effects. In this part of the analysis, since I have no
problem with the representativeness of the municipalities, I can also introduce
the more stringent fixed effects at the municipality level (instead of at the
provincial level) – represented by ψm.
The introduction of municipalities fixed effects, with observation coming
before and after the introduction of the Internet technology, allows to over-
come estimation bias that comes from unobserved time-persistent factors. To
alleviate bias linked with unobservable time-varying factors that affect both
political outcomes and access to the Internet, broadband availability is instru-
29In Spain there are 17 Comunidad Autonomas or CC.AA. characterized by a very hetero-
geneous level of development.
30The same results hold if I introduce the interaction with the 50 Spanish provinces.
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mented in the following way:
InternetS harem,t = γ1(Landlines1996m∗PostInternet)+γ2Xm,t+αt+ζm+ηm,t
(2.5)
where, as usual, Landlines1996 is the time-invariant number of fixed tele-
phone lines (over the total population) present in municipal m in 1996. αt
and ζm are year and municipality fixed effects. As in the main analysis, the
underlying identification assumption is that whatever correlation existed be-
tween the number of landlines and relevant municipality characteristics, this
did not change at the time of introduction of the broadband technology.
Table 2.26 present the OLS and IV results. The table has the following
structure: column (1) shows the OLS results, column (2) moves to the IV
identification strategy, adding municipal controls and region (x year) fixed
effects in column (3). Finally, column (4) presents a falsification test: fol-
lowing Campante et al. (2018) and Falck et al. (2014), I run the same IV
regression of column (4) just for the pre-Internet elections (namely 1996 and
2000), assuming the Internet pattern in 2000 to be equal to the 2008 one.
In line with the results found in Table 2.25, Table 2.26 confirms that In-
ternet diffusion leads to a decrease in the vote share for the right-wing party
PP. Indeed, both the OLS and the IV coefficients (with and without controls)
are negative and strongly significant. In the most complete specification, the
Internet effect on voting behavior is quite relevant: given an average vote
share for PP in 1996 and 2000 of 39.5%, going from zero to full broadband
access would correspond to a decline in its political success of about 33 per-
centage points. Also in this case, a downward bias of the OLS coefficient is
observable, while the big reduction of the magnitude of coefficient between
Columns (2) and (3) suggests that the introduction of controls is very relevant.
It is important to highlight that the placebo test works well: the coefficient
in column (4) is insignificant and almost equal to zero. Results are confirmed
also if I run the equation having as a dependent variable the share of vote
calculated over the total number of eligible voters, as opposed to the number
of voters who actually turned out. This would address some estimation bias
due to a change in voting turnout, given that the literature has identified a
negative Internet effect on electoral participation.
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2.7. Conclusion
Since 2014, 1.8 million refugees have arrived in Europe, more than 1 million
in 2015 alone. This immigration crisis has been associated with far-reaching
changes in the political scenario in many countries of the European Union:
the surge in the number of immigrants has been matched by a dramatic fall
in the level of trust in European Institutions and a hike in voter support for
right-wing, populist parties (Barone et al., 2016; Dustmann et al., 2019; Halla
et al., 2017). The media, and especially the Internet, have played a role in
shaping these reactions: indeed, the last few years have been characterized by
a peak in the diffusion, primarily via social platforms, of fake news, which has
impacted political outcomes and people’s beliefs about immigration (Allcott
& Gentzkow, 2017; Pennycook & Rand, 2018).
This paper has examined the role played by the early Internet exposure
on political and migration-related outcomes. More specifically, the paper
focused its attention on those days when social media were less prevalent and
fake news were not an issue. Focusing on the Spanish context and exploiting
a unique and confidential database, I have explored whether access to the
Internet made citizens more conscious of the patterns of immigration and
whether, at the same time, it changed the way they perceive immigrants. The
results found were, in part, unexpected.
First, higher Internet exposure is associated with a better knowledge of im-
migration patterns at the national level. Citizens living in areas with higher
broadband Internet coverage were more likely to be aware of the actual share
of non-natives living in Spain and were less prone to overestimate this per-
centage. However, the opposite path is observed when it comes to the dynam-
ics of local immigration, as respondents in municipalities with higher Internet
penetration seem to have greater misperceptions of the non-natives living in
their community.
Second, despite the absence of any differences in the pre-Internet era, re-
spondents with greater Internet availability were more likely to hold a positive
view of the immigration phenomenon in the post-Internet period. This gen-
erally more positive attitude is more prevalent among younger generations.
Besides, it is further confirmed when different specific outcomes are investi-
gated, including the fear of competition in the job market, the redistribution
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of public goods, and ethnic diversities – the main factors influencing natives’
perceptions of immigrants.
These results are not without their consequences. Indeed, attitudes to im-
migration can be considered a significant driver of voting behavior, and this is
made evident in the second part of the paper. Here, I showed that respondents
that report casting their vote for the Partido Popular – Spain’s traditional
right-wing party – are characterized by different (i.e., worse) attitudes toward
immigrants, while the results of this conservative party have been worse since
the diffusion of the Internet.
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Estimated % immigrant Real % immigrant
Graphs by year
The graph presents the average estimated share of foreign born by CIS respondents. Red
columns display the real share of foreign-born in Spain by year.
45
Figure 2.6: Share of immigrants at the municipal level (2012)
Source: Padrón Continuo - Spanish Statistical Office (INE)















DK/NA Negative Neutral Positive
 
Source: CIS questionnaires. The graph shows the distribution of responses to the question:
“Overall, do you think that immigration is bad, good, or neither bad nor good for the coun-
try?”. Years 1995, 1996; 2008-2012
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Internet share Fitted values
The graph shows the correlation between the share of landlines in 1996 and share of broad-
band lines at municipal level (2008-2012). Source: “Anuario Economico de España - La
Caixa” (Economic Yearbook of Spain)
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Figure 2.9: Geographical distribution of landlines and broadband lines
(a) Landlines per 1,000 population (1996)
(b) Broadband lines per 1,000 population (2009)
Source:“Anuario Economico de España - La Caixa” (Economic Yearbook of Spain)
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Low Internet High Internet Low Internet High Internet
Pre internet period Post internet period
Graphs by internet_era
Source: CIS questionnaires. The graph shows the share of respondents agrees with the state-
ment: “Immigration is good for the country” (Blank and Don’t know answers excluded), by
Internet penetration and Internet period. “Pre-Internet period” refers to 1995-1996. “Post-
Internet period” refers to 2008-2012. “Low Internet” and “High Internet” refers to munici-
pality in which the (future) Internet penetration is respectively below and above the median.
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1995 1996 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Each point represents the estimated coefficient of the reduced form, with 95% c. i. shown.
Dependent Variable: Dummy equal to one if the respondent agrees with the statement: “Im-
migration is good for the country” (Blank and Don’t know answers excluded). Years 1995-
1996; 2008-2012. All regressions include year and province fixed effects and the baseline
share of landlines in 1996. Regressions are weighted for the number of respondents per
municipality-year. Explanatory Variable: share of landlines in 1996. Regressions included
(self-reported) personal controls and municipal controls. Robust standard errors clustered at
the municipal level in parentheses.
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Appendix B: List of Tables
Table 2.1: CIS Summary Statistics, by year
Year Observations Provinces Municipalities Average respondent
(per municip.)
1995 3,809 48 213 10.21
1996 2,374 44 161 10.59
2008 2,674 47 222 10.61
2009 2,733 45 275 10.86
2010 2,696 49 281 12.73
2011 2,748 50 273 16.04
2012 2,259 46 239 19.63
Table 2.2: Estimated share of migrants, by year
0% 1-5% 6-10% 11-15% 16-20% 21-25% 26-30% >30% N.A.
2008 1 207 449 197 385 111 217 419 688
0.04 7.74 16.79 7.37 14.40 4.15 8.12 15.67 25.73
2009 0 257 503 329 502 190 310 410 232
0.00 9.40 18.40 12.04 18.37 6.95 11.34 15.00 8.49
2010 2 236 468 357 473 202 282 454 222
0.07 8.75 17.36 13.24 17.54 7.49 10.46 16.84 8.23
2011 1 261 477 350 527 216 295 417 204
0.04 9.50 17.36 12.74 19.18 7.86 10.74 15.17 7.42
2012 0 167 343 236 361 131 210 338 473
0.00 7.39 15.18 10.45 15.98 5.80 9.30 14.96 20.94
Total 4 1128 2240 1469 2248 850 1314 2038 1819
0.03 8.60 17.09 11.21 17.15 6.48 10.02 15.55 13.87
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Table 2.3: Level of information and personal characteristics
Correct (national) Overest. (national) Correct (local) Overest. (local)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Gender and Age
Male 0.198∗∗∗ -0.404∗∗∗ 0.122∗∗∗ -0.283∗∗∗
(0.030) (0.024) (0.025) (0.023)
Age 0.000 -0.004∗∗∗ 0.001 -0.002∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Social class (“High” excluded)
Upper Middle 0.052 -0.171 0.272 -0.024
(0.283) (0.243) (0.266) (0.237)
Middle -0.199 0.053 0.216 0.135
(0.278) (0.238) (0.261) (0.232)
Lower Middle -0.219 0.145 0.213 0.240
(0.279) (0.238) (0.262) (0.233)
Working -0.459 0.437∗ 0.052 0.486∗∗
(0.286) (0.242) (0.266) (0.236)
Other/dk -0.462 0.167 0.319 0.178
(0.310) (0.257) (0.278) (0.249)
Economic Situation (“Very good” excluded)
Good 0.064 -0.118∗∗∗ 0.028 -0.106∗∗∗
(0.043) (0.035) (0.037) (0.035)
Average -0.021 0.069∗∗ -0.017 0.040
(0.043) (0.034) (0.036) (0.034)
Bad -0.118∗∗ 0.239∗∗∗ -0.098∗∗ 0.178∗∗∗
(0.050) (0.039) (0.041) (0.038)
Very bad -0.272∗∗∗ 0.463∗∗∗ -0.349∗∗∗ 0.463∗∗∗
(0.085) (0.064) (0.069) (0.060)
Other/dk 0.005 -0.028 -0.269 0.309∗∗
(0.186) (0.148) (0.166) (0.145)
N: 11291 11291 11573 11573
Standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels: ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Level of information and personal characteristics (Cont.)
Correct (national) Overest. (national) Correct (local) Overest. (local)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Political Ideology (“Center” excluded)
Left 0.011 -0.102∗∗∗ -0.045 -0.026
(0.044) (0.035) (0.038) (0.035)
Right -0.120∗ 0.125∗∗ -0.148∗∗∗ 0.108∗∗
(0.065) (0.050) (0.054) (0.049)
Other/dk -0.283∗∗∗ 0.295∗∗∗ -0.096∗∗∗ 0.300∗∗∗
(0.042) (0.032) (0.033) (0.030)
Education (“No education” excluded)
Primary 0.029 -0.024 -0.084 -0.063
(0.067) (0.051) (0.052) (0.049)
Secondary 0.213∗∗∗ -0.241∗∗∗ -0.028 -0.188∗∗∗
(0.074) (0.058) (0.059) (0.056)
Professional 0.096 -0.108∗ -0.009 -0.148∗∗∗
(0.074) (0.056) (0.057) (0.054)
University 0.224∗∗∗ -0.297∗∗∗ -0.039 -0.256∗∗∗
(0.079) (0.061) (0.063) (0.060)
Other/dk 0.400∗∗∗ -0.626∗∗∗ -0.057 -0.435∗∗∗
(0.074) (0.059) (0.061) (0.057)
Occupational Status (“Employed” excluded)
Retire -0.020 -0.005 -0.011 0.070∗∗
(0.037) (0.030) (0.031) (0.029)
Unemployed -0.161∗∗∗ 0.244∗∗∗ -0.117∗∗∗ 0.241∗∗∗
(0.042) (0.032) (0.034) (0.031)
Student 0.091 0.109∗ -0.045 0.123∗∗
(0.070) (0.058) (0.062) (0.058)
Other/dk -0.488∗ -0.012 -0.304 0.120
(0.280) (0.173) (0.198) (0.170)
N: 11291 11291 11573 11573
Standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels: ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table 2.4: Information on immigration – National dynamics
Correct estimation Overestimation
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Internet share 0.219*** 0.212*** -0.460*** -0.257**
(0.0811) (0.0743) (0.110) (0.113)
Municipal Controls: No Yes No Yes
Personal Controls: No Yes No Yes
N: 11141 11141 11163 11163
Adj. R2 0.008 0.023 0.030 0.099
Dependent Variables: Dummy equal to one if the respondent reports a cor-
rect estimated range of immigrants living in the country (column (1) and (2));
Dummy equal to one if the respondent reports an over-estimated range of im-
migrants (>15%) living in the country (column (3) and (4)). Real share of im-
migrants: between 12.8% (2012) 13.9% (2009). Years: 2008-2012. All regres-
sions include year and province fixed effects and are weighted for the number
of respondents per municipality-year. (Self-reported) Personal controls: gen-
der, age, squared-age, social class, occupational status, economic status, polit-
ical preferences, and education level. Municipal controls: population, surface
in Km2, population density, altitude, % immigrants over total population, % of
EU15 Immigrants, % of non-EU15 Immigrants and % of Sub-Saharan African
Immigrants over immigrants population. Standard errors clustered at the mu-
nicipal level in parentheses. Significance levels: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, ***
p < 0.01.
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Table 2.5: Information on immigration – National dynamics (Logit model)
Correct estimation Overestimation
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Internet share 2.084*** 1.939*** -2.004*** -1.232**
(0.773) (0.680) (0.482) (0.518)
Municipal Controls: No Yes No Yes
Personal Controls: No Yes No Yes
N: Observations: 11141 11141 11163 11163
Logit model. Dependent Variables: Dummy equal to one if the respondent
reports a correct estimated range of immigrants living in the country (column
(1) and (2)); Dummy equal to one if the respondent reports an over-estimated
range of immigrants (>15%) living in the country (column (3) and (4)). Real
share of immigrants: between 12.8% (2012) 13.9% (2009). Years: 2008-2012.
All regressions include year and province fixed effects and are weighted for the
number of respondents per municipality-year. (Self-reported) Personal controls:
gender, age, squared-age, social class, occupational status, economic status, po-
litical preferences, and education level. Municipal controls: population, surface
in Km2, population density, altitude, % immigrants over total population, % of
EU15 Immigrants, % of non-EU15 Immigrants and % of Sub-Saharan African
Immigrants over immigrants population. Standard errors clustered at the mu-
nicipal level in parentheses. Significance levels: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, ***
p < 0.01.
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Table 2.6: Information on immigration – Local dynamics
Correct estimation Overestimation
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Internet share -0.452** -0.479*** 0.123 0.082
(0.195) (0.148) (0.229) (0.150)
Municipal Controls: No Yes No Yes
Personal Controls: No Yes No Yes
N: 10803 10803 10803 10803
Adj. R2: 0.031 0.044 0.025 0.103
Dependent Variables: Dummy equal to one if the respondent reports a cor-
rect estimated range of immigrants living in the municipality (column (1)
and (2)); Dummy equal to one if the respondent reports an over-estimated
range of immigrants living in the municipality (column (3) and (4)). Years:
2008-2012. All regressions include year and province fixed effects and
are weighted for the number of respondents per municipality-year. (Self-
reported) Personal controls: gender, age, squared-age, social class, occu-
pational status, economic status, political preferences, and education level.
Municipal controls: population, surface in Km2, population density, al-
titude, % immigrants over total population, % of EU15 Immigrants, %
of non-EU15 Immigrants and % of Sub-Saharan African Immigrants over
immigrants population. Standard errors clustered at the municipal level in
parentheses. Significance levels: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table 2.7: Information on immigration – Local dynamics (Logit model)
Correct estimation Overestimation
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Internet share -2.458** -2.204** 0.521 0.260
(1.023) (0.893) (0.963) (0.721)
Municipal Controls: No Yes No Yes
Personal Controls: No Yes No Yes
N: 10803 10803 10803 10803
Logit model. Dependent Variables: Dummy equal to one if the respon-
dent reports a correct estimated range of immigrants living in the mu-
nicipality (column (1) and (2)); Dummy equal to one if the respondent
reports an over-estimated range of immigrants living in the municipality
(column (3) and (4)). Years: 2008-2012. All regressions include year and
province fixed effects and are weighted for the number of respondents
per municipality-year. (Self-reported) Personal controls: gender, age,
squared-age, social class, occupational status, economic status, political
preferences, and education level. Municipal controls: population, sur-
face in Km2, population density, altitude, % immigrants over total pop-
ulation, % of EU15 Immigrants, % of non-EU15 Immigrants and % of
Sub-Saharan African Immigrants over immigrants population. Standard
errors clustered at the municipal level in parenthesesSignificance levels:
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table 2.8: Summary statistics – Outcome variables
Obs. Mean St. Dev.
Information
Estimated immigrant share (national) 9711 0.221 0.149
Estimated immigrant share (local) 9972 0.199 0.173
Attitudes
Immigration is good for the country 17593 0.431 0.495
There are too many immigrants 17810 0.429 0.495
Immigrants:
Steal natives jobs 18163 0.621 0.485
Force natives’ salaries down 17922 0.733 0.443
Should not receive unemployment subsidy 18183 0.088 0.283
Should not be allowed to vote 17094 0.361 0.480
Should not be allowed to gain Spanish national-
ity
17137 0.183 0.386
Should renounce their culture 18549 0.112 0.316
Political views
Voted for PP in the last election 19293 0.147 0.354
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Table 2.9: Positive view (OLS and IV regressions)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Internet share 1.358∗∗∗ 0.834∗∗∗ 3.761∗∗∗ 3.038∗∗∗ 2.841∗∗
(0.190) (0.165) (0.760) (0.813) (1.136)
Model: OLS OLS IV IV IV
First Stage - - 0.177∗∗∗ 0.175∗∗∗ 0.168∗∗∗
F Test: - - 88.39 82.04 69.03
Mun. Controls: No Yes No No Yes
Pers. Controls: No Yes No Yes Yes
N: 17036 17036 17036 17036 17036
Dependent Variable: Dummy equal to one if the respondent agrees with the
statement: “Immigration is good for the country” (Blank and Don’t know an-
swers excluded). Years 1995, 1996; 2008-2012. All regressions include year and
province fixed effects and the baseline share of landlines in 1996. Regressions
are weighted for the number of respondents per municipality-year. Instrumen-
tal Variable: share of landlines in 1996 * Post Internet dummy. (Self-reported)
Personal controls: gender, age, squared-age, social class, occupational status,
economic status, political preferences, and education level. Municipal controls:
population, surface in Km2, population density, altitude, % immigrants over total
population, % of EU15 Immigrants, and % of Sub-Saharan African Immigrants
over immigrant population. Standard errors clustered at the municipal level in
parentheses. Significance levels: ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table 2.10: Too many (OLS and IV regressions)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Internet share -0.693∗∗∗ -0.223 -2.192∗∗ -1.191 -0.444
(0.219) (0.168) (0.983) (0.983) (1.279)
Model: OLS OLS IV IV IV
First Stage - - 0.177∗∗∗ 0.175∗∗∗ 0.168∗∗∗
F Test: - - 89.76 82.90 70.29
Mun. Controls: No Yes No No Yes
Pers. Controls: No Yes No Yes Yes
N: 17267 17267 17267 17267 17267
Dependent Variable: Dummy equal to one if the respondent agrees with the
statement: “There are too many immigrants in the country” (Blank and Don’t
know answers excluded). Years 1995, 1996; 2008-2012. All regressions in-
clude year and province fixed effects and the baseline share of landlines in 1996.
Regressions are weighted for the number of respondents per municipality-year.
Instrumental Variable: share of landlines in 1996 * Post Internet dummy. (Self-
reported) Personal controls: gender, age, squared-age, social class, occupational
status, economic status, political preferences, and education level. Municipal
controls: population, surface in km2, population density, altitude, % immigrants
over total population, % of EU15 Immigrants and % of Sub-Saharan African Im-
migrants over immigrant population. Standard errors clustered at the municipal
level in parentheses. Significance levels: ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table 2.11: Positive view (OLS regressions) – Reduced form
Post-Internet era Pre-Internet era
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Telephone 96 share 0.533∗∗∗ 0.362∗∗∗ 0.408∗∗∗ 0.047 -0.068
(0.075) (0.079) (0.105) (0.182) (0.211)
Mun. Controls: No No Yes No Yes
Pers. Controls: No Yes Yes No Yes
N: 17036 17036 17036 4691 4691
Dependent Variable: Dummy equal to one if the respondent agrees with the state-
ment: “Immigration is good for the country” (Blank and Don’t know answers ex-
cluded). Years 2008-2012 (Columns 1-3); 1995-1996 (Columns 4-5). All regres-
sions include year and province fixed effects and the baseline share of landlines in
1996. Regressions are weighted for the number of respondents per municipality-
year. Explanatory Variable: share of landlines in 1996. (Self-reported) Personal
controls: gender, age, squared-age, social class, occupational status, economic sta-
tus, political preferences, and education level. Municipal controls: population,
surface in Km2, population density, altitude, % immigrants over total population,
% of EU15 Immigrants, and % of Sub-Saharan African Immigrants over immi-
grant population. Standard errors clustered at the municipal level in parentheses.
Significance levels: ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table 2.12: Positive view (PROBIT and IVPROBIT)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Internet share 3.560∗∗∗ 2.376∗∗∗ 9.589∗∗∗ 8.350∗∗∗ 7.815∗∗
(0.504) (0.469) (1.873) (2.214) (3.058)
Model: OLS OLS IV IV IV
First Stage - - 0.142∗∗∗ 0.139∗∗∗ 0.0715∗∗∗
F Test: - - 34.52 32.10 27.57
Mun. Controls: No Yes No No Yes
Pers. Controls: No Yes No Yes Yes
N: 17036 17036 17036 17036 17036
Probit and IV Probit model. Dummy equal to one if the respondent agrees with
the statement: “Immigration is good for the country” (Blank and Don’t know an-
swers excluded). Years 2008-2012 (Columns 1-3); 1995-1996 (Columns 4-5).
All regressions include year and province fixed effects and the baseline share of
landlines in 1996. Regressions are weighted for the number of respondents per
municipality-year. Instrumental Variable: share of landlines in 1996 * Post Inter-
net dummy. (Self-reported) Personal controls: gender, age, squared-age, social
class, occupational status, economic status, political preferences, and education
level. Municipal controls: population, surface in Km2, population density, alti-
tude, % immigrants over total population, % of EU15 Immigrants, and % of Sub-
Saharan African Immigrants over immigrant population. Standard errors clustered
at the municipal level in parentheses. Significance levels: ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05,
∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table 2.13: Positive view (OLS and IV regressions) – Not weighted
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Internet share 0.825∗∗∗ 0.545∗∗∗ 3.743∗∗∗ 2.639∗∗∗ 2.871∗∗∗
(0.130) (0.117) (0.769) (0.736) (0.835)
Model: OLS OLS IV IV IV
First Stage - - 0.136∗∗∗ 0.128∗∗∗ 0.062∗∗∗
F Test: - - 26.86 23.82 18.73
Mun. Controls: No Yes No No Yes
Pers. Controls: No Yes No Yes Yes
N: 17036 17036 17036 17036 17036
Dependent Variable: Dummy equal to one if the respondent agrees with the
statement: “Immigration is good for the country” (Blank and Don’t know an-
swers excluded). Years 2008-2012 (Columns 1-3); 1995-1996 (Columns 4-5).
All regressions include year and province fixed effects and the baseline share of
landlines in 1996. Instrumental Variable: share of landlines in 1996 * Post Inter-
net dummy. (Self-reported) Personal controls: gender, age, squared-age, social
class, occupational status, economic status, political preferences, and education
level. Municipal controls: population, surface in Km2, population density, al-
titude, % immigrants over total population, % of EU15 Immigrants, and % of
Sub-Saharan African Immigrants over immigrant population. Standard errors
clustered at the municipal level in parentheses. Significance levels: ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗
p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table 2.14: Positive view (OLS and IV regressions) – Alternative weight
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Internet share 0.909∗∗∗ 0.588∗∗∗ 3.839∗∗∗ 2.775∗∗∗ 3.038∗∗∗
(0.137) (0.121) (0.732) (0.719) (0.809)
Model: OLS OLS IV IV IV
First Stage - - 0.142∗∗∗ 0.135∗∗∗ 0.0809∗∗
F Test: - - 33.62 29.79 24.81
Mun. Controls: No Yes No No Yes
Pers. Controls: No Yes No Yes Yes
N: 17036 17036 17036 17036 17036
Dependent Variable: Dummy equal to one if the respondent agrees with the
statement: “Immigration is good for the country” (Blank and Don’t know an-
swers excluded). Years 2008-2012 (Columns 1-3); 1995-1996 (Columns 4-5).
All regressions include year and province fixed effects and the baseline share of
landlines in 1996. Regressions are weighted for the (log of) population of the
municipality. Instrumental Variable: share of landlines in 1996 * Post Internet
dummy. (Self-reported) Personal controls: gender, age, squared-age, social class,
occupational status, economic status, political preferences, and education level.
Municipal controls: population, surface in Km2, population density, altitude, %
immigrants over total population, % of EU15 Immigrants, and % of Sub-Saharan
African Immigrants over immigrant population. Standard errors clustered at the
municipal level in parentheses. Significance levels: ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗
p < 0.01.
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Table 2.15: Positive view (OLS and IV regressions) – Alternative Internet
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Internet share 0.444∗∗∗ 0.305∗∗∗ 2.435∗∗∗ 2.059∗∗∗ 1.620∗∗∗
(Total hh) (0.0704) (0.0587) (0.461) (0.470) (0.371)
Model: OLS OLS IV IV IV
First stage - - 0.157∗∗∗ 0.154∗∗∗ 0.200∗∗∗
F Test: - - 30.76 28.59 42.00
Mun. Controls: No Yes No No Yes
Pers. Controls: No Yes No Yes Yes
N: 17036 17036 17036 17036 17036
Dependent Variable: Dummy equal to one if the respondent agrees with the state-
ment: “Immigration is good for the country” (Blank and Don’t know answers ex-
cluded). Years 1995, 1996; 2008-2012. All regressions include year and province
fixed effects and the baseline share of landlines in 1996. Regressions are weighted
for the number of respondents per municipality-year. Internet share is calculated
as the ratio between the number of broadband lines in the municipality over the
total households of municipality registered in 2011. Instrumental Variable: share
of landlines in 1996 (over the total households of municipality registered in 2001)
* Post Internet dummy. (Self-reported) Personal controls: gender, age, squared-
age, social class, occupational status, economic status, political preferences, and
education level. Municipal controls: population, surface in Km2, population den-
sity, altitude, % immigrants over total population, % of EU15 Immigrants, and %
of Sub-Saharan African Immigrants over immigrant population. Standard errors
clustered at the municipal level in parentheses. Significance levels: ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗
p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table 2.16: Positive view – Municipal level collapsed
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Internet share 0.637∗∗∗ 0.352∗∗∗ 3.608∗∗∗ 2.500∗ 2.995∗
(0.118) (0.114) (1.090) (1.351) (1.734)
Model: OLS OLS IV IV IV
First Stage - - 0.099∗∗∗ 0.066∗∗ 0.059∗
F Test: - - 12.25 6.357 4.771
Mun. Controls: No Yes No Yes Yes
Pers. Controls: No Yes No Yes Yes
N: 1540 1498 1540 1540 1498
Dependent Variable: Share of individuals (over the total number of respon-
dents in the municipality) that agrees with the statement: “Immigration is good
for the country” (Blank and Don’t know answers excluded). Years 1995, 1996;
2008-2012. All regressions include year and province fixed effects and the
baseline share of landlines in 1996. Regressions are weighted for the number
of respondents per municipality-year. Instrumental Variable: share of land-
lines in 1996 * Post Internet dummy. (Self-reported) Personal controls: (mu-
nicipal average of) gender, age, squared-age, social class, occupational status,
economic status, political preferences and education level. Municipal con-
trols: population, surface in km2, population density, altitude, % immigrants
over total population, % of EU15 Immigrants and % of Sub-Saharan African
Immigrants over immigrant population. Standard errors clustered at municipal
level in parentheses. Significance levels: ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table 2.17: Relationship between positive views and other migration concerns
Immigration is overall good for the country
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Steal jobs -0.355∗∗∗ -0.288∗∗∗
(0.014) (0.023)
Reduce salaries -0.177∗∗∗ -0.031
(0.019) (0.023)
Unempl. benefit -0.273∗∗∗ -0.107∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.013)
Deny culture -0.223∗∗∗ -0.104∗∗∗
(0.021) (0.031)
No nationality -0.302∗∗∗ -0.165∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.008)
Controls: Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N: 16238 16088 16266 16547 15336 13631
OLS regressions. Dependent Variable: Dummy equal to one if the respondent agrees
with the statement: “Immigration is good for the country” (Blank and Don’t know
answers excluded). Explanatory variables: Dummy equal to one if the respondent
agrees with the following statements: “Immigrants steal jobs from natives”; “Immi-
grants force natives’ salaries down”; “Immigrants should not obtain unemployment
subsidies”; “Immigrants should renounce their own culture”; “Immigrants should not
be able to obtain Spanish nationality”. Years 1995, 1996; 2008-2012. All regressions
include year and province fixed effects. (Self-reported) Personal controls: gender, age,
squared-age, social class, occupational status, economic status, political preferences,
and education level. Municipal controls: population, surface in km2, population den-
sity, altitude, % immigrants over total population, % of EU15 Immigrants and % of
Sub-Saharan African Immigrants over immigrant population. Standard errors clustered
at the municipal level in parentheses. Significance levels: ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗
p < 0.01.
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Table 2.18: Immigrants steal jobs from natives
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Internet share -0.896∗∗∗ -0.232 -3.124∗∗∗ -2.064∗∗∗ -1.479∗∗
(0.160) (0.150) (0.444) (0.474) (0.584)
Model: OLS OLS IV IV IV
F Test: - - 18.13 17.17 15.88
Mun. Controls: No Yes No No Yes
Pers. Controls: No Yes No Yes Yes
N: 17573 17573 17573 17573 17573
Dependent Variable: Dummy equal to one if the respondent agrees with the state-
ment: “Immigrants steal jobs from natives” (Blank and Don’t know answers ex-
cluded). Years 1995, 1996; 2008-2012. All regressions include year and province
fixed effects and the baseline share of landlines in 1996. Regressions are weighted
for the number of respondents per municipality-year. Instrumental Variable: share
of landlines in 1996 * Post Internet dummy. (Self-reported) Personal controls:
gender, age, squared-age, social class, occupational status, economic status, polit-
ical preferences, and education level. Municipal controls: population, surface in
km2, population density, altitude, % immigrants over total population, % of EU15
Immigrants and % of Sub-Saharan African Immigrants over immigrant popula-
tion. Standard errors clustered at the municipal level in parentheses. Significance
levels: ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table 2.19: Immigrants force natives’ salaries down
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Internet share -0.866∗∗∗ -0.438∗∗∗ -2.208∗∗∗ -1.476∗∗∗ -0.194
(0.121) (0.115) (0.376) (0.448) (0.659)
Model: OLS OLS IV IV IV
F Test: - - 18.55 17.58 13.37
Mun. Controls: No Yes No No Yes
Pers. Controls: No Yes No Yes Yes
N: 17348 17348 17348 17348 17348
Dependent Variable: Dummy equal to one if the respondent agrees with the state-
ment: “Immigrants force natives’ salaries down” (Blank and Don’t know answers
excluded). Years 1995, 1996; 2008-2012. All regressions include year and province
fixed effects and the baseline share of landlines in 1996. Regressions are weighted
for the number of respondents per municipality-year. Instrumental Variable: share
of landlines in 1996 * Post Internet dummy. (Self-reported) Personal controls: gen-
der, age, squared-age, social class, occupational status, economic status, political
preferences, and education level. Municipal controls: population, surface in km2,
population density, altitude, % immigrants over total population, % of EU15 Im-
migrants and % of Sub-Saharan African Immigrants over immigrant population.
Standard errors clustered at the municipal level in parentheses. Significance levels:
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table 2.20: Immigrants should not obtain unemployment subsidies
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Internet share -0.255∗∗∗ -0.139∗ -0.797∗∗ -0.656∗∗ -0.597∗
(0.084) (0.081) (0.317) (0.329) (0.360)
Model: OLS OLS IV IV IV
F Test: - - 18.34 17.41 14.51
Mun. Controls: No Yes No No Yes
Pers. Controls: No Yes No Yes Yes
N: 17598 17598 17598 17598 17598
Dependent Variable: Dummy equal to one if the respondent agrees with the
statement: “Immigrants should not obtain unemployment subsidies” (Blank
and Don’t know answers excluded). Years 1995, 1996; 2008-2012. All re-
gressions include year and province fixed effects and the baseline share of land-
lines in 1996. Regressions are weighted for the number of respondents per
municipality-year. Instrumental Variable: share of landlines in 1996 * Post
Internet dummy. (Self-reported) Personal controls: gender, age, squared-age,
social class, occupational status, economic status, political preferences, and ed-
ucation level. Municipal controls: population, surface in km2, population den-
sity, altitude, % immigrants over total population, % of EU15 Immigrants and
% of Sub-Saharan African Immigrants over immigrant population. Standard
errors clustered at the municipal level in parentheses. Significance levels: ∗
p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
70
Table 2.21: Immigrants should renounce their own culture
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Internet share -0.347∗∗∗ -0.187∗∗ -0.763∗∗∗ -0.542∗∗ -0.420
(0.080) (0.084) (0.252) (0.250) (0.369)
Model: OLS OLS IV IV IV
F Test: - - 18.01 17.15 15.68
Mun. Controls: No Yes No No Yes
Pers. Controls: No Yes No Yes Yes
N: 17946 17946 17946 17946 17946
Dependent Variable: Dummy equal to one if the respondent agrees with the state-
ment: “Immigrants should renounce their own culture” (Blank and Don’t know
answers excluded). Years 1995, 1996; 2008-2012. All regressions include year
and province fixed effects and the baseline share of landlines in 1996. Regressions
are weighted for the number of respondents per municipality-year. Instrumen-
tal Variable: share of landlines in 1996 * Post Internet dummy. (Self-reported)
Personal controls: gender, age, squared-age, social class, occupational status,
economic status, political preferences, and education level. Municipal controls:
population, surface in km2, population density, altitude, % immigrants over total
population, % of EU15 Immigrants and % of Sub-Saharan African Immigrants
over immigrant population. Standard errors clustered at the municipal level in
parentheses. Significance levels: ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table 2.22: Immigrants should not be able to obtain Spanish nationality
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Internet share -0.622∗∗∗ -0.362∗∗ -1.566∗∗∗ -1.190∗∗ -0.678
(0.147) (0.144) (0.527) (0.487) (0.676)
Model: OLS OLS IV IV IV
F Test: - - 18.33 17.29 15.65
Mun. Controls: No Yes No No Yes
Pers. Controls: No Yes No Yes Yes
N: 16555 16555 16555 16555 16555
Dependent Variable: Dummy equal to one if the respondent agrees with the state-
ment: “Immigrants should not be able to obtain Spanish nationality” (Blank and
Don’t know answers excluded). Years 1995, 1996; 2008-2012. All regressions in-
clude year and province fixed effects and the baseline share of landlines in 1996.
Regressions are weighted for the number of respondents per municipality-year.
Instrumental Variable: share of landlines in 1996 * Post Internet dummy. (Self-
reported) Personal controls: gender, age, squared-age, social class, occupational
status, economic status, political preferences, and education level. Municipal
controls: population, surface in km2, population density, altitude, % immigrants
over total population, % of EU15 Immigrants and % of Sub-Saharan African Im-
migrants over immigrant population. Standard errors clustered at the municipal
level in parentheses. Significance levels: ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table 2.23: Heterogeneity Analysis – By age
Age: 18-30 31-40 41-52 53-65 >66
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Internet share 3.588∗∗ 4.135∗∗∗ 4.739∗∗∗ 2.003 0.361
(1.563) (1.176) (1.361) (1.734) (1.481)
F Test: 15.93 12.99 14.96 16.38 15.47
Mun. Controls: Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Pers. Controls: Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N: 3706 3351 3566 3378 3035
IV Regressions. Dependent Variable: Dummy equal to one if the respon-
dent agrees with the statement: “Immigration is good for the country” (Blank
and Don’t know answers excluded). Years 1995, 1996; 2008-2012. All re-
gressions include year and province fixed effects and the baseline share of
landlines in 1996. Regressions are weighted for the number of respondents
per municipality-year. Instrumental Variable: share of landline in 1996 * Post
Internet dummy. (Self-reported) Personal controls: gender, age, squared-age,
social class, occupational status, economic status, political preferences and
education level. Municipal controls: population, surface in Km2, population
density, altitude, % immigrants over total population, % of EU15 Immigrants
and % of Sub-Saharan African Immigrants over immigrant population. Stan-
dard errors clustered at the municipal level in parentheses. Significance lev-
els: ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table 2.24: Factors accounting for the relationship between immigration and voting
for the right
Voting for PP
(1) (2) (3) (4)








Mun. Controls: Yes Yes Yes Yes
Pers. Controls: Yes Yes Yes Yes
N: 13835 14308 14298 13464
OLS Regressions. Dependent Variable: Dummy equal to one if the respondent re-
ports having voted for the PP in the last elections (Blank and Don’t know answers
excluded; respondents reporting not having voted in the last elections excluded).
Years 1995, 1996; 2008-2012. All regressions include year and province fixed ef-
fects and are weighted for the number of respondents per municipality-year. (Self-
reported) Personal controls: gender, age, squared-age, social class, occupational
status, economic status and education level. Municipal controls: population, sur-
face in Km2, population density, altitude, % immigrants over total population, %
of EU15 Immigrants and % of Sub-Saharan African Immigrants over immigrant
population. Standard errors clustered at the municipal level in parentheses. Sig-
nificance levels: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table 2.25: Internet impact on PP votes
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Internet share -0.079 -0.187 -0.871∗ -0.925∗ -1.645∗∗
(0.141) (0.140) (0.495) (0.524) (0.722)
Model: OLS OLS IV IV IV
F Test: 17.46 16.36 15.96
Mun. Controls: No Yes No No Yes
Pers. Controls: No Yes No Yes Yes
N: 15153 15153 15153 15153 15153
Dependent Variable: Dummy equal to one if the respondent reports hav-
ing voted for the PP in the last elections (Blank and Don’t know answers
excluded; respondents reporting not having voted in the last elections ex-
cluded). Years 1995, 1996; 2008-2012. All regressions include year and
province fixed effects and the baseline share of landlines in 1996. Regres-
sions are weighted for the number of respondents per municipality-year.
Instrumental Variable: share of landlines in 1996 * Post Internet dummy.
(Self-reported) Personal controls: gender, age, squared-age, social class, oc-
cupational status, economic status, and education level. Municipal controls:
population, surface in Km2, population density, altitude, % immigrants over
total population, % of EU15 Immigrants and % of Sub-Saharan African Im-
migrants over immigrant population. Standard errors clustered at the mu-
nicipal level in parentheses. Significance levels: ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗
p < 0.01.
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Table 2.26: Internet impact on PP votes (OLS and IV regression) – Electoral data
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Internet share -0.115∗∗∗ -0.972∗∗∗ -0.131∗∗
(0.014) (0.050) (0.055)
Internet Share Fake -0.040
(0.046)
Mean % PP vote 0.395
Model: OLS IV IV IV
First Stage: - 0.232∗∗∗ 0.187∗∗∗ -
F Test: - 32.09 21.13 -
Controls: No No Yes Yes
Observations: 12895 12895 12690 6282
Years: 1996, 2000, 2008 and 2011. All regressions include year and mu-
nicipality fixed effects. Instrumental Variable: number of landlines in
1996 * Post Internet dummy. Column (4) is a falsification test. time vari-
ant demographic controls: (Log) population, unemployment rate, cars,
banks and commercial activities per capita. Time invariant demographic
controls (from 2001 census, interacted with year dummies): extension
and altitude of the municipality, % people under 25, % people over 65, %
people with not-compulsory education, average number of children; of-
fices, and cultural venues per capita. Region fixed effects are interacted
with a year dummy in Columns 3, 4 and 5. Standard errors clustered
at the municipal level in parentheses. Significance levels: ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗
p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Appendix C: Additional Tables
Table 2.A1: Immigration in Spain – By country of origin
2017 2008 1998
Total Share Total Share Total Share
Total Foreign 4,572,807 5,268,762 637,085
EU (15) 861,852 0.188 1,090,122 0.207 277,844 0.436
UK 240,785 0.053 352,957 0.067 75,600 0.119
Bulgaria 127,669 0.028 153,973 0.029 1,453 0.002
Romania 687,733 0.150 731,806 0.139 2,258 0.004
Ukraine 103,072 0.023 79,096 0.015 462 0.001
Morocco 749,670 0.164 652,695 0.124 111,043 0.174
Argentina 70,221 0.015 147,382 0.028 19,315 0.030
Colombia 145,358 0.032 284,581 0.054 9,997 0.016
Ecuador 141,810 0.031 427,718 0.081 3,972 0.006
China 208,075 0.046 125,914 0.024 11,611 0.018
Source: Spanish Statistical Office (INE)
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Table 2.A2: Summary statistics – Respondents’ characteristics
Obs. Mean St. Dev.
Age 19293 47.22 17.972
Gender:
Female 19293 0.517 0.500
Male 19293 0.483 0.500
Social class:
High 19293 0.002 0.048
Upper Middle 19293 0.057 0.232
Middle 19293 0.531 0.499
Lower Middle 19293 0.248 0.432
Working 19293 0.136 0.343
Occupational Status:
Employed 19285 0.545 0.498
Retired 19285 0.231 0.422
Unemployed 19285 0.164 0.370
Student 19285 0.054 0.227
Political Ideology:
Center 19268 0.586 0.493
Left 19268 0.113 0.317
Right 19268 0.061 0.240
Economic Situation:
Very good 19293 0.131 0.338
Good 19293 0.261 0.439
Average 19293 0.388 0.487
Bad 19293 0.166 0.372
Very bad 19293 0.046 0.209
Education level:
No education 19293 0.107 0.309
Primary 19293 0.391 0.488
Secondary 19293 0.191 0.393
Professional 19293 0.135 0.341
University 19293 0.079 0.269
Residual category to sum 100%: “Don’t know / Refuse to answer”.
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Table 2.A3: Summary statistics – Municipalities’ characteristics
Obs. Mean St. Dev.
Broadband Lines 19293 62423.350 173511.801
Fixed-phone Lines 19293 182823.227 402981.193
Population 19293 399860.549 829186.532
Area (km2) 19293 209.772 280.838
Altitude 19019 301.591 298.430
Population density 19293 2596.574 3993.772
Real share of immigrant pop. (local) 19155 0.081 0.084
EU Share of immigrants (%)1 19057 0.377 0.194
Non EU Share of immigrants (%) 1 13110 0.034 0.030
Sub-Saharan Share of immigrants (%)1 13110 0.040 0.043
1 Over the immigrant population;
Table 2.A4: Positive view (OLS and IV regressions) – Extended Table
(1) (2)

























Municipal and Personal Controls: Yes Yes
Observations: 17036 17036
Dependent Variable: Dummy equal to one if the respondent agrees with
the statement: “Immigration is good for the country” (Blank and Don’t
know answers excluded). Years 1995, 1996; 2008-2012. All regres-
sions include year and province fixed effects and the baseline share of
landlines in 1996. Regressions are weighted for the number of respon-
dents per municipality-year. Instrumental Variable: share of landlines
in 1996 * Post Internet dummy. Standard errors clustered at the munic-
ipal level in parentheses. Significance levels: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05,
*** p < 0.01.
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Positive view (OLS and IV regressions) – Extended Table (Cont.)
(1) (2)
Internet share 0.834*** 2.841**
(0.165) (1.136)
Share of immigrants (local) 0.159 0.022
(0.127) (0.141)
EU Share of immigrants (local) 0.082* 0.119**
(0.042) (0.054)






Age squared -0.000*** -0.000***
(0.000) (0.000)
Social class (High excluded):












Municipal and Personal Controls: Yes Yes
Observations: 17036 17036
Dependent Variable: Dummy equal to one if the respondent agrees with the state-
ment: “Immigration is good for the country” (Blank and Don’t know answers ex-
cluded). Years 1995, 1996; 2008-2012. All regressions include year and province
fixed effects and the baseline share of landlines in 1996. Regressions are weighted
for the number of respondents per municipality-year. Instrumental Variable: share
of landlines in 1996 * Post Internet dummy. Standard errors clustered at the mu-
nicipal level in parentheses. Significance levels: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, ***
p < 0.01.
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Positive view (OLS and IV regressions) – Extended Table (Cont.)
(1) (2)
Internet share 0.834*** 2.841**
(0.165) (1.136)


















Municipal and Personal Controls: Yes Yes
Observations: 17036 17036
Dependent Variable: Dummy equal to one if the respondent agrees with the state-
ment: “Immigration is good for the country” (Blank and Don’t know answers ex-
cluded). Years 1995, 1996; 2008-2012. All regressions include year and province
fixed effects and the baseline share of landlines in 1996. Regressions are weighted
for the number of respondents per municipality-year. Instrumental Variable: share
of landlines in 1996 * Post Internet dummy. Standard errors clustered at the mu-
nicipal level in parentheses. Significance levels: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, ***
p < 0.01.
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Positive view (OLS and IV regressions) – Extended Table (Cont.)
(1) (2)
Internet share 0.834*** 2.841**
(0.165) (1.136)
























Municipal and Personal Controls: Yes Yes
Observations: 17036 17036
Dependent Variable: Dummy equal to one if the respondent agrees with the state-
ment: “Immigration is good for the country” (Blank and Don’t know answers ex-
cluded). Years 1995, 1996; 2008-2012. All regressions include year and province
fixed effects and the baseline share of landlines in 1996. Regressions are weighted
for the number of respondents per municipality-year. Instrumental Variable: share of
landlines in 1996 * Post Internet dummy. Standard errors clustered at the municipal
level in parentheses. Significance levels: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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3. DO FAR-RIGHT MAYORS INCREASE THE
PROBABILITY OF HATE CRIMES? EVIDENCE FROM
ITALY
3.1. Introduction
Extreme right parties have seen their support soar in all western countries.
This poses an existential threat to democratic systems, civil liberties, and con-
stitutional checks and balances (Guriev & Papaioannou, 2021). The growth
in support for the radical right has often been matched with an increase in the
episodes of discrimination and violence against minorities.31 However, there
is no empirical research that establishes a causal relationship between the
election of extreme right politicians and hate crimes. In this paper, I aim to
address this significant gap in the literature by shedding light on the follow-
ing question: does the appointment of far-right mayors affect the probability
of hate crimes against immigrants?
To answer this question, I focus on local Italian politicians. Italy is a partic-
ularly interesting context for conducting a study of this nature for several rea-
sons. The country has experienced a notable increase in support for far-right
parties, especially following the 2015 refugee crisis that affected the country
to a great extent. In the 2019 European elections, the two most important
far-right political forces, Lega (“League”) and Fratelli d’Italia (“Brothers of
Italy”) jointly received more than 40% of the vote share after a campaign that
focused almost exclusively on the immigration topic and used strong anti-
immigrant rhetoric.
This support is not limited to the national level but has also emerged at
the local level, especially in northern areas where the League has a long-
established presence. Local politicians belonging to these parties often use
tough language against immigrants and have introduced highly discrimina-
tory municipal regulations. Moreover, Italy suffers from a discrepancy be-
tween central and local governments when it comes to implementing policies
31See, for instance, the article by Annalisa Camilli “C’è un aumento degli attacchi razzisti
in Italia?” on the Italian magazine Internazionale (February 2019).
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aimed at preventing the spread of hate crimes.32 This attrition makes the
potential effect of mayors on hate crimes even more notable.
Focusing on local elections also allows me to use a methodological ap-
proach that provides to my estimates solid causal evidence. In fact, the high
number of municipalities (and, therefore, of local elections) in Italy is ide-
ally suited for using a Regression Discontinuity (RD) approach (Imbens &
Lemieux, 2008; Lee, 2008). Thus, to assess the effect of the victory of far-
right mayors on the likelihood that hate crimes occur, I construct a dataset
of local elections from 2008 to 2018. I then compare the probability of hate
crimes in municipalities in which far-right candidates won or lost with a tiny
margin of votes.
In general, data on hate crimes are in short supply (OSCE, 2014). In this
paper, I use an original dataset that I constructed starting from the episodes
reported by Lunaria, a Non-Governmental Organization that has recorded
episodes of hate crimes against immigrants since 2007. This unique dataset
contains detailed information, including the precise date and location of the
crimes and a short description of each episode. The detailed data level allows
me to categorize the crimes by type of act and offender, thereby making it
possible to perform various analyses and test the potential mechanisms un-
derlying the results. Lunaria compiles these data on hate crimes primarily
from national and local newspapers; additionally, some cases are reported
directly to Lunaria by victims, witnesses, and other NGOs.
The results show that in municipalities led by far-right mayors, the like-
lihood of hate crimes is significantly higher. The effect of far-right mayors
is sizeable; using an RD with optimal bandwidths (Calonico et al., 2014), I
estimate that the probability that a hate crime occurs in municipalities led by
far-right mayors is about five percentage points higher on an annual basis.
However, this value likely represents a lower bound effect. Indeed, Bracco
et al. (2018) show that League mayors reduce the presence of migrants (and,
thus, the number of potential victims) in municipalities.
32“A difficult situation in the sense of protecting the rights of minorities has developed in
Italy. If, at the national level, the law protects their rights, at the regional level, these
rights are at the local authorities’ discretion. [...] This situation has led to various prob-
lems among Muslims, as the Italian authorities (both local and regional) associate Mus-
lim communities with terrorism and radicalism.” (OSCE, 2016).
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The effect of the far-right mayors is particularly strong in the first half of
the five-year political term. Simultaneously, I find no impact on the lagged
hate crimes – i.e., those that occurred in the year(s) before the election. This
result rules out the possibility of selection in municipalities and confirms that
what I capture is the effect of the far-right mayors. Besides, I demonstrate
that the results persist even when focusing on the most severe hate crimes,
including those that involve physical violence against immigrants. In terms
of mechanisms, I examine two elements that the recent literature has shown
to affect hate crimes: the change in social norms and the role of the Internet.
The first channel that I explore is the “erosion of social norms”. Focusing
on Donald Trump’s case, Bursztyn et al. (2020) have recently demonstrated
that the unexpected election of a politician can make citizens feel entitled to
behave in a way that was previously considered unacceptable. I prove the
relevance of this mechanism in my context in two ways. First, I focus on
the municipalities that elected an extreme right mayor for the first time only
recently – i.e., those that are not familiar with the far-right. Comparing these
municipalities with those with long-established extreme right tendencies, I
find the effect on hate crimes driven by the former. Second, I investigate
whether the election of a far-right mayor generates behavioral changes in the
surrounding communities. To do so, I focus on Italy’s 611 Labor Market
Areas (LMAs), small and homogeneous territorial units. Using a staggered
difference-in-differences approach, I provide evidence of spillover effects; in-
deed, after the appointment of the first far-right mayor in an LMA, an increase
in hate crimes is also recorded in the adjacent municipalities. This result is
corroborated by an event study that excludes pre-trends in these areas.
The second channel I analyze is the role played by the Internet. The recent
literature provides evidence that the Internet and social media are responsible
for an increase in hate crimes (Müller & Schwarz, 2018, 2020; Petrova et al.,
2020). In line with these findings, I prove the effect of far-right mayors on
hate crimes to be concentrated in locations with greater Internet availability.
This result is stable both when I use real Internet data and when I implement
an instrumental variable approach to mitigate the endogeneity related to In-
ternet demand (Campante et al., 2018). One factor that might explain the
effect of the Internet on hate crimes is that the possibility of connecting to
the Internet reduces the cost of coordination between potential perpetrators
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(Petrova et al., 2020). To test whether this is the case in my context, I fo-
cus on episodes in which offenders act in groups. Similar to what found by
Müller and Schwarz (2020) in the US, my results do not fully support this
coordination mechanism.
The fact that the hate crimes episodes recorded by Lunaria come from
newspapers or are reported by citizens and NGOs gives rise to potential con-
cerns. Although Lunaria reports that the veracity of each episode is verified
with multiple sources, the results could be biased if the media or individuals
are more vigilant and more likely to report episodes of hate crimes as a re-
sult of the election of a far-right mayor. To mitigate this potential concern, I
perform several robustness tests.
First, I focus on crimes involving physical violence and damages to immi-
grants’ properties. Using the same RD approach, I demonstrate that far-right
mayors’ effect persists when these specific episodes are investigated. This
analysis proves that the appointment of far-right mayors also affects the most
severe hate crimes. Simultaneously, in line with Daniele and Dipoppa (2017),
this exercise provides a robustness check. Indeed, given their salient nature,
physical assaults and damages are extremely likely to be reported in the me-
dia and, consequently, to be included in Lunaria’s dataset, regardless of the
mayor’s political ideology. Besides, focusing on violent crimes addresses
the potential concern related to the definition of “hate crimes” since these
episodes are less open to interpretation.
Second, to mitigate the concern of bias in reporting, I exploit the fact that
Lunaria provides the source of each crime present in the dataset. I first show
that the distribution of hate crime sources is similar when comparing munic-
ipalities led by far-right mayors and those not. This exercise provides initial
evidence that there is no bias in reporting depending on the mayors’ polit-
ical affiliation. Additionally, I demonstrate that the effect of far-right may-
ors persists when I exclude episodes directly communicated by citizens and
NGOs to Lunaria – i.e., the sources that are more likely to report hate crimes
following the election of a far-right mayor. Lastly, to address the potential
problem of bias in media, I consider different subsamples of news sources,
focusing on those characterized by a lower possibility of distortion related
to the far-right mayors’ appointment. I first look just at cases reported by
printed newspapers; I then focus on episodes present in newspapers dealing
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with national stories; I also go further, excluding the hate crimes reported by
the most important left-wing newspapers. Whatever the subsample of news
sources considered, the effect of far-right mayors remains.
The paper contributes to several strands of literature. First, it relates to
recent work on political support for populism and the extreme right and the
consequences of these parties reaching power (Guriev & Papaioannou, 2021).
A growing number of papers analyze how the presence of non-natives might
affect the political dynamics, at both the national (Barone et al., 2016; Dust-
mann et al., 2019; Halla et al., 2017) and the local level (Harmon, 2018; Otto
& Steinhardt, 2014). Overall, these studies found a positive association be-
tween the presence of immigrants and the political success of the far-right
parties, although there is no shortage of in which the opposite relationship
has been identified (Gamalerio et al., 2020b; Steinmayr, 2020; Vertier &
Viskanic, 2019). However, little is known about how the electoral success
of anti-immigrant parties influences the behavior of citizens and their rela-
tionship with foreigners. I contribute to this literature by examining how
victories of radical parties impact an outcome related to migration, namely
hate crimes.
To the best of my knowledge, my paper is the first providing causal ev-
idence that the election of far-right politicians generates an increase in hate
crimes. In a related work, Bracco et al. (2018) show that the presence of a
Lega mayor led to a reduction in the presence of immigrants in a municipal-
ity. Indeed, my paper proposes a possible explanation for this result, namely
an increase in hate crimes in the municipality. Another work similar to mine
is by Bove et al. (2019) who shows, in the same Italian context, that immi-
gration leads local governments to allocate more public resources to local
police.
This paper also relates to recent works on the determinants of hate crimes.
One of the first contributions is by Glaeser (2005), who presents a theoret-
ical model on the circumstances that incentivize politicians to supply hate-
creating stories. Recent contributions provide empirical evidence on the po-
tential causes of hate crimes against minorities. The determinants of hate
crimes investigated so far are the unemployment rate (Falk et al., 2011), ex-
posure to religious minorities (Colussi et al., 2021), terrorist attacks (Hanes
& Machin, 2014; Ivandic et al., 2019), and large inflows of refugees and asy-
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lum seekers (Dinas et al., 2019; Sola, 2018). All these factors are found to be
responsible for an increase in the episodes of hate crime. I contribute to this
literature by investigating the role of politicians and, in particular, of mayors.
Additionally, I support this literature by providing a new and detailed dataset
of hate crimes, an issue that suffers from a general and severe problem of lack
of data.
My results are especially related to a recent work by Müller and Schwarz
(2020), who demonstrate how Trump’s tweets about Islam-related topics pre-
dict an increase in hate crimes over the following days. My study differs
from and complements Müller and Schwarz (2020) in several aspects. First,
it generalizes the result by examining the appointment of far-right politicians
instead of their online behavior. Additionally, it extends and strengthens the
result by looking at numerous extreme politicians and using an RD approach
to produce solid causal evidence. Lastly, my analysis differs in that it ana-
lyzes the role played by local politicians, who can be highly influential for
the community’s behavior, especially in a context characterized by the pres-
ence of many small municipalities such as Italy.
My paper also has strong parallels with that of Bursztyn et al. (2020), who
focus on Donald Trump’s victory in the 2016 US Presidential Elections to
show how unexpected electoral outcomes can quickly erode social norms and
increase individuals’ willingness to express xenophobic views publicly. My
paper confirms the relevance of this mechanism by means of many elections
and actual electoral data instead of online experiments. Additionally, it goes
further by showing that the erosion of social norms is not limited to areas
where extreme politicians are appointed but also affects the surrounding lo-
calities.
Lastly, this work also relates to the literature that explores the impact of the
Internet on social and political outcomes. Zhuravskaya et al. (2020) provide
an excellent literature review relating to this topic. More specifically, recent
literature has shown that the Internet and social media are responsible for an
increase in hate crimes (Chan et al., 2016; Müller & Schwarz, 2018, 2020;
Petrova et al., 2020). For instance, Müller and Schwarz (2018) investigates
the role of Facebook in the propagation of hate crimes in Germany. I con-
firm the relevance of this mechanism by showing that the results are more
pronounced in municipalities with greater Internet availability.
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The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 3.2 describes the Italian
political context, with a focus on the extreme right parties considered in the
analysis; Section 3.3 illustrates in details the dataset of the hate crimes con-
structed by Lunaria; Section 3.4 presents the empirical analysis, reports the
main results, and provides several robustness checks; Section 3.5 discusses
the relationship between political mandates and hate crimes; Section 3.6 pro-
poses the potential mechanisms underlying the results; and, finally, Section
3.7 concludes.
3.2. Political background and data
Italy has over 8,000 municipalities, which represent the lowest level of gov-
ernment. Municipal governments play an essential role in the Italian insti-
tutional framework. They manage key public services such as local police,
traffic enforcement, nursery schools, public housing, local roads, garbage col-
lection, and public transport. Indeed, voters care deeply about their perfor-
mance, as proven by very high voter turnout (for instance, the average turnout
in the 2018 municipal elections was 71%).
The mayor (Sindaco) is head of an executive board and exercises execu-
tive power; by contrast, the municipal council represents the municipality’s
legislative body. Since 1993, Italian mayors have been directly elected by
voters. Large municipalities (i.e., those with more than 15,000 inhabitants,
which represent 9% of the municipalities) use a dual ballot system and allow
a candidate to be supported by different parties; by contrast, municipalities
below the threshold use a plurality system where just one party or civic list
is associated with each candidate. The party (or coalition) of the winning
candidate receives 66.66% of the municipal council seats (60% in munici-
palities above the 15,000-inhabitant threshold). Once elected, the mayor’s
electoral mandate lasts five years, and there is a two-mandate limit. The tim-
ing of electoral cycles varies such that each year a large but different subset
of municipalities has elections that typically occur in spring.
One of the main actors in the current Italian political context is Lega.
Founded in 1991 under the name Lega Nord (“Northern League”), the party’s
ideology used to combine political and fiscal federalism with the defense of
northern Italian traditions. The party’s ultimate goal was the secession of
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Padania, an alternative name for the Po Valley, a plain in Northern Italy, from
the rest of the country. From 1994 onwards, Lega Nord took part in several
coalition governments at the national level, allied with center-right parties,
and obtained a vote share of approximately 8-10%. After Matteo Salvini was
elected as Federal Secretary in 2013, the party abandoned its distinctly “pro-
north” focus, as was evident from the party’s rebranding as Lega, dropping
the word “Nord,” and turned its political attention toward national issues.
After the appointment of Salvini as secretary, the theme of immigration has
undoubtedly become much more salient in the party’s manifesto. However,
from the outset, the League members have always stood out for their strong
anti-immigrant rhetoric. Like other extreme right-wing parties, its political
consensus has increased recently, and in 2019 it obtained 34% of the vote
share in the European elections. By its very nature, the party lends itself well
to success at the local level, especially in northern regions, for which it has
historically claimed to fight.
Lega is by far the most popular extreme right-wing party in Italy. There are,
however, in the country other parties characterized by a similar political ide-
ology. Relevant examples include Fratelli d’Italia (“Brothers of Italy”), in-
spired by the nostalgic post-fascist Italian Social Movement, La Destra (“The
Right”), and the more combative CasaPound and Fiamma Tricolore (“Tri-
color Flame”). Unlike Lega, their political success is especially widespread
in central (particularly in Lazio) and southern Italy. As proof of this, a mem-
ber of Fratelli d’Italia became president of a region (Abruzzo) for the first
time in February 2019, with 48.0% of the vote share.
All these parties share a clear anti-immigration stance, which is evident
for both national and local representatives. For instance, in Bologna, the
Lega leader in the regional council has decorated his garden with a family of
ceramic pigs (instead of the usual gnomes), claiming that they were “to keep
the Muslims away.”33 Following an arson attack on a car, the Lega mayor of
Gallarate (VA), convinced that the perpetrator was Tunisian, wrote a Face-
book post in which he called for the man to be “kicked back to his home
country.” In fact, the Tunisian was the owner of the car, which had been set
33As reported on the Repubblica website on April 26, 2013 in the local section of Bologna
(https://bologna.repubblica.it).
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on fire by an Italian man with a mental disorder.34 The mayor of Domodos-
sola (VB), supported by Lega and Fratelli d’Italia, asked that Italian children
be separated from migrants during the administration of vaccines to avoid the
risk of infection.35
To assess whether a far-right mayor impacts the likelihood of hate crimes
occurring, I compile the results of municipal elections during the 2008-2018
period from the Italian Minister of the Interior. For each local election, data
are available on each candidate’s vote share, the parties/lists supporting each
one, and the date of the ballot. Additionally, I obtain personal information on
the mayors, including gender, age, and education level. Given their status as
“special regions,” which implies that the municipal council has different pow-
ers, the dataset does not include elections in Sicily, Sardinia, Valle d’Aosta,
Friuli-Venezia Giulia or Trentino-Alto Adige/Südtirol.
I focus on political mandates (five years) in which a candidate supported
by a far-right party – in most cases Lega and the others mentioned above
(See Table 3.A1 in the Appendix for the complete list) – run for election.
This result in 2,563 municipality-mandate observations, from 1,852 differ-
ent municipalities. Table 3.1 provides descriptive statistics of the far-right
candidates’ performances.
Among all local elections during the 2008-2018 period, a candidate be-
longing to, or supported by, a far-right party has run in approximately 16%
of cases and became mayor in 4.1%. In the elections included in the analysis
(namely those in which a candidate supported by the extreme right actually
run), a far-right mayor is appointed in 26% of cases. The average margin
of victory is -20%, where a positive value indicates that the far-right candi-
date won the election. Although most municipalities in which a candidate
supported by the extreme right ran for election are located in the north of
the country (mainly due to the effect of Lega), there are also examples of
municipalities located in central and southern regions, particularly Tuscany,
Lazio, and Campania. The geographical distribution of municipalities with a
far-right candidate and mayor is shown in Figure 3.1.
34As reported on the Corriere website on August 19, 2018 in the local section of Milan
(https://milano.corriere.it/notizie/cronaca).
35As reported on the La Stampa website on June 28, 2018 in the local section of Verbano-
Cusio-Ossola (https://www.lastampa.it/verbano-cusio-ossola/).
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Table 3.2 highlights the differences between municipalities with and with-
out an extreme right-wing candidate. As illustrated, cities with a far-right
candidate are usually more populous, have a higher-performing economy
since they are more prosperous and productive, and are characterized by a
higher presence of immigrants; by contrast, they are not significantly dif-
ferent when considering the level of education. Finally, municipalities with
far-right candidates have a lower number of pensioners and students. These
characteristics (rich, productive cities with a significant foreign population)
are typical of northern Italy’s municipalities, where Lega is highly likely to
have an electoral presence.
3.3. Hate crimes
3.3.1. Definition and legislative context
A hate crime (also known as a bias crime) is a prejudice-motivated crime that
occurs when a perpetrator targets a victim because of their membership of a
specific social group or race. As a general rule, hate crimes result from high
levels of xenophobia, the activity of radical organizations, and the ineffective-
ness of state law enforcement functions. Phenomena such as terrorist attacks,
the 2015 refugee crisis, and the residual effects of the economic and finan-
cial crisis have been mentioned as root causes of hatred in European countries
(EMORE, 2018). The literature has identified that hate crimes are responsible
for high social and economic costs, thereby discouraging long-term integra-
tion and acting as a barrier to population movement (Manning & Roy, 2007;
Shields & Price, 2002). Additionally, they produce severe impacts on victims
(Nielsen, 2002).
A comparative analysis of hate crime is always a difficult task, given that
the criteria for identifying and classifying such crimes vary among countries.
However, there is evidence that this severe phenomenon is becoming increas-
ingly widespread. In Sweden, xenophobic hate crimes grew by 17%, and
Islamophobic crimes doubled between 2011 and 2015. During the same pe-
riod, right-wing extremist violence rose by over a third in Germany. Despite
the seriousness of the matter, there is a general lack of data relating to the
problem. With a few exceptions, official statistics are not kept or classified
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in several European countries, including Greece, the Netherlands, Hungary,
Austria, and Ireland (FRA, 2018)36.
The main legislative instrument of the Italian legal system for the repres-
sion of hate crimes is Law 205/1993 (also known as Legge Mancino). This
law, introduced in 1993, criminalizes acts of violence and incitement to vi-
olence, discrimination on racial, ethnic, national, or religious grounds, and
the promotion of ideas based on racial superiority or ethnic or racist hatred.
However, Italy is still among the countries that do not record official statistics
on hate crime systematically.37
3.3.2. Lunaria database
The primary source of hate crimes in my paper is Lunaria. Since 2007, this
non-profit association has been building a database, “Cronache Di Ordinario
Razzismo,” which reports episodes of hate crimes against immigrants in Ital-
ian municipalities (see: http://www.cronachediordinariorazzismo.org).38 Al-
though this source is not institutional, it is acknowledged as Italy’s most com-
prehensive and reliable source. This is borne out by the fact that many Euro-
pean and international agencies, including the Organization for Security and
Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and the European Union Agency for Funda-
mental Rights (FRA), have used this dataset to write reports on the topic.
The database is constructed primarily by compiling information on hate
crimes reported by local and national newspapers, both paper and online ver-
36EU Agency for Fundamental Rights.
37Two bodies deal with hate crimes linked to the Italian Ministry of the Interior: the National
Office for Racial Discrimination (UNAR) and the Observatory for Security Against Dis-
criminatory Acts (OSCAD). However, these agencies “provide valuable support to peo-
ple who are victims of discriminatory crimes”. Putting it differently, people who are
victims of hate crimes might, voluntarily, contact these organizations and ask for help.
Besides not being public at any level, these data would not solve the potential problems
of reporting bias. A further activity of UNAR and OSCAD is “maintains relations with
associations and institutions, public and private, that deal with the fight against discrim-
ination”. Among these associations, as explicitly reported on their website, the most
important is Lunaria.
38It is critical to stress that this source reports episodes of hate crimes where the victims
belong to ethnic minorities; this implies that attacks on other minorities (e.g., members
of the LGBT community) are not included in this analysis.
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sions. Additional episodes in the database are sourced from general web-
sites or blogs, reports by NGOs, and reports sent directly to Lunaria by citi-
zens who have been witnesses or victims of racial abuse. The information
collected is verified, where possible, through the consultation of multiple
sources. For every episode, the dataset reports the precise date, the municipal-
ity in which it occurred, and the exact source; additionally, a short description
of the crime is provided, usually based on newspaper articles relating to the
event.
Followin a classification system proposed by Lunaria39, I categorize each
hate crime according to two criteria. First, each episode is categorized by the
nature of the criminal act; these labels are damage to buildings or property,
discrimination, verbal violence, and physical assault. This categorization by
the type of act is quite standard among international bodies and academic
papers. For instance, in the German context, Falk et al. (2011) divide right-
wing extremist crimes into violent and non-violent acts.
Second, each crime is classified by the domain – i.e., the area – of the
perpetrator. More precisely, I split the hate crimes into “political” and “non-
political” acts. The first category includes all hate crimes committed by lo-
cal politicians, city council members, provincial/regional governments, and
political groups. Examples include statements by politicians that are partic-
ularly offensive to immigrants and the display of banners or party statements
containing racist phrases. The second category includes hate crimes com-
mitted by members of society and non-political institutions such as doctors,
teachers, and police officers. Examples of acts committed by this group are
39Lunaria identifies four main domains in which the seeds of racism are sown: institutions,
the media, politics, and society. However, the proposed categorization did not align well
with the context of my analysis for several reasons. For instance, the first domain (insti-
tutions) includes all hate crimes carried out by institutional representatives, at both the
political level (e.g., local councilors) and the non-political level (e.g., police officers).
However, making a distinction between political and non-political institutions is rele-
vant in my context. Similarly, the category “media” was problematic for my analysis,
especially when it came to assigning the location of these episodes correctly. In fact,
it included newspaper articles with a racist connotation that appeared to have occurred
in a specific location. In reality, these were articles with discriminatory content that de-
scribed an episode that occurred in that location. For this reason, I decided to eliminate
these crimes. More broadly, Lunaria’s categorization was inconsistent and subject to
interpretation, and refinements were necessary.
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physical assaults, racist insults during sporting events, and refusing to rent a
home to a foreigner.
My analysis includes all episodes that took place in 2008-2018, a time
frame in which 4,718 hate crimes were reported. Figure 3.2 shows the mu-
nicipalities where at least one episode is recorded; Figure 3.3 and Figure
3.4 illustrate the yearly number of hate crimes, by nature and area, respec-
tively. Table 3.A2 also provides the yearly crimes cases, considering all the
four above-mentioned nature categories. Furthermore, Table 3.3 shows de-
scriptive statistics regarding the number of hate crimes in light of electoral
mandates and the presence or absence of a far-right candidate. Overall, the
probability of a hate crime occurring during the electoral term in which a
far-right candidate participated in the election is 15%, while this percentage
drops to 5% when the extreme right supports no candidates. The figures are
similar if the total number of hate crimes is examined. This gap also persists
when considering both political and non-political hate crimes.
3.4. Empirical Analysis
3.4.1. RD approach: methodology and main results
One of the methodological challenges of identifying the effect of far-right
mayors on hate crimes is that their election is not random. Indeed, the mayor
or municipality might have unobserved characteristics that could affect both
the electoral performance of parties and the likelihood of hate crimes oc-
curring. Moreover, observed and unobserved local factors may simultane-
ously affect voter preferences and hate crime probability. These factors make
causality in the relationships between far-right mayors and hate crime occur-
rence challenging to infer.
To address this problem, I use a regression discontinuity (RD) approach
(Imbens & Lemieux, 2008; Lee, 2008).40 RD is a fundamentally sound and
widely applicable approach to learn about the effect of election results on var-
ious outcomes (Eggers et al., 2015). The intuitive appeal of RD in the analy-
sis of elections derives from the idea that candidates who win and lose close
40The main results found in this Section and in Section 3.5 are confirmed when a fixed
effects approach is used (See Appendix D).
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elections should, on average, be comparable. This comparability depends on
the assumption that parties do not have complete control over the vote share
they receive, and thus their victory can be considered almost random.
The internal validity of the RD approach holds if specific conditions are
fulfilled. These include the inability to manipulate the assignment variable
strategically and the continuity of the distribution of observed covariates around
the threshold (Lee & Lemieux, 2010). In Subsection 3.4.2, I present formal
tests to demonstrate that these conditions are indeed satisfied.
Thus, in my analysis, I focus on elections where a far-right candidate won
or lost with a narrow margin of votes, using the following specification:
HateCrimem,t =βFarRightm,T + γ f (MarginO f Victorym,T )+
γ f (MarginO f Victorym,T ) ∗ FarRightm,T + ζZi,T−1 + θXm,T−1+
µElectionDistancei,t + τt + ψp + ϵm,t
(3.1)
where the dependent variable HateCrime is a dummy equal to one if (at least)
one hate crime is reported in municipality m in year t. In the analysis, I focus
mostly on the extensive margin (i.e., whether a hate crime occurred or not),
instead of the intensive margin (i.e., the total number of hate crimes), given
that the frequency of hate crimes at the municipal-yearly level is relatively
low. However, results for the intensive margin, which are in line in terms of
significance and direction, are also provided. Table 3.4 provides descriptive
statistics of hate crimes at the municipal-yearly level – i.e., of the main de-
pendent variables considered in the analysis –, by nature and area, both at the
extensive and intensive margin.
FarRight is a binary indicator that takes value one in municipalities where,
in the most recent election year (T), a mayor who is a member of or is sup-
ported by a far-right party was elected. The parameter of interest is β and pro-
vides the treatment effect of the election of a far-right mayor on hate crimes.
A far-right mayor’s presence lasts for a five-year term, while the data on hate
crimes occurrence are at the municipal-yearly level. Hence, β provides the
average annual effect of electing a far-right mayor on hate crimes across the
electoral cycle.
f(MarginOfVictory) is a flexible polynomial function of the margin of vic-
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tory, and the interaction term allows for different functional forms on the two
sides of the cut-off.
Z is a set of characteristics related to the mayor (age, gender, and edu-
cation level) while X is a vector of municipality controls that includes (the
log of) the population and surface area. X also considers relevant economic
and demographic indicators such as the average disposable income, the em-
ployment rate, the share of highly educated people, the share of immigrants,
students, and pensioners, and the number of no-profit associations per capita.
These controls are held constant at pre-mandate values to avoid issues of re-
verse causality. The main data sources are the 2001 Italian census, the Italian
National Institute of Statistics (ISTAT), and the Italian Minister of Finance.
Table 3.5 provides the descriptive statistics of these municipality character-
istics and reference years. Finally, Equation 3.1 also includes year (τt) and
region (ψp) fixed effects;41 ϵ is a robust error term, clustered at the municipal
level.
Table 3.6 presents the results for Equation 3.1 – i.e., controlling for the
margin of victory of the far-right candidate. In particular, the coefficients rep-
resent the results of an RD in which I estimate a first-order local polynomial
regression, using an optimal bandwidth selected according to the methodol-
ogy proposed by Calonico et al. (2014) and a triangular kernel.
In all the specifications, the coefficients are positive and significant, pro-
viding evidence that the election of a far-right mayor leads to an increase in
the probability of hate crimes. Results are stable regardless of the RD es-
timates used; additionally, coefficients do not change after the introduction
of local and time fixed effects (Column 2), nor when controlling for munici-
pal (Column 3) and mayor (Column 4) characteristics. In the most complete
specification (Column 5), coefficients indicate that, around the threshold, the
election of an extreme right mayor is responsible for an increase in the annual
probability of a hate crime equal to 4.1 percentage points. Notably, the results
displayed in Table 3.6 very likely provide a lower-bound estimation: indeed,
as reported by Bracco et al. (2018), the election of a Lega mayor causes a
reduction in the number of immigrants present in the municipality, which, in
turn, is associated with a decrease in the potential number of victims.
41Results are not affected if province fixed effects are use.
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This “jump” in the probability of hate crimes in municipalities led by far-
right mayors is evident in Figure 3.5. Lastly, Table 3.7 provides the results
using a second-order local polynomial regression. As evident, the results,
both in terms of magnitude and significance, remain very similar.
In short, the RD approach provides evidence that the probability of hate
crimes increases following the election of a far-right mayor. In the following
subsections, I discuss the general internal validity of the RD design (see Lee
and Lemieux (2010)), and I perform several robustness exercises to address
concerns related to the nature of my dataset.
3.4.2. Internal validity of the RD design
The RD design provides unbiased estimates of the treatment if specific con-
ditions are fulfilled. First, an RD approach can be invalid if individuals can
precisely manipulate the assignment variable. In this specific framework,
discontinuities at the cutoff might raise the suspicion that the candidates can
manipulate the margin of victory. To check the validity of this hypothesis,
I run a McCrary test (McCrary, 2008), the results of which are presented in
Figure 3.6. Given that the margin of victory is constant throughout the five-
year electoral cycle, the level of observation in this test is the mandate (i.e.,
each point represents the electoral distance, but they are shown just once per
mandate). Reassuringly, the test suggests that the margin of far-right can-
didates in the set of elections considered is not significantly discontinuous
around zero.
To further discard the hypothesis of non-random sorting of units into con-
trol and treatment status, I implement a data-driven manipulation test based
on a local polynomial density estimation technique recently proposed by Cat-
taneo et al. (2016). This novel manipulation test avoids pre-binning of the
data, thereby improving size properties; besides, it allows restrictions on
other features of the model, improving power properties. As displayed in
Figure 3.7, also this test rejects the hypothesis of jumps around the thresh-
old. Lastly, Figure 3.8 plots a histogram of the margin of victory in 50 bins,
making this null effect graphically clear.
Another key hypothesis of RD is that, around the threshold, the treatment
allocation (i.e., having a far-right mayor or not) should be as good as random.
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Put differently, no significant discontinuity around the threshold for other
covariates should be observed. Using a first- and second-order polynomial,
respectively, Table 3.8 and Table 3.9 confirm this hypothesis.
A further essential exercise is to examine the sensitivity of the results to
the bandwidth choice. Table 3.6 displays the coefficients using a one com-
mon coverage error rate (CER)-optimal bandwidth, as proposed by Calonico
et al. (2014). The size of this bandwidth (0.132) is comparable to that used
by Bracco et al. (2018) (0.141). To further check the sensitivity of the results,
I test the estimates using alternative bandwidths. As shown in Table 3.10, the
results are stable if a mean square error (MSE)-optimal bandwidth is applied
(column 2). Finally, the results are significant when more stringent band-
widths are manually imposed, such as 0.066 (the CER-optimal bandwidth
divided by two) and 0.05, as reported respectively in columns 3 and 4).
An additional threat to an RD design might stem from discontinuities at
other values of the assignment variable. To check whether this was the case, I
run Equation 3.1 using a different cutoff for variable f(MarginOfVictory). Ta-
ble 3.11, which reports the coefficients when a (positive and negative) cutoff
of 0.1, 0.2 and 0.4 is used, rules out this possibility.
3.4.3. Robustness checks: municipalities’ selection
The exercises proposed in Subsection 3.4.2 confirm the general internal valid-
ity of the RD approach. However, additional concerns for the analysis might
arise, related primarily to the nature of the dataset.
An initial concern is linked to the potential selection of the municipalities
treated; in fact, one might think that the inhabitants of the municipalities that
elected an extreme right-wing mayor were already inclined to commit hate
crimes before the election.
I tackle this concern by looking at the lagged dependent variables. Indeed,
since Yi,t can be highly correlated with Yi,t−1, finding a discontinuity in Yi,t
but not in Yi,t−1 would provide strong evidence to support the validity of the
RD design (Lee & Lemieux, 2010). In this particular setting, I first focused
on hate crimes that occurred in the municipality at time t-5, since a mayor’s
mandate lasts five years. Reassuringly, Table 3.12 shows that no effect is
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found when the lagged period is analyzed. Similarly, Table 3.13 focuses on
the year just before the appointment of the far-right mayor; i.e., it looks at
the effect of mayors on the hate crimes reported the year before the election.
Here again, zero impact is observed.
Moreover, this latter analysis sheds light on the role of another politically
related potential determinant of hate crime: the election campaign. In fact,
one might suspect that the campaign period, which is usually tense because of
rallies, may affect hate crimes. The non-results presented in Table 3.13 seem
to rule out this possibility and suggest that the effect of extreme right-wing
politicians arises only once the candidate has won the election.
3.4.4. Robustness checks: bias in reporting
A second concern is related to how the dataset is constructed. As already
described, the primary source of hate crimes included in Lunaria’s dataset is
articles reported in national and local newspapers, both online and printed.
Additionally, it includes episodes that have been compiled from blogs, NGO
reports, and cases reported directly by citizens.
Although Lunaria states that the veracity of each episode is checked with
multiple sources, this compilation process could generate reporting bias in
the analysis. In fact, it is possible that some members of civil society, espe-
cially those involved in the fight against racial intolerance, are more vigilant
and more likely to report hate crimes as a reaction to the election of a far-
right mayor. Furthermore, there might be an increase in hate crimes as the
media discuss attacks against immigrants in places where this issue is more
salient, i.e., in municipalities led by far-right mayors. Similarly, one might
fear that the media are politically biased and report more episodes of hate
crimes following the election of a far-right mayor, as with members of civil
society.
In short, the results presented in Table 3.6 could be biased if they were
driven by the fact that media or individuals are more likely to report episodes
of racism following the election of a mayor of the extreme right. To address
these concerns, I present in this section several robustness checks.
Focus on visible hate crimes. First, I focus on the nature of hate crimes.
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In particular, I repeat the analysis of equation 3.1, focus solely on specific
kinds of episodes, namely those categorized as visible (damage and physical
attacks) and violent (physical attacks only). The results are shown in Ta-
ble 3.14. As evident, the effect of far-right mayors persists when only this
subsample of episodes is considered. Certainly, this result is interesting in
itself because it suggests that the appointment of a far-right mayor leads to an
increase in the most severe hate crimes.
Following a similar approach to that taken by Daniele and Dipoppa (2017),
this exercise addresses the potential bias in the Lunaria database. Indeed,
these types of crime represent the most severe and extreme cases since they
involve physical assaults against immigrants or damage to facilities or prop-
erty (in most cases, immigrant centers and shops or cars belonging to foreign-
ers). Not surprisingly, these are the least frequent in the Lunaria dataset, as
shown in Table 3.A2. For their severity and visibility, these episodes are the
most salient, i.e., those most likely to be covered by the media, regardless of
the mayor’s political views or affiliation. In other words, their serious nature
implies that such episodes are less likely to be distorted when reported.
Simultaneously, focusing on these episodes mitigates the concern about
sensitivity to the various definitions of hate crime. As mentioned above, a
single, comprehensive definition of hate crime is not provided by the different
legal systems. Thus, the fact that the results are confirmed is reassuring since,
for these episodes, there is much less room for interpretation. Finally, this
result addresses concerns related to the higher media visibility of mayors (or
politicians in the ruling coalition) compared to opposition politicians. Indeed,
by their very nature, these acts are generally carried out by members of civil
society and not politicians.
Sources selection. I seek to further address the problem of selection in
reporting by exploiting the fact that Lunaria provides its source for each
hate crime. Figure 3.9 shows the frequencies of hate crimes broken down
by source. The figure confirms that the most common sources of hate crime
reports in Lunaria’s dataset are local or national newspapers, both printed and
online.42
42Note that when it comes to printed newspapers, I was not able to identify whether the
episodes were reported in the printed version, the newspaper’s website, or both; in this
categorization, what defines whether the source is printed or online is that, for the former,
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The category “National newspapers” includes the major national newspa-
pers, i.e., those with circulations of more than 50,000 copies according to
the sector’s leading certification company.43 The category “Local newspa-
pers” includes the main Italian newspapers with regional, interregional and
provincial coverage, with circulations ranging from 5,000 to 74,000 copies.
Newspapers that fall into the category “National online newspapers” are web-
sites that report national news; examples include the websites of Italian public
television (rainews.it) and the main private and satellite television channels
(e.g., tgcom24.mediaset.it and tg24.sky.it). Other websites included in this
category are general information websites such as linkiesta.it, leggo.it and
notizie.yahoo.com. Lastly, websites that report news related to the territory
fall into the category “Local online newspapers.” The ultimate purpose of
these websites is to provide a brief, uncritical description of the events taking
place in the community.44
An initial reassuring result is provided in Figure 3.10, in which I plot the
distributions of the sources depending on the mayors’ political ideology. As is
evident, it does not seem that, in municipalities led by far-right mayors, hate
crime episodes are (over)reported by a specific media source. This provides
indirect proof of the absence of bias in media reporting.
The categorization of the sources shown in Figure 3.9 allows me to perform
some additional robustness exercises. More specifically, based on the sources
of the hate crimes, I create three subsamples for the analysis. Figure 3.11
graphically summarizes this selection of samples.
First, in a subsample named “Source A”, I remove the hate crimes reported
a paper version of the newspaper actually exists.
43http://www.adsnotizie.it/
44Typically, these newspapers do not deal with political issues and, if they do, they report
only on certain objective events (for example, the result of local government votes). A
format typical of this category is today.it. This news platform has more than 50 local
versions (for instance, milanotoday, romatoday, savonatoday) and offers, in free format,
news intended to be viewed mainly through apps (according to the website, more than
80% of users connect via a smartphone or tablet). Given i) the very uncritical style of
the news reported on these sites, and ii) the large, general audience they seek to reach,
there is no reason to assume that they are politically biased. More specifically, there is no
reasonable suspicion that these sources have an interest in reporting hate crimes in some
municipalities and not in others or that they change their level of reporting following the
election of a mayor with a particular political ideology.
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by the sources most likely to be more vigilant after the election of a far-right
mayor. These include episodes reported by citizens (victims or witnesses of
crimes) and cases directly compiled by Lunaria. In addition, I exclude the
following from this subsample: crimes reported in blogs (in particular those
with a highly anti-racist tendency and that cover social and political issues),
by NGOs, and by websites that deal with immigration, minorities, and racism.
Finally, I remove the few episodes whose source was not mentioned from this
restricted version of the dataset.
The second and third subsamples (“Source B” and “Source C”) focus on an
even narrower sample of sources based on the characteristics of newspapers.
In particular, “Source B” includes only episodes reported in national and local
printed newspapers. By contrast, the sources in “Source C" are both online
and printed newspapers that deal with national events. In both cases, I also
consider episodes reported by newswires.
Printed newspapers (“Source B”) have a better reputation and are there-
fore more reliable when it comes to reporting news; this addresses the con-
cern relating to the general reliability of Lunaria’s dataset. On the one hand,
by selecting hate crimes reported in newspapers that cover national issues
(“Source C”), I seek to address the potential bias due to newspaper ideology.
This issue would create problems for the identification strategy only if news-
papers are more likely to report crimes against immigrants in municipalities
led by far-right mayors, not if they cover episodes of hate crimes more in ab-
solute terms. Since most of the municipalities in the dataset are small and the
mayors are not very well known (and, thus, carry no political weight in na-
tional political dynamics), this is unlikely, in my opinion. Put differently, if a
newspaper with ideological bias wants to raise awareness of violence against
immigrants at the national level, it would not “miss the opportunity” to report
an episode of hate crime, regardless of whether it happened in a municipality
led by a mayor belonging to a left-wing party, a right-wing party or a civic
list.
The results of these robustness exercises are reported in Table 3.15. As can
be observed, the results are confirmed even when this subsample of sources
is considered. This is true both when all the hate crimes are considered in the
analysis and when focusing on the salient ones – i.e., damages and physical
assaults.
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Table 3.16 goes even further and provides the results for an additional
robustness check based on newspaper ideology. Apart from direct reports,
NGOs and missing sources, Table 3.16 displays the results not considering
the cases that appear in the left-wing Italian newspapers.45 They include the
national and the local versions of Repubblica – by far, the leading Italian
center-left journal – as well as the magazines associated with the same ed-
itorial group (Huffington Post and Espresso)46; additionally, I drop in this
part of the analysis the cases reported by the even more extreme left-oriented
journals such as L’unità and Il Manifesto.47 Reassuringly, the results are also
confirmed when these sources are excluded. This is the case both when look-
ing at all the hate crimes and focusing just on the visible ones.
Lastly, Table 3.17 shows the results when the intensive margin (i.e. the
number of hate crimes per 10,000 inhabitants) are examined. As discussed,
in the analysis, I focus more on extensive margin, given the relatively low
number of episodes at the municipal-year level. However, it is reassuring
that the results are similar when the analysis is performed on the intensive
margin. This result is true both when considering all sources and looking at
the sub-samples of sources (Table 3.18).
3.5. The political economy of hate crimes
In this part of the analysis, I explore the difference between political and non-
political hate crimes in greater depth, following the definition provided in
Section 3.3. Besides, I analyze whether there are other differences related to
mayors’ political mandate beyond political affiliation.
First and foremost, I examine whether the results are different depending
on whether the hate crime is committed by a politician or a member of society.
To do so, I replicate Equation 3.1, using political and non-political episodes
as two different dependent variables. Table 3.19 presents the results of this
45Following the media slant proposed by the international platform worldpress.org. See:
https://www.worldpress.org/newspapers/EUROPE/Italy.cfm for an overview of the Ital-
ian newspapers’ political position.
46In March 2016, other newspapers (La Stampa and Il Secolo XIX) were acquired by the
same group. When I repeat the analysis, also excluding the hate crimes reported in these
newspapers from 2016 onwards, results are confirmed.
47Note that less than 30 cases come from these two sources.
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exercise. In this part of the analysis, statistical precision is lost to some extent,
and the coefficients are partially significant only for political hate crimes.
The coefficients displayed so far, in both Table 3.6 and Table 3.19, provide
the average annual effect of electing a far-right mayor on hate crimes across
the electoral cycle. A natural question is whether this effect differs over time
across the mayor’s five-year political term of office. Figure 3.12 presents a
visual response to this question. As is evident, the effect of far-right mayors
on hate crimes seems to be concentrated in the first half of the mandate (up
to the second year), while it disappears in the second part of the term. This
result is consistent with the literature in the Italian context. Indeed, Bracco et
al. (2018) provide evidence that, on the one hand, the appointment of a Lega
mayor leads to lower net inflows of immigrants in the municipality and, on
the other, this effect is stronger immediately after the election, while it tends
to attenuate with time.
A related question is whether there is a difference depending on whether
a mayor can be re-elected or not. As mentioned, mayors in Italy can remain
in office for a maximum of two terms. I thus performed the RD analysis
described in Equation 3.1 in two different subgroups: the municipalities in
which the mayor is eligible for a second mandate and those in which (s)he is
not. To implement this analysis, I follow the methodology proposed by Carril
et al. (2017). This technique balances the covariates around the threshold and
weighs the observations in each subgroup by the (inverse of their) conditional
probabilities of belonging to that subgroup. This approach helps isolate the
difference due to the subgroup characteristic of interest from other observable
dimensions.
Table 3.20 presents the results. The table has the following structure: each
column refers to a different dependent variable, while FRM Re-eligible and
FRM Term Limit refer, respectively, to the effect of the far-right mayor in
municipalities where the mayor is eligible for a second mandate and those
in which (s)he is not. The panel at the bottom shows the difference between
these two coefficients and their p-value. As is evident, the effect of far-right
mayors differs depending on whether one can be re-elected. In particular,
the coefficients relating to the term-limit mayors are statistically higher than
those for re-electable ones.
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The results are even more interesting when the two analyses, based on the
time and re-electability, are combined. In particular, this part of the analysis
focuses on political hate crimes. Table 3.21 reveals an interesting pattern.
In municipalities in which the mayor is eligible for a second term, the effect
of far-right mayors is present only in the first half of the mandate (column
1). By contrast, when the election is approaching, there is no difference in
the likelihood of political hate crimes occurring depending on the mayor’s
political ideology (as reported in column 2, the far-right mayor coefficient is
actually negative, although very close to zero). A completely different picture
emerges for mayors in their second term of office; here, the effect of far-right
mayors on political hate crimes is concentrated in the second half of their
term (as shown in column 4).
Given the difference observed between re-electable and term-limit mayors,
a final analysis concerns whether and how the occurrence of hate crimes af-
fects a mayor’s chances of being re-elected. In other words, do voters tend
to reward or punish a mayor if there have been political hate crimes during
his term of office? To answer this question, I collapsed the variables at the
mandate level and explored the probability of a (re-electable) mayor being
re-elected. Specifically, I used the following framework:
ReElectedm,T+1 =β1HateCrimem,T + β2FarRightm,T+
β3(HateCrimem,T× FarRightm,T ) + γMarginO f Victorym,T+
θXi,t + τt + ψp + ϵm
(3.2)
where ReElected is a dummy equal to one if the mayor is re-elected in the
mandate T+1. HateCrimem,T is a binary indicator that takes a value of one if a
hate crime is reported in municipality m in political mandate T ; FarRightm,T
is equal to one if municipality m is led by a far-right major in political man-
date T. MarginO f Victorym,T controls for the mayor’s electoral margin of
victory in political mandate T. X is a vector of municipal and mayor char-
acteristics. τ and ψ are, respectively, year and region fixed effects, and ϵ is
a robust error term. The coefficient of interest is β3; this interaction term
provides the probability of a far-right mayor being confirmed as mayor in
mandate T + 1 if a hate crime occurs in mandate T.
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The results are shown in Table 3.22. Although not statistically significant
(p-value equal to 0.16), the coefficient of the interaction term is negative and
increases in magnitude for political hate crimes. This result could suggest
that voters tend to punish far-right mayors more if they commit a hate crime
during their political mandate. This, in turn, might potentially explain the
difference in behavior between mayors who can and cannot be re-elected, as
pictured in Table 3.20 and 3.21.
3.6. Channels
This part of the analysis investigates potential mechanisms underlying the
results reported so far. Specifically, it focuses on two elements that the recent
literature has shown to affect the likelihood of hate crimes being committed:
the erosion of social norms and the role of the Internet.
3.6.1. Change in social norms
A potential channel that might explain the results found so far is the erosion
of social norms. Indeed, new public information, such as the election of a
particular politician, can quickly change social norms. This effect might be
even more pronounced if the election result was not predicted. People may
become more inclined to react by expressing views or taking actions that
were previously stigmatized. In this regard, Bursztyn et al. (2020) provide a
neat example; they use online experiments to show how Donald Trump’s rise
in popularity and eventual victory increased the willingness of individuals to
express xenophobic views publicly.
To check the relevance of social norms in my context, I use a twofold
approach. First, I focus on the municipalities in which a far-right mayor is
elected for the first time. Second, I look at the spillover effects in neighboring
municipalities.
The Italian context is particularly suitable for these analyses, given the his-
tory of Lega, the main far-right party in the country. As mentioned, Lega was
initially a federalist party that claimed to protect the citizens of the wealthy
northern regions (especially Piedmont, Lombardy, and Veneto) from the na-
tional government’s inefficiency and corruption. Things changed since when
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Matteo Salvini was appointed as party secretary in 2013. From that moment,
the party has taken on a strong nationalist tone, and its political manifesto
has increasingly focused on national issues, such as immigration and crime,
overlooking topics like federalism and secessionism. This has meant that in
recent years, Lega has achieved good election results in central and southern
Italy, where it was virtually nonexistent until a few years ago.
Figure 3.13 provides a good illustration of what has just been discussed:
as reflected in the red bars, the success of the far-right in the three northern
regions mentioned above has been considerable and constant over time. By
contrast, the blue bars show that, although smaller in quantitative terms, there
has been a significant increase in support for the far-right in the other regions
in recent years, mainly due to an increase in Lega’s vote share.48
The first exercise I use to test the relevance of social norms is to replicate
the RD analysis, splitting the municipalities depending on the historical pres-
ence of the far right. Specifically, I identify municipalities in which a far-right
mayor was appointed for the first time in the 2008-2018 period. I then check
whether the impact on hate crimes differ with respect to municipalities that
had already appointed a far-right mayor in the past (i.e., those more famil-
iar with the far-right). Indeed, if social norms are relevant to the results, the
“shock” experienced in municipalities where a far-right mayor was elected
for the first time should be more significant, so the impact on hate crimes
should be greater.
The results are shown in Table 3.23 and Table 3.24, respectively for all and
visible hate crimes. These tables suggest that the results are driven by far-
right mayors elected for the first time, at both the extensive and the intensive
margin. Specifically, Panel A shows that the effect on hate crimes is strong
when looking at the election in which the right-wing candidate won by a
tiny margin, and it is the first time that the far-right came to power in the
municipality. By contrast, the same analysis shows no effect on hate crimes
(indeed, it shows negative effects for violent crimes) if voters live in a city
already familiar with far-right mayors (Panel B). This result offers the first
evidence of the importance of the erosion of social norms. In fact, it shows
that the main effect of the analysis is not driven by places with a historical
48For example, the success rate of Lega candidates in non-northern regions was 23% as
opposed to 25% when far-right candidates in a broader sense were considered.
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far-right presence; on the contrary, it seems to be driven by municipalities
that have recently been exposed to the far-right.
A similar, social-norm-related mechanism worth exploring is linked to
spillovers. Indeed, a potential effect of the election of a far-right mayor may
be an increase in hate crimes, not only, as already demonstrated, in the mu-
nicipality where he or she is in office but also in surrounding municipalities.
The idea behind this mechanism is as follows: in a given area, the population
is already “endowed” with racist ideologies that are not openly expressed be-
cause they are considered socially unacceptable. However, the appointment
of an extreme right-wing mayor in a neighboring municipality could allevi-
ate this social stigma, as it could be interpreted as an indication that there are
people with similar radical ideas in the surrounding areas.
I test this potential spillover effect by focusing on Italy’s 611 Labor Market
Area (LMAs).49 These territorial units are well suited to this analysis because
they capture relatively small, homogeneous zones (in my dataset, the average
number of municipalities in an LMA is equal to 29.18). The map in Figure
3.14 shows these areas, depending on the political success of far-right parties
in local elections. In particular, the blue areas are LMAs in which, already in
2008, at least one far-right mayor was in power. Given the historical presence
of the extreme right in these locations, “information shock” concerning these
areas cannot be evaluated: for this reason, I exclude them from this part of the
analysis. Green areas are those where the extreme right has recently emerged,
i.e., LMAs where there is at least one municipality that elected a radical right
mayor in the 2009-2018 period and where there were no far-right mayors in
2008. Finally, the yellow areas are those in which no extreme right-wing
mayors were elected in any municipality for the whole 2008-2018 period.
To test the spillover effects, I use the following (staggered) difference-in-
49Labor Market Areas (LMAs) are 611 subregional geographical areas where the bulk of
the labor force lives and works and where companies can find most of the labor force
necessary to occupy jobs.
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differences approach:
HateCrimem,t =β1FarRightL,m,t + β2PostFarRightL,m,t+
β3(FarRightL,m,t× PostFarRightL,m,t) + γ#FarRightL,t+
θXi,t + τt + ψm + ϵm
(3.3)
where, as usual, HateCrime is a dummy equal to one if at least one hate crime
is reported in municipality m during the year t. FarRightL,m,T is a binary
indicator that takes a value of one if the municipality m belongs to an LMA L
where a far-right mayor has been elected in the year t; PostFarRightL,m,t takes
a value of one in the years after the election of the first far-right mayor in the
LMA L. I refer to this approach as staggered difference-in-differences, given
that the post-treatment period differs for every LMA treated. #FarRightL,t
controls for the number of far-right mayors present in the LMA in the year t.
X is a vector of municipal and mayor characteristics. τ and ψ are, respectively,
year and municipality fixed effects, and ϵ is an error term, clustered at the
LMA level. The staggered DiD estimator of the effect is given by β3.
A related analysis is carried out to check if the potential spillover effect is
heterogeneous over time. For this reason, I also use the following approach:
HateCrimem,t =β1FarRightL,m,t + β2YearPostFarRightL,m,t+
β3(FarRightL,m,t× YearPostFarRightL,m,t) + γ#FarRightL,t+
θXi,t + τt + ψm + ϵm
(3.4)
where the generic dummy variable for the post-treatment period is replaced
with the exact number of years elapsed since the first far-right mayor was
elected in the LMA. Finally, it is important to stress that, in this part of the
analysis, I exclude municipalities where a far-right mayor was actually ap-
pointed (apart from areas with a historical far-right presence, i.e., those in
blue on the map). Put differently, to capture the spillover effects, I focus
on municipalities not led by far-right mayors, but located in areas where a
far-right mayor is in power.
Table 3.25 provides the results. Columns 1 and 2 focus on the generic hate
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crime dummy, while columns 3 and 4 show visible episodes. As evident from
columns 1 and 3, the DiD estimators described in Equation 3.3 are positive
and statistically significant. In other words, an increase in the probability of
(visible) hate crimes is observed after the election of a far-right mayor in a
nearby location. This result is stable when both all hate crimes and the most
serious crimes are considered. Columns 2 and 4 show the timing of these
spillovers in more detail, i.e., when Equation 3.4 is used. Indeed, it seems
that this effect is particularly strong when two and especially three and four
years have passed since the appointment of the first far-right mayor in the
LMA, while it fades over time.
This analysis might be biased if there is a selection in the LMAs that
elected a far-right mayor. In other words, a potential concern is that the hy-
pothesis of the parallel trends required by a DiD setting is violated. I exploit
the staggered nature of local elections to conduct an event study and test
whether treated municipalities display a differential trend before the appoint-
ment of the far-right mayor. Figure 3.15 presents the results of this exercise.
The two groups – i.e., municipalities in which a far-right mayor was elected
in their LMA and those without any far-right mayors – do not appear to fol-
low differential trends in the years before the far-right presence in the LMA.
The statistical insignificance of the coefficients in the years leading up to the
appointment of the far-right mayor serves as proof of the parallel trend as-
sumption.
Overall, the results in Tables 3.23 - 3.25 confirm the relevance of the mech-
anism related to the erosion of social norms, suggesting that, (only) after the
election of a radical politician in a nearby location, people in the surrounding
areas feel entitled to exhibit behaviors initially considered socially unaccept-
able.
3.6.2. The effect of the Internet
The recent literature has recognized how the Internet can affect voting be-
havior, the support for extreme parties, and the attitudes of natives toward
immigrants (see Zhuravskaya et al. (2020) for a detailed review). Addition-
ally, the Internet and social media have been identified as responsible for pro-
ducing increases in hate crimes (Albornoz et al., 2020; Müller & Schwarz,
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2018, 2020; Petrova et al., 2020). In this part of the analysis, I thus exam-
ine whether the results found so far differ depending on the municipalities’
internet exposure.
To evaluate the role of broadband internet, I use 2018 data from AGCOM
(Authority for Communications Guarantees, i.e., the regulator and competi-
tion authority for the communication industries in Italy). Specifically, I split
the municipalities according to whether the average broadband internet speed
(Mbps) was slow or fast (i.e., below or above the median).50 I then perform
two different RD analyses in the two subgroups, following Carril et al. (2017).
As already described, this methodology allows conducting binary subgroup
analysis in RD settings based on inverse propensity score weights (IPSW).
Table 3.26 shows the results of this exercise. The table follows a struc-
ture similar to Table 3.20 – i.e., each column looks at a different dependent
variable, while each line shows the effect of far-right mayors on hate crimes
in municipalities with diverse Internet exposure. Panel A presents the re-
sults when the municipalities are divided according to the real average In-
ternet speed (Mbps). As is evident, the effect of extreme right mayors on
hate crimes is concentrated in municipalities where Internet speed is high,
especially when the intensive margin is considered (column 2). Here, the
difference between the two coefficients – the far-right mayor’s effect on hate
crimes in slow Internet municipalities and the far-right mayor’s effect on hate
crimes in fast Internet municipalities – is significant, with a p-value of 0.059.
To address the endogeneity concerns related to the Internet connection,
I then perform the same exercise using an instrumental variable approach.
Specifically, I instrument Internet penetration by looking at the distance from
the closest UGS (Urban Group Stage), as proposed by Campante et al. (2018)
in the same Italian context. Panel B confirms that the municipalities closest
to a UGS (i.e., locations where it is easier to get a fast Internet connection)
are those where the far-right mayors’ effect is found; on the contrary, this
effect disappears in municipalities far away from a UGS (where the Internet
connection, therefore, tends to be slower and more difficult to get).
One of the reasons the Internet, and especially social media, can increase
50I also performed the same exercise looking at the internet availability (i.e., municipalities
with low or high Internet penetration): the results are entirely in line with those presented
in this section.
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hate crimes is that they facilitate coordination between individuals. For ex-
ample, Petrova et al. (2020) demonstrate the importance of this mechanism in
the Russian context. On the contrary, Müller and Schwarz (2020) do not find
the coordination effect relevant in the United States. I test the relevance of the
coordination mechanism by focusing on the episodes that Lunaria identifies
as “group hate crimes” – i.e., crimes committed by more than one individual.
These episodes (1,021 out of the 4,788 in the dataset) are therefore those that
require coordination.
Column 3 of Table 3.26 present the results, again using the actual internet
speed and the instrumental variable approach. As is evident, the results of this
exercise are less conclusive; if, on the one hand, the magnitude and direction
of the coefficients support the coordination mechanism, statistical precision
is lost, and the coefficients do not seem to be notably different between the
two subgroups.
3.7. Conclusion
Recently, extreme right-wing parties have been gaining considerable elec-
toral support at the national and local levels. Countries such as Germany,
France, Austria, and, more recently, Spain have seen the emergence of par-
ties with a strong anti-immigrant stance. Simultaneously, a significant in-
crease in assaults against minorities (e.g., Muslims, Jews, and members of the
LGBT community) has been observed throughout Europe. With their rhetoric
and institutional actions, extremist politicians might have contributed to the
growth of this climate of intolerance.
In this paper, I focused on the role of local politicians, figures who often
do not enjoy widespread media coverage but can have a crucial impact on
their community (Putnam, 1966). More specifically, I empirically evaluated
whether the election of far-right mayors impacts the probability that a hate
crime against foreigners occurs in the community. I set the analysis in Italy,
a country in which anti-immigration parties, among which the League stands
out, have obtained remarkable and widespread political success in the terri-
tory. At the same time, international bodies have pointed out attrition between
national and local authorities to implement laws to protect minorities.
The high number of Italian municipalities allowed me to implement an RD
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approach that established a solid causal relationship between far-right mayors
and hate crimes by comparing local elections that were won or lost with a tiny
margin of votes by the far-right candidate.
I found that, in municipalities where mayors supported by extreme-right
parties are in power, the likelihood of a hate crime occurring is significantly
higher; estimates indicate an increase in the yearly probability of a hate crime
of around five percentage points. Additionally, a significant increase in the
most severe hate crimes – i.e., those involving physical assaults or damages –
is observable. The effect of the far-right mayors on hate crimes is particularly
strong in the first part of their mandate and for mayors not eligible for re-
election. Reassuringly for my identification strategy, I did not find any effect
when looking at the crimes that happen in the municipalities before the far-
right mayors’ election. To discard the possibility that the results were due to
a reporting bias, I also provided several robustness checks.
In the second part of the paper, I explored two potential channels that might
explain the results. First, I looked at the erosion of social norms. Following
Bursztyn et al. (2020), the idea behind this mechanism is that some citizens
may have innate racist views, and the election of a far-right mayor may serve
as an indication that they are not alone. This, in turn, may lead these indi-
viduals to be less reluctant to commit hate crimes. I confirmed the relevance
of this mechanism in my context in two ways. First, I showed that my re-
sults are driven by municipalities in which the far-right mayor was elected
for the first time. Second, I provided evidence of spillover effects in neigh-
boring municipalities. Using a staggered difference-in-differences approach
and focusing on the Labor Market Area (LMAs), I found that, after the ap-
pointment of a far-right mayor, the probability of hate crimes also increases
in the surrounding municipalities.
A second channel that I explored is the role of the Internet. Recent liter-
ature has shown that the Internet and social media significantly impact hate
crimes (Müller & Schwarz, 2018, 2020; Petrova et al., 2020). The relevance
of this mechanism is confirmed in my analysis. Indeed, the effect of far-right
mayors is present in areas that are highly exposed to the Internet, while it
fades away in areas with low coverage. A potential reason that can explain
why the possibility to go online impacts the frequency of hate crimes is that
it reduces the cost of coordination (Petrova et al., 2020). However, this does
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not seem to be the case in this context since I found no difference in the ef-
fect of radical mayors on hate crimes committed in groups depending on the
Internet coverage.
Overall, this paper contributes to the literature by showing a potential, se-
vere effect of the appointment of extreme politicians. I also contribute in
terms of data by providing a new and detailed dataset of hate crimes, an
issue that suffers from a general problem of shortage of data. While my
paper focuses on the hate crimes suffered by immigrants, many other minori-
ties, because of their sexual orientation, religious belief, or political vision,
are often victims of these repugnant episodes. Constant monitoring of this
phenomenon is, therefore, necessary. This must be based on accurate data
collection processes and dissemination; also, it is necessary that politicians,
of whatever ideology and level of administration, are committed to strongly
condemning these crimes.
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Appendix A: List of Figures
Figure 3.1: Municipalities where far-right candidates run and win
Far-right candidates run (Sample) Far-right candidates win (Treated)
Source: Italian Minister of Interior
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Figure 3.2: Municipalities where at least one hate crime is reported (2008-2018)
Source: Lunaria – “Cronache Di Ordinario Razzismo”
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Far-right margin of victory
Note: Each point represents the bin sample average that a hate crime is reported for margin
of victory. The straight line is a first-order polynomial in Margin of Victory fitted separately
on each side of the margin of victory threshold at zero. 95% confidence intervals are shown.
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Note: Piedmont, Lombardy and Veneto are defined as northern regions.
125
Figure 3.14: Far-right success, Labor Market Areas
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Years since first far-right mayor in the LMA
The graph shows the result of an event-study where the dependent variable is a dummy equal
to one if at least a hate crime is reported during the year. The treatment consists in the
election of the first far-right mayor in the municipality’s LMA. X reports the years since
treatment. Years: 2008-2018. All Regressions include year and municipal fixed effects, and
controls for mayor (age, gender, education level) and timing variant municipal controls ((ln)
population and (ln) foreign population.) 95% c. i. shown.
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Appendix B: List of Tables
Table 3.1: Far-right performance in local elections (2008-2018)
N Mean SD Min Max
Far-right candidate ran 20735 0.157 0.363 0.000 1.000
League candidate ran 20735 0.128 0.334 0.000 1.000
Far-right candidate won 20735 0.041 0.199 0.000 1.000
Far-right candidate won (if one ran) 3246 0.264 0.441 0.000 1.000
Far-right margin of victory (if one ran) 3246 -0.202 0.301 -0.987 1.000
Source: Italian Interior Minister.
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Table 3.2: Municipalities summary statistics, by far-right presence
Far-Right candidate: Run Not run elections Diff.
Population (2008) 12551.158 6482.733 6068.425∗∗∗
Surface area 33.168 34.505 -1.336
% of immigrants (2008) 0.072 0.050 0.022∗∗∗
log income per capita (2005) 9.586 9.479 0.107∗∗∗
Production units per capita (2005) 0.086 0.076 0.010∗∗∗
Unemployment rate (2001) 0.055 0.098 -0.043∗∗∗
% pop. with higher education (2011) 46.388 46.287 0.101
% of pensioners (2001) 0.230 0.258 -0.028∗∗∗
% of students (2001) 0.060 0.065 -0.005∗∗∗
Non profit assoc. per capita (2008) 0.005 0.005 -0.001∗∗∗
Means displayed. Source: 2001 Italian Census; Italian National Institute of Statistics.
Table 3.3: Hate crimes summary statistics, by far-right presence (mandate level)
Far-Right candidate: Run Not run elections Diff.
Dummy hate crimes 0.154 0.050 0.104∗∗∗
Dummy hate crimes (political) 0.090 0.013 0.077∗∗∗
Dummy hate crimes (non-political) 0.101 0.036 0.065∗∗∗
Tot. hate crimes per capita 0.230 0.119 0.111∗∗∗
Tot. hate crimes per capita (political) 0.112 0.017 0.096∗∗∗
Tot. hate crimes per capita (non-political) 0.118 0.067 0.051∗∗∗
Means displayed. Source: Lunaria – “Cronache di Ordinario Razzismo”.
Years: 2008-2018.
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Table 3.4: Hate crimes summary statistics – RD Regression
Mean SD Min Max
Extensive Margin
Hate crime 0.064 0.244 0.000 1.000
Political hate crime 0.035 0.183 0.000 1.000
Non-political hate crime 0.040 0.195 0.000 1.000
Visible hate crime 0.014 0.117 0.000 1.000
Violent hate crime 0.011 0.104 0.000 1.000
Intensive Margin
Hate crime (per 10,000 people) 0.066 0.695 0.000 58.309
Political hate crime (per 10,000 people) 0.032 0.295 0.000 9.948
Non-political hate crime (per 10,000 people) 0.034 0.629 0.000 58.309
Visible hate crime (per 10,000 people) 0.009 0.301 0.000 29.155
Violent hate crime (per 10,000 people) 0.005 0.121 0.000 8.525
N: 11482
Summary statistics at municipal-year level. Only municipalities with a far-right
candidate considered. Years: 2008-2018.
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Table 3.5: Municipal and mayor controls summary statistics – RD Regression
N Mean SD Min Max
Population (2008) 11449 11051 25703 49 598183
Surface Area 11420 31.066 46.111 0.120 654.390
% of immigrants (2008) 11411 0.073 0.038 0.000 0.249
log income per capita (2005) 11456 9.584 0.176 8.540 10.390
Production units per capita (2005) 11456 0.085 0.021 0.025 0.344
% pop. with highr education (2011) 11410 0.460 0.098 0.139 0.823
% of pensioners (2001) 11449 0.231 0.064 0.040 0.664
Non-profit assoc. per capita (2008) 11456 0.005 0.003 0.000 0.056
Mayor age 11020 51.869 10.246 24.000 86.000
Mayor male 11061 0.850 0.357 0.000 1.000
Mayor education:
Primary 10623 0.007 0.083 0.000 1.000
Secondary 10623 0.533 0.499 0.000 1.000
Professional School 10623 0.017 0.129 0.000 1.000
Degree or higher 10623 0.443 0.497 0.000 1.000
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Table 3.6: Far-right mayors effect on hate crimes – RD Estimates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Conventional 0.052∗∗ 0.050∗∗ 0.046∗∗ 0.047∗∗ 0.041∗
(0.023) (0.021) (0.022) (0.022) (0.023)
Bias-corrected 0.053∗∗ 0.048∗∗ 0.047∗∗ 0.046∗∗ 0.041∗
(0.023) (0.021) (0.022) (0.022) (0.023)
Robust 0.053∗∗ 0.048∗∗ 0.047∗∗ 0.046∗ 0.041∗
(0.025) (0.023) (0.024) (0.024) (0.025)
Bandwidth: 0.135 0.156 0.121 0.155 0.116
N (Left): 1976 2258 1632 2069 1490
N (Right): 1663 1841 1416 1669 1288
Local FEs: No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mun. Controls: No No Yes No Yes
Mayor Controls: No No No Yes Yes
RD Estimates (First-order polynomial). Dependent variables: dummy equal
to one if at least one hate crime is reported during the year. Years: 2008-
2018. Municipal controls: log of the population and of surface area in KM2,
% of immigrants, %pensioners, %students, % of people with at least sec-
ondary education, employment rate, log of the average disposable income,
number of non-profit associations per capita. Mayor controls: age, gender,
and education level. Standard errors clustered at the municipal level in paren-
theses. Significance levels: ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table 3.7: Far-right mayors effect on hate crimes – Second-order polynomial
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Conventional 0.062∗ 0.055∗ 0.045∗ 0.044 0.043
(0.032) (0.029) (0.027) (0.030) (0.026)
Bias-corrected 0.064∗∗ 0.057∗ 0.046∗ 0.045 0.043∗
(0.032) (0.029) (0.027) (0.030) (0.026)
Robust 0.064∗ 0.057∗ 0.046∗ 0.045 0.043
(0.033) (0.030) (0.028) (0.031) (0.027)
Bandwidth: 0.143 0.147 0.166 0.159 0.187
N (Left): 2092 2156 2189 2111 2347
N (Right): 1734 1760 1801 1715 1847
Local FEs: No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mun. Controls: No No Yes No Yes
Mayor Controls: No No No Yes Yes
RD Estimates (Second-order polynomial). Dependent Variables: Dummy
equal to one if (at least) a hate crime is reported during the year n-5. Years:
2008-2018. Municipal controls: log of the population and of surface in KM2,
% of immigrants, %pensioners, %students, % of people with at least sec-
ondary education, employment rate, log of the average disposable income,
number of no profit associations per capita. Mayor controls: age, gender,
level of education. Standard errors clustered at the municipal level in paren-
theses. Significance levels: ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table 3.8: Balance controls around the threshold – First-order polynomial
Mayor age Mayor male Mayor education
Far-right mayor -1.544 -0.080 0.157
(1.694) (0.082) (0.215)
Bandwidth: 0.136 0.108 0.095
N (Left): 1894 1529 1305
N (Right): 1594 1312 1134
Pop. (Ln) Surface area (Ln) % Immigr.
Far-right mayor -0.012 0.060 0.006
(0.140) (0.155) (0.007)
Bandwidth: 0.131 0.140 0.111
N (Left): 1912 2020 1608
N (Right): 1603 1702 1386
% Secondary educ. Income (Ln) % Employment
Far-right mayor -0.581 0.038 0.003
(1.820) (0.027) (0.007)
Bandwidth: 0.103 0.136 0.138
N (Left): 1482 1854 1869
N (Right): 1293 1572 1590
% Pensioners Non-profit per cap.
Far-right mayor 0.008 0.000
(0.009) (0.000)
Bandwidth: 0.134 0.098
N (Left): 1818 1349
N (Right): 1545 1205
RD Estimates. Standard errors clustered at the municipal level in parentheses.
Significance levels: ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table 3.9: Balance controls around the threshold – Second-order polynomial
Mayor age Mayor male Mayor education
Far-right mayor -1.333 -0.105 0.232
(2.286) (0.0972) (0.247)
Bandwidth: 0.148 0.154 0.144
N (Left): 2063 2132 1948
N (Right): 1685 1718 1607
Pop. (Ln) Surface area (Ln) % Immigr.
Far-right mayor 0.011 0.284 0.006
(0.178) (0.206) (0.008)
Bandwidth: 0.147 0.156 0.159
N (Left): 2158 2249 2283
N (Right): 1761 1841 1852
% Secondary educ. Income (Ln) % Employment
Far-right mayor -0.080 0.061∗ -0.004
(2.101) (0.036) (0.010)
Bandwidth: 0.138 0.134 0.141
N (Left): 2010 1823 1898
N (Right): 1688 1545 1612
% Pensioners Non-profit per cap.
Far-right mayor 0.008 0.001∗
(0.012) (0.000)
Bandwidth: 0.172 0.124
N (Left): 2296 1677
N (Right): 1858 1461
RD Estimates. Standard errors clustered at the municipal level in parentheses.
Significance levels: ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table 3.10: Far-right mayors effect on hate crimes – Different bandwidth
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Far-right mayor 0.053∗∗ 0.043∗∗ 0.057∗ 0.058∗
(0.024) (0.020) (0.030) (0.035)
Optimal Bandwidth: cerrd mserd cerrd/2 -
Bandwidth: 0.132 0.194 0.066 0.05
N (Left): 1948 2711 1047 712
N (Right): 1612 2138 897 652
Controls: No No No No
RD Estimates (First-order polynomial). Dependent Variables:
dummy equal to one if at least one hate crime is reported during the
year. Standard errors clustered at the municipal level in parentheses.
Significance levels: ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
Table 3.11: Far-right mayors effect on hate crimes – Different cut-off
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Far-right mayor 0.014 0.052 -0.132 0.018 -0.008 -0.006
(0.057) (0.060) (0.085) (0.027) (0.107) (0.022)
Cutoff: 0.1 -0.1 0.2 -0.2 0.4 -0.4
Bandwidth: 0.030 0.028 0.049 0.044 0.095 0.058
N (Left): 396 397 394 534 259 633
N (Right): 319 404 303 514 89 701
Controls: No No No No No No
RD Estimates (First-order polynomial). Dependent Variables: dummy equal to one if
at least one hate crime is reported during the year. Years: 2008-2018. Columns (1),
(3) and (5) consider the sample of elections with a margin of victory > 0. Columns
(2), (4) and (6) consider the sample of elections with a margin of victory < 0. Standard
errors clustered at the municipal level in parentheses. Significance levels: ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗
p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table 3.12: Far-right mayors effect on lagged hate crimes – All years
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Conventional -0.006 -0.019 -0.035 -0.013 -0.031
(0.043) (0.045) (0.040) (0.050) (0.042)
Bias-corrected -0.012 -0.024 -0.039 -0.019 -0.035
(0.043) (0.045) (0.040) (0.050) (0.042)
Robust -0.012 -0.024 -0.039 -0.019 -0.035
(0.046) (0.048) (0.043) (0.053) (0.045)
Bandwidth: 0.147 0.122 0.164 0.116 0.159
N (Left): 473 385 468 339 442
N (Right): 382 333 388 295 360
Local FEs: No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mun. Controls: No No Yes No Yes
Mayor Controls: No No No Yes Yes
RD Estimates (First-order polynomial). Dependent Variables: Dummy
equal to one if at least one hate crime is reported during the year n-5. Years:
2008-2018. Municipal controls: log of the population and of surface area
in KM2, % of immigrants, %pensioners, %students, % of people with at
least secondary education, employment rate, log of the average disposable
income, number of non-profit associations per capita. Mayor controls: age,
gender, and education level. Standard errors clustered at the municipal level
in parentheses. Significance levels: ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table 3.13: Far-right mayors effect on lagged hate crimes – Year before the elections
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Conventional -0.006 -0.019 -0.035 -0.013 -0.031
(0.043) (0.045) (0.040) (0.050) (0.042)
Bias-corrected -0.012 -0.024 -0.039 -0.019 -0.035
(0.043) (0.045) (0.040) (0.050) (0.042)
Robust -0.012 -0.024 -0.039 -0.019 -0.035
(0.046) (0.048) (0.043) (0.053) (0.045)
Bandwidth: 0.147 0.122 0.164 0.116 0.159
N (Left): 473 385 468 339 442
N (Right): 382 333 388 295 360
Local FEs: No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mun. Controls: No No Yes No Yes
Mayor Controls: No No No Yes Yes
RD Estimates (First-order polynomial). Dependent Variables: dummy equal
to one if at least one hate crime is reported during the year n-1. Years:
2008-2018. Municipal controls: log of the population and of surface area
in KM2, % of immigrants, %pensioners, %students, % of people with at
least secondary education, employment rate, log of the average disposable
income, number of non-profit associations per capita. Mayor controls: age,
gender, and education level. Standard errors clustered at the municipal level
in parentheses. Significance levels: ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table 3.14: Far-right mayors effect – Visible and violent hate crimes
Visible Visible Violent Violent
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Far-right mayor 0.017∗ 0.019∗∗ 0.012∗ 0.013∗
(0.009) (0.009) (0.007) (0.008)
Bandwidth: 0.128 0.139 0.125 0.126
N (Left): 1870 1791 1805 1624
N (Right): 1591 1531 1564 1421
Controls: No Yes No Yes
RD Estimates (First-order polynomial). Dependent variables:
dummy equal to one if at least one visible or violent hate crime
is reported during the year. Years: 2008-2018. Visible hate
crimes: damages + physical assaults. Violent hate crimes: phys-
ical assaults. All Regressions include year and region fixed ef-
fects. Municipal controls: log of the population and of surface
area in KM2, % of immigrants, %pensioners, %students, % of
people with at least secondary education, employment rate, log
of the average disposable income, number of non-profit associ-
ations per capita. Mayor controls: age, gender, and education
level. Standard errors clustered at the municipal level in paren-
theses. Significance levels: ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table 3.15: Far-right mayors effect – Sub-sources robustness check
Source A: No direct Reports, NGOs, missing
All All Visible Visible
Far-right mayor 0.048∗∗ 0.038∗ 0.017∗ 0.018∗
(0.021) (0.023) (0.009) (0.010)
Bandwidth: 0.159 0.116 0.138 0.126
N (Left): 2297 1495 2008 1633
N (Right): 1864 1293 1684 1426
Controls: No Yes No Yes
Source B: Printed newspapers and newswires
All All Visible Visible
Far-right mayor 0.034∗∗ 0.026 0.014∗ 0.014∗
(0.015) (0.016) (0.007) (0.008)
Bandwidth: 0.132 0.112 0.123 0.111
N (Left): 1948 1468 1782 1443
N (Right): 1612 1262 1532 1257
Controls: No Yes No Yes
Source C: National newspapers and newswires
All All Visible Visible
Far-right mayor 0.034∗∗ 0.035∗∗ 0.019∗∗ 0.020∗∗
(0.016) (0.015) (0.008) (0.009)
Bandwidth: 0.116 0.133 0.136 0.131
N (Left): 1670 1736 1980 1714
N (Right): 1427 1465 1662 1449
Controls: No Yes No Yes
RD Estimates (First-order polynomial). Dependent variables:
dummy equal to one if at least one (visible) hate crime is re-
ported during the year. Years: 2008-2018. All Regressions in-
clude year and region fixed effects. Municipal and mayor con-
trols: see Table 3.6. Standard errors clustered at the municipal
level in parentheses. Significance levels: ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05,
∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table 3.16: Far-right mayors effect – Left-wing newspapers exluded1
All All Visible Visible
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Far-right mayor 0.039∗∗ 0.033∗ 0.019∗∗ 0.021∗∗∗
(0.020) (0.019) (0.008) (0.008)
Bandwidth: 0.148 0.143 0.120 0.147
N (Left): 2174 1852 1733 1917
N (Right): 1773 1565 1492 1584
Controls: No Yes No Yes
1 Repubblica, Huffington Post, L’Espresso, Il Manifesto, L’Unità,
Radio Popolare. Hate crimes from Direct Reports, NGOs, and
missing sources are also excluded.
RD Estimates (First-order polynomial). Dependent variables:
dummy equal to one if at least one (visible) hate crime is reported
during the year. Years: 2008-2018. Visible hate crimes: damages
+ physical assaults. All regressions include year and region fixed
effects. Municipal controls: log of the population and of surface
area in KM2, % of immigrants, %pensioners, %students, % of
people with at least secondary education, employment rate, log
of the average disposable income, number of non-profit associ-
ations per capita. Mayor controls: age, gender, and education
level. Standard errors clustered at the municipal level in paren-
theses. Significance levels: ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
141
Table 3.17: Far-right mayors effect – Intensive margin
All All Visible Visible
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Far-right mayor 0.081∗∗ 0.056∗∗ 0.027∗ 0.034∗∗
(0.036) (0.027) (0.016) (0.017)
Bandwidth: 0.107 0.103 0.131 0.115
N (Left): 1574 1347 1931 1484
N (Right): 1352 1175 1607 1283
Controls: No Yes No Yes
RD Estimates (First-order polynomial). Dependent Variables:
total hate crimes per 10,000 people during the year. Years:
2008-2018. All regressions include year and region fixed ef-
fects. Municipal controls: log of the population and of surface
area in KM2, % of immigrants, %pensioners, %students, % of
people with at least secondary education, employment rate, log
of the average disposable income, number of non-profit associ-
ations per capita. Mayor controls: age, gender, and education
level. Standard errors clustered at the municipal level in paren-
theses. Significance levels: ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table 3.18: Far-right mayors effect – Intensive margin (sub-sources)
Source A: No Direct Reports
All All Visible Visible
Far-right mayor 0.070∗∗ 0.051∗ 0.025 0.034∗∗
(0.034) (0.027) (0.015) (0.017)
Bandwidth: 0.130 0.115 0.152 0.123
N (Left): 1901 1490 2227 1590
N (Right): 1597 1288 1794 1383
Controls: No Yes No Yes
Source B: Printed Newspapers and Newswires
All All Visible Visible
Far-right mayor 0.044∗∗ 0.039∗ 0.025 0.033∗
(0.020) (0.020) (0.016) (0.017)
Bandwidth: 0.109 0.099 0.137 0.118
N (Left): 1599 1290 1999 1516
N (Right): 1357 1150 1677 1310
Controls: No Yes No Yes
Source C: National Newspapers and Newswires
All All Visible Visible
Far-right mayor 0.048∗∗ 0.043∗∗ 0.025 0.034∗∗
(0.021) (0.021) (0.015) (0.017)
Bandwidth: 0.119 0.102 0.160 0.127
N (Left): 1704 1323 2302 1633
N (Right): 1465 1168 1869 1431
Controls: No Yes No Yes
RD Estimates (First-order polynomial). Dependent Variables:
total hate crimes per 10,000 people during the year. Years:
2008-2018. All regressions include year and region fixed ef-
fects. Municipal and mayor controls: see Table 3.6. Standard
errors clustered at the municipal level in parentheses. Signifi-
cance levels: ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table 3.19: Far-right mayors effect – Political and non-political hate crimes
Political Non Political
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Far-right mayor 0.032∗ 0.022 0.015 0.018
(0.017) (0.015) (0.016) (0.015)
Bandwidth 0.136 0.133 0.128 0.154
N (Left): 1994 1737 1860 1984
N (Right): 1663 1465 1586 1608
Controls: No Yes No Yes
RD Estimates (First-order polynomial). Dependent variables:
dummy equal to one if at least a hate crime is reported during
the year. Years: 2008-2018. All regressions include year and
region fixed effects. Municipal controls: log of the population
and of surface area in KM2, % of immigrants, %pensioners,
%students, % of people with at least secondary education, em-
ployment rate, log of the average disposable income, number of
non-profit associations per capita. Mayor controls: age, gender,
education level. Standard errors clustered at the municipal level
in parentheses. Significance levels: ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗
p < 0.01.
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Table 3.20: Far-right mayors (FRM) effect – Re-electable vs. non-re-electable.
All Hate Crimes Political Hate Crimes
Dummy Per capita Dummy Per capita
(1) (2) (3) (4)
FRM Re-eligible 0.039 0.032 0.015 0.001
(0.032) (0.042) (0.023) (0.024)
FRM Term Limit 0.178∗ 0.238∗∗ 0.104∗ 0.173∗∗
(0.098) (0.115) (0.058) (0.084)
Difference: 0.139 0.206 0.089 0.172
Difference (P-value): 0.176 0.093 0.153 0.049
RD Estimates (First-order polynomial). Dependent variables: dummy equal to
one if at least one (political) hate crime is reported during the year (Columns 1
& 3); Total (political hate crimes per 10,000 people during the year (Columns 2
& 4). “Difference” refers to the gap between the “FRM Term Limit” and “FRM
Re-eligible” coefficient, while “Difference (P-value)” shows the significance of
this gap. Years: 2008-2018. All Regressions include year and region fixed
effects. Municipal controls: log of the population and of surface in KM2, %
of immigrants, %pensioners, %students, % of people with at least secondary
education, employment rate, log of the average disposable income, number of
non-profit associations per capita. Mayor controls: age, gender, and education
level. All the covariates are balanced around the threshold, using the propensity
score weighting methodology proposed by Carril et al. (2017). Standard errors
clustered at the municipal level in parentheses. Significance levels: ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗
p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table 3.21: Far-right mayors effect on political hate crimes, by re-eligibility & time
Re-electable Term Limit
First Half Second Half First Half Second Half
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Far-right mayor 0.035∗ -0.008 0.006 0.119∗
(0.021) (0.027) (0.046) (0.070)
Bandwidth: 0.155 0.142 0.147 0.177
N (Left): 826 423 362 233
N (Right): 837 396 141 106
Controls: Yes Yes Yes Yes
RD Estimates (First-order polynomial). Dependent variables: dummy equal to
one if at least one political hate crime is reported during the year. Years: 2008-
2018. All Regressions include year and region fixed effects. Municipal controls:
log of the population and of surface area in KM2, % of immigrants, %pensioners,
%students, % of people with at least secondary education, employment rate, log
of the average disposable income, number of non-profit associations per capita.
Mayor controls: age, gender, and education level. Standard errors clustered at the
municipal level in parentheses. Significance levels: ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗
p < 0.01.
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Far-right mayor (FRM) 0.015 0.016 0.005
(0.024) (0.022) (0.022)
Dummy HC × FRM -0.030
(0.048)
Dummy political HC 0.040
(0.032)
Dummy political HC × FRM -0.083
(0.063)
Dummy non political HC -0.014
(0.022)
Dummy non political HC × FRM 0.019
(0.060)
N 11952 11952 11952
OLS Estimates. Dependent Variables: Dummy equal to one if a (non-term
limit) mayor is re-elected in the next term. Dummy HC takes value one if a
hate crime is reported during the 5 years political mandate. Dummy (non)
political HC takes value one if a (non) political hate crime is reported during
the 5 years political mandate. Years: 2008-2018. All Regressions include
year and region fixed effects and control for the electoral margin of vic-
tory. Municipal controls: log of the population and of surface in KM2, % of
immigrants, %pensioners, %students, % of people with at least secondary
education, employment rate, log of average disposable income, number of
non-profit associations per capita. Mayor controls: age, gender, and educa-
tion level. Standard errors clustered at the municipal level in parentheses.
Significance levels: ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table 3.23: Far-right mayors effect on hate crimes – First vs not-first-time elected
Panel A: First-time elected
Extensive Margin Intensive Margin
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Far-right mayor 0.054∗∗ 0.041 0.054∗ 0.047
(0.027) (0.026) (0.031) (0.033)
Bandwidth: 0.105 0.100 0.095 0.097
N (Left): 1428 1198 1294 1182
N (Right): 929 821 874 800
Controls: No Yes No Yes
Panel B: Not-first-time elected
Extensive Margin Intensive Margin
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Far-right mayor 0.095 0.044 0.186 0.068
(0.060) (0.049) (0.114) (0.060)
Bandwidth: 0.099 0.115 0.116 0.111
N (Left): 1346 1375 1556 1330
N (Right): 277 273 307 265
Controls: No Yes No Yes
RD Estimates (First-order polynomial). Dependent variables
(columns 1 and 2): dummy equal to one if at least one hate crime
is reported during the year. Dependent variables (columns 3 and
4): total hate crimes per 10,000 people during the year. Years:
2008-2018. All Regressions include year and region fixed ef-
fects. Municipal controls: log of the population and of surface
area in KM2, % of immigrants, %pensioners, %students, % of
people with at least secondary education, employment rate, log
of the average disposable income, number of non-profit associ-
ations per capita. Mayor controls: age, gender, and education
level. All the covariates are balanced around the threshold, using
the propensity score weighting methodology proposed by Car-
ril et al. (2017). Standard errors clustered at the municipal level
in parentheses. Significance levels: ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗
p < 0.01.
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Table 3.24: Far-right mayors effect on visible hate crimes – First vs not-first-time
elected
Panel A: First-time elected
Extensive Margin Intensive Margin
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Far-right mayor 0.027∗∗ 0.030∗∗ 0.038∗ 0.043∗
(0.013) (0.014) (0.023) (0.024)
Bandwidth: 0.106 0.103 0.132 0.140
N (Left): 1460 1238 1822 1671
N (Right): 946 830 1138 1089
Controls: No Yes No Yes
Panel B: Not-first-time elected
Extensive Margin Intensive Margin
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Far-right mayor 0.004 -0.029∗∗∗ -0.008∗∗ -0.012∗∗∗
(0.013) (0.011) (0.004) (0.004)
Bandwidth: 0.147 0.073 0.075 0.077
N (Left): 2019 854 998 919
N (Right): 370 185 203 190
Controls: No Yes No Yes
RD Estimates (First-order polynomial). Dependent variables
(Columns 1 and 2): dummy equal to one if at least one visible hate
crime is reported during the year. Dependent variables (Columns 3
and 4): total visible hate crimes per 10,000 people during the year.
Years: 2008-2018. Visible hate crimes: damages + physical assaults.
All Regressions include year and region fixed effects. Municipal con-
trols: log of the population and of surface area in KM2, % of immi-
grants, % of people with at least secondary education over total pop-
ulation, log of average disposable income, employment rate. Mayor
controls: age, gender, and education level. All the covariates are
balanced around the threshold, using the propensity score weighting
methodology proposed by Carril et al. (2017). Standard errors clus-
tered at the municipal level in parentheses. Significance levels: ∗
p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table 3.25: Far-right mayors (FRM) spillover effects on neighbouring localities
All Hate Crimes Visible Hate Crimes
(1) (2) (3) (4)
FRM in LMA × post FRM in LMA 0.009∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗
(0.003) (0.002)
FRM in LMA × Year from election=1 -0.006 0.003
(0.011) (0.006)
FRM in LMA × Year from election=2 0.017∗ 0.004
(0.010) (0.005)
FRM in LMA × Year from election=3 0.025∗∗∗ 0.009∗
(0.009) (0.005)
FRM in LMA × Year from election=4 0.029∗∗∗ 0.011∗∗
(0.009) (0.005)
FRM in LMA × Year from election=5 -0.003 -0.005
(0.010) (0.005)
N 62122 18331 62122 18331
Difference-in-Differences estimates. Dependent variables (Columns 1 and 2): dummy equal
to one if at least a (visible) hate crime is reported during the year. Visible hate crimes: dam-
ages + physical assaults. Years: 2008-2018. All Regressions include year and municipal
fixed effects. Mayor controls: age, gender, education level. Timing Variant municipal con-
trols: (ln) population and (ln) foreign population. Standard errors clustered at the Labor
Market Areas (LMA) level in parentheses. Significance levels: ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗
p < 0.01.
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Table 3.26: Far-right mayors (FRM) effect on hate crimes – Internet role
Panel A: Real Internet Speed (2018)
Dummy HC HC per capita HC group
(1) (2) (3)
FRM in slow Internet mun. 0.060 -0.019 0.005
(0.045) (0.053) (0.014)
FRM in fast Internet mun. 0.063∗ 0.116∗∗ 0.015
(0.035) (0.049) (0.017)
Difference 0.002 0.136 0.009
Difference Pvalue 0.970 0.059 0.672
N 2455 2455 2455
Panel B: Instrument for Internet Speed
Dummy HC HC per capita HC group
(1) (2) (3)
FRM in mun. close to UGS 0.093∗∗ 0.138∗∗∗ 0.006
(0.038) (0.053) (0.012)
FRM in mun. far from UGS -0.006 -0.039 -0.016
(0.057) (0.058) (0.027)
Difference -0.098 -0.176 -0.021
Pvalue 0.149 0.024 0.468
N 2418 2418 2418
RD Estimates (First-order polynom). Dependent variables (Columns 1): dummy equal to
one if at least one hate crime is reported during the year; Dependent variables (Columns
2): total hate crimes per 10,000 people during the year; Dependent variables (Columns 3):
dummy equal to one if at least one hate crime committed in a group is reported during the
year. “Difference” refers to the gap between the “FRM in fast Internet mun.” (“FRM in
mun. far to UGS”) and “FRM in slow Internet mun.” (“FRM in mun. close from UGS”)
coefficient, while “Difference (P-value)” shows the significance of this gap. Years: 2008-
2018. All Regressions include year and region fixed effects. Fast and slow Internet refers
to municipalities with Internet speeds below or above the median (Source: AGCOM, 2018).
“Close to UGS” and “Far from UGS” refers to municipalities with distance below or above
the median from the closest UGS, used as an instrument for Internet Speed (Campante et al.,
2018). Municipal and mayor controls: see Table 3.6. All the covariates are balanced around
the threshold, using the propensity score weighting methodology proposed by Carril et al.
(2017). Standard errors clustered at the municipal level in parentheses. Significance levels:
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Appendix C: Additional Tables
Table 3.A1: Parties considered to be extreme right
Lega Fratelli D’Italia La Destra
Forza Nuova CasaPound Italia Fiamma Tricolore
Alleanza Nazionale Movimento Sociale Fascismo e Libertà
Table 3.A2: Hate crimes – By nature and year
Act type: Damages Discrimination Verbal Violence Total
2008 9 35 21 57 122
2009 13 93 102 98 306
2010 5 112 108 56 281
2011 12 126 244 78 460
2012 9 59 220 62 350
2013 6 72 413 66 557
2014 10 75 634 45 764
2015 16 62 385 39 502
2016 12 59 344 25 440
2017 28 73 347 32 480
2018 29 53 287 87 456
Total 149 819 3105 645 4718
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Appendix D: Fixed effects approach
To strengthen the results found through an RD approach in Section 3.4.1, I
repeat the analysis using an alternative empirical methodology – i.e., a fixed
effects approach. Specifically, in this part of the analysis, I focus on the full
sample of municipalities in which, between 2008 and 2018, a candidate be-
longing to a far-right party has run for the local elections at least once. Simul-
taneously, to fully exploit the fixed effects strategy, this part of the analysis is
carried out at the monthly level (while results presented in Section 3.4.1 were
at the annual level).
The main specification I study is the following:
HateCrimem,t =βFarRightm,T + θXm,t + ζZi,T + τt + ψm + ρt + ϵm (3.5)
where the dependent variable HateCrime is a dummy equal to one if (at least)
one hate crime is reported in municipality m in month t. As in the main
analysis, I decide to focus on the extensive margins (i.e., whether a hate crime
occurred or not) instead of the intensive margin (i.e., the total number of hate
crimes reported).
FarRight is a binary indicator that takes value one in municipalities where,
in the most recent election year (T), a mayor who is a member of or is sup-
ported by a far-right party was elected. The parameter of interest is β and pro-
vides the treatment effect of the election of a far-right mayor on hate crimes.
The presence of a far-right mayor lasts for a five-year term, while the data
on hate crimes occurrence is, in this part of the analysis, at the municipal-
monthly level. Hence, β provides the average monthly effect of electing a
far-right mayor on hate crimes across the electoral cycle.
X is a vector of municipality controls that vary at the annual level: in par-
ticular, for this part of the analysis, they include the population and the for-
eign population; additionally, Z controls for mayor’s characteristics, includ-
ing gender, age, and level of education. Lastly, a rich battery of fixed effects
is introduced. Specifically, τ is a year fixed effects, ψ is a municipality fixed
effects, and ρ is a month of the year fixed effects, introduced to remove po-
tential issues of seasonality in hate crimes. ϵ is a robust error term, clustered
at the municipal level.
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Table 3.A3 provides the results. To make the coefficients easier to inter-
pret, the Table also reports the mean of the dependent variables and the co-
efficient β multiplied by twelve, which provides the average annual effect.
As is evident, a positive and strongly significant effect of far-right mayors on
the occurrence of hate crimes is confirmed. In particular, as reported in Col-
umn (1), in municipalities led by a far-right mayor the monthly probability of
hate crimes is, on average, 0.3 per cent higher (that is equivalent to an annual
increase of 3.6 percentage points).
Columns (2) and (3) show the results by dividing political and non-political
hate crimes. As notable, when a fixed effects approach is used, the magnitude
of the political and non-political hate crimes is similar, although the latter is
slightly more statistically significant. Besides, columns 4 and 5 show the
effect of far-right mayors when looking at specific types of crimes – i.e.,
visible (damage and physical attacks) or violent (physical attacks only). Also
in this case, the results are positive and significant, confirming what found
in Table 3.14 of the main body. The (x 12) coefficients indicate that the
appointment of a far-right mayor increases the yearly likelihood of visible
and violent hate crimes by 1.4 and 1 per cent respectively.
Although the interpretation of the coefficients is (slightly) different, it is
reassuring that the effect found with an RD approach is confirmed when a
fixed effects methodology is implemented. This is true not only when looking
at all hate crimes but also at the most salient and severe ones. Finally, it
is important to remark that the coefficients are also comparable in terms of
magnitude, especially when looking at the visible and violent episodes. This
is an additional factor that reassures the reliability of the results found in the
main analysis.
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Table 3.A3: Far-right mayors effects on hate crimes – Fixed Effects
All Political Non political Visible Violent
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Far-right mayor 0.0030∗∗∗ 0.0015∗ 0.0015∗∗ 0.0012∗∗∗ 0.0007∗∗
(0.0011) (0.0008) (0.0007) (0.0004) (0.0004)
Mean: 0.0089 0.0040 0.0054 0.0013 0.0010
Coefficient (x12): 0.0355 0.0176 0.0179 0.0143 0.0090
N: 254647 254647 254647 254647 254647
Controls: Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Dependent Variables: Dummy equal to one if (at least) a hate crime is reported during the
month. Years: 2008-2018. All regressions include year, month of the year and munici-
pal fixed effects. Municipal controls: population and foreign population. Mayor controls:
gender, age, and level of education. Standard errors clustered at the municipal level in paren-




4. IS THIS THE REAL LIFE OR JUST FANTASY?
REFUGEE RECEPTION, EXTREME RIGHT VOTING,
AND BROADBAND INTERNET
4.1. Introduction
The refugee crisis has been at the center of the global debate during the last
years. In Europe, the salience of the topic has been a consequence of the
broad political rhetoric and the increasing number of asylum applications in
recent years (Figure 4.1). The debate about the relocation of refugees across
and within European countries has proven a politically strenuous exercise.
As a result, evidence about the electoral and social repercussions of refugees’
redistribution can inform policymaking in this regard.
Recent literature in political economy has studied the effect of immigration
on voters’ behavior, especially focusing on the support for extreme parties,
which have seen their approval soared in several European countries. How-
ever, the evidence produced is contradictory, as some studies find that immi-
gration increases the support for far-right parties51 and anti-immigration atti-
tudes (Barone et al., 2016; Dustmann et al., 2019; Edo et al., 2019; Hangart-
ner et al., 2019a, 2019b; Harmon, 2018; Otto & Steinhardt, 2014; Peri et al.,
2020), while others find opposite results (Lonsky, 2020; Steinmayr, 2020;
Vertier & Viskanic, 2019). This contradictory evidence calls for further re-
search on the potential mechanisms behind these divergent results. In partic-
ular, there is not much evidence in the literature on the interaction between
a micro-level of exposure (i.e., the direct contact between natives and im-
migrants) and a macro-level of exposure (i.e., the salience of migration in
traditional and new media) and its effect on natives’ attitudes.
This paper contributes to this recent literature in two ways. First, we study
the effect of micro-exposure to refugees on natives’ voting behavior. We
focus on a diffuse reception policy in Italy, and we show that the opening of
specific refugee centers harms the electoral performance of far-right and anti-
51Throughout the analysis, we use “far-right parties”, “extreme right” and “radical right” as
synonyms.
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immigrant parties. As described in more detail below, these specific refugee
centers generate interactions between natives and immigrants that are consis-
tent with the predictions of the contact theory (Allport, 1954): this could, in
turn, explain the negative effect on anti-immigrant parties vote shares.
However, we also demonstrate that the intensity of the exposure – ex-
pressed as the size of the refugee centers – is critically important. In fact,
we show that the negative effect on the radical right is more substantial for
smaller refugee centers and that it eventually becomes positive when the
refugee center’s size rises above a certain threshold. This evidence points
to the size of immigration inflows as a relevant explanation for the litera-
ture’s contradictory findings. It also suggests that natives may perceive new
immigrants’ arrival as a potential threat to their economic, cultural, and social
dominance when the number of refugees and asylum seekers hosted becomes
too big. This perceived threat can lead to an increase in prejudice and anti-
immigrant attitudes by natives against refugees and asylum seekers, as sug-
gested by the “realistic group conflict theories” (Campbell, 1965; Dustmann
et al., 2019; Lahav, 2004; Quillian, 1995; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999; Taylor,
1998).
Second, we study the interaction between this type of micro-level exposure
and a macro-level exposure captured by the media’s potential role. Specifi-
cally, we focus our attention on the role of broadband Internet. Indeed, recent
literature shows how the Internet and social media can increase the polariza-
tion of society, benefiting extremist parties and worsening the relationship
between immigrants and natives.52 Given the evidence provided by this lit-
erature, we can expect the micro-level exposure effect to be more negligible
in areas with greater access to broadband Internet and the associated macro-
level of exposure. Consistent with this expectation, we show that the negative
effect of refugee centers’ on the support for the radical right is more substan-
tial in areas with low access to the internet. This result suggests that the
possibility to go online reduces the effect of the direct contact between im-
migrants and natives. This reduction can happen through the Internet and
social media’s role in reinforcing anti-immigration beliefs (Chan et al., 2016;
52For a detailed literature review of the impact of the Internet and Social Media on political
outcomes, see Zhuravskaya et al. (2020). Similarly, DellaVigna and La Ferrara (2015)
review the literature on the economic and social impact of exposure to the broadly defined
media.
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Müller & Schwarz, 2018, 2020; Petrova et al., 2020) and support for populist
parties (Guriev et al., 2021; Schaub & Morisi, 2019).
We implement the analysis using data from Italian municipalities and study-
ing a program to relocate refugees and asylum seekers called “The Protection
System for Asylum Seekers and Refugees” (SPRAR). As described below,
SPRAR is one of the most important refugee reception programs in Italy.
However, it is not the only channel through which refugees and asylum seek-
ers are relocated locally (see Campo et al. (2021)). We focus on these types
of refugee centers53 mostly for two reasons. The first is data availability.
Specifically, we implement the analysis by exploiting a rare database on the
reception of refugees through this policy (see Gamalerio (2019) and Gamale-
rio et al. (2020a)). This dataset contains precise information on the location
of the refugee center at the municipal level and on the number of places made
available in the refugee center, allowing us to investigate the role of immigra-
tion inflow’s size.54
The second reason is related with the type of contact that SPRARs can po-
tentially produce between natives and migrants. As described in more detail
in Section 4.2, the interactions generated by SPRAR centers seem to fulfill
the conditions of the contact theory developed by Allport (1954), which can
lead to a reduction in prejudice and anti-immigrant attitudes. SPRARs are
medium-small centers directly opened and managed by municipal govern-
ments, aiming to help the refugees and asylum seekers integrate and become
autonomous on the territory that hosts them. Municipalities that open these
centers often employ asylum seekers in public utility works, fostering in-
teraction with the local population. Besides, SPRARs provide job market
orientation services to refugees, who may be hired by local firms and be-
come work colleagues and friends with people in the local community. Also,
anecdotal evidence describes how SPRAR centers’ opening has helped many
towns keep alive local public services like schools, especially in areas with a
declining population. Thus, it is highly likely that SPRAR centers generate
the type of direct contact that could improve the attitudes of natives toward
migrants, as described by the contact theory (Allport, 1954). For this reason,
53From now on, defined as “SPRARs”.
54As a robustness check, we also show that our baseline results do not change if, inside the
treatment variable, we consider other types of refugee centers for which we have less
detailed data and information.
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we think that SPRAR centers represent an exciting testing ground.
The empirical analysis studies the effect of the opening of SPRARs on the
change in the support for far-right parties between the 2013 and the 2018
national elections. It also looks at the effect on the votes shares of political
forces located in the center of the political spectrum. We estimate these ef-
fects through both ordinary least squares (OLS) and instrumental variables
(IV). Specifically, we develop the IV analysis using pre-existing group ac-
commodation buildings as an instrument for the opening of SPRAR centers.
Examples of group accommodation buildings are homes for the disabled, el-
derly, orphans, and drug addicts. As explained in more detail below, we
exploit the fact that these buildings, while they were created in the past with
different purposes, could host asylum seekers in the years of the refugee cri-
sis (Steinmayr, 2020). Crucially for our identification strategy, we show that
these buildings do not correlate with the change in vote shares between the
2008 and the 2013 national elections. Conversely, they correlate with the
vote shares between the 2013 and the 2018 elections. This evidence suggests
that our instrument started to correlate with our dependent variables only dur-
ing the years of the refugee crisis, namely when the group accommodation
buildings could be used to host refugees and asylum seekers.
Once we implement this identification strategy, our results show that host-
ing refugees negatively affects the vote shares of far-right parties. At the same
time, it benefits the moderate, centrist political forces. This effect is signifi-
cant and quite large in magnitude: the IV estimates indicate that municipali-
ties that opened a SPRAR center between the 2013 and 2018 elections experi-
enced a change in the votes shares of extreme right, approximately 7 percent-
age points lower than municipalities that did not open SPRAR centers. The
results are robust when controlling for municipalities’ socio-economic fea-
tures, the local politicians’ characteristics, and the presence of other refugee
centers opened through alternative channels different from the SPRAR pro-
gram.
In the second part of the paper, we investigate two potential channels that
might explain the main result. First, we focus on the dimension of the centers,
and we show that small SPRARs drive the results. In fact, we demonstrate
that the effect on the support for the radical right becomes positive if a refugee
center with more than 28 places every 1000 inhabitants made available to
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host refugees every year is opened. The result suggests that governments
and policymakers should redistribute refugees and asylum seekers in a more
homogeneous way and through the opening of diffuse and small reception
centers.
Second, our heterogeneity analysis shows that the negative effect is more
substantial for municipalities with lower access to broadband Internet. This
suggests that the macro-level impact of an increase in the media migration’s
salience can potentially reduce the micro-level impact that works through the
direct contact between natives and migrants.
The paper contributes to two very recent strands of literature. First, it con-
tributes to the recent political economy literature, which studies how immi-
gration and the reception of refugees and asylum seekers affect the electoral
success of extreme right and populist political parties. Some of the papers
in this literature find that large immigration flows and stocks can positively
affect the vote for far-right and populist parties (Edo et al., 2019; Hangartner
et al., 2019a, 2019b; Harmon, 2018; Otto & Steinhardt, 2014; Peri et al.,
2020). The evidence produced suggests that this positive effect is concen-
trated in small municipalities and rural areas (Dustmann et al., 2019), and it
is larger for migrants with dissimilarities in terms of language, religion, and
race compared to natives (Mendez & Cutillas, 2014).
Specifically for Italy, Barone et al. (2016) show that immigrants’ share at
the municipal level positively affects the vote shares of (extreme) right par-
ties. Our paper differs from Barone et al. (2016) in that we focus on asylum
seekers and a specific reception policy. Also, Bellucci et al. (2019) study
the positive causal relationship between perceived immigration and the votes
shares of anti-immigrant parties. Our analysis differs from the one of Bel-
lucci et al. (2019) in that we study the effect of direct contact between natives
and immigrants and not natives’ perceptions. Lastly, the paper probably most
similar to ours is that of Campo et al. (2021). In their recent analysis, Campo
et al. (2021) investigate the effect of the opening CAS centers on voting for
the right-wing populist parties. Although their results are opposite to those
found in our paper, the two analyses should be considered complementary.
In fact, the SPRAR system is markedly different from the CAS system, es-
pecially in the kinds of interactions generated between natives refugees (see
Section 4.2). Thus, the fact that different reallocation programs generate di-
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vergent effects on the support for the radical right reinforces our assumptions
about the importance of the integration-oriented services provided to asylum
seekers in SPRARs.55
Conversely, other papers in the same literature find that migration can re-
duce the support for far-right and populist political parties (Steinmayr, 2020),
especially when the inflow is small (Vertier & Viskanic, 2019). More specif-
ically, Steinmayr (2020) uses data from Upper Austria to show that munici-
palities that host refugees experience a reduction in the positive overall trend
in support for the far-right Freedom Party. Besides, Vertier and Viskanic
(2019) show that the opening of refugee centers that follows the relocation
of refugees from Calais to other French municipalities reduces the vote share
increase of the far-right Front National. Our baseline results on voting for
far-right parties are in line with the results of Steinmayr (2020). However,
our paper differs in that we investigate how this baseline effect changes with
the size of the refugee centers and broadband Internet availability. Our pa-
per’s baseline result and the heterogeneity analysis on the size of the refugee
centers are consistent with the findings of Vertier and Viskanic (2019). Differ-
ently from them, we also investigate the role of the Internet and its interaction
with refugees’ reception.
55Three other papers study the reception of refugees in Italy. Genovese et al. (2017) use sur-
vey data from Italian Regions to study how public feelings about non-EU immigration are
influenced by the central government’s distribution of refugees across different regions.
Our paper differs in that they study the effect of refugees’ reception on attitudes using
survey data, while we use data on voting behavior measured at the municipal level. Bratti
et al. (2021), using data on Italian municipalities and the 2016 Italian Constitutional Ref-
erendum, show that the geographical proximity to refugee reception centers leads to an
increase in turnout and the share of anti-government votes, measured by the shares of
“no” to the Constitutional Reform. Our paper differs in that we focus on opening refugee
centers within a municipality rather than in neighboring municipalities. This different
focus enables us to study the effect of direct contact between the local population and
the refugees hosted rather than indirect contact. The different focus probably explains
why we find results that go in a different direction. Finally, data on SPRAR refugee cen-
ters are provided by Gamalerio (2019), who uses data on Italian municipalities to study
the effect of electoral incentives on the probability that a municipal government opens a
SPRAR center. The analysis of Gamalerio (2019) suggests that the opening of refugee
centers in Italian municipalities is endogenous to various observable and unobservable
municipal characteristics. For this reason, in this paper, we implement an instrumental
variable strategy that enables us to deal with this potential endogeneity.
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This paper also contributes to the literature that studies how the Internet
and social media can have a significant effect on voting behavior and the
attitudes of natives toward immigrants (Bellucci et al., 2019; Chan et al.,
2016; Falck et al., 2014; Gavazza et al., 2019; Guriev et al., 2021; Müller &
Schwarz, 2018, 2020; Petrova et al., 2020; Romarri, 2020; Schaub & Morisi,
2019; Zhuravskaya et al., 2020). For example, the analyses by Müller and
Schwarz (2018, 2020) describe how social media can lead to an increase in
hate crimes toward immigrants, respectively in Germany and the US; simi-
lar results have also been found in Russia (Petrova et al., 2020). Moreover,
Guriev et al. (2021) and Schaub and Morisi (2019) provides evidence on the
relationship between the Internet and the electoral support for both right-wing
and left-wing populist political parties. For what concerns the Italian context,
Campante et al. (2018) provide evidence of the direct effect of broadband in-
ternet on voting behavior. In contrast, Bellucci et al. (2019) demonstrate that
natives support more anti-immigration parties in areas with more broadband
Internet availability when they expect more migrants to arrive.56 We con-
tribute to this literature by showing how the effect of direct contact between
refugees and natives can change across areas with different levels of access
to broadband Internet.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 4.2 describes the differ-
ent allocation policies of refugees in Italy, with a specific focus on SPRAR;
Section 4.3 illustrates in details the sources and the characteristics of the
dataset of the analysis; Section 4.4 presents the empirical analysis, reports the
main results, and provides several robustness checks; Section 4.5 proposes
two channels that can potentially explain the results; and, finally, Section 4.6
concludes.
4.2. Institutional Setting: the allocation of refugees in Italy
This paper studies how the opening of refugee centers affects voting for far-
right parties. Specifically, we focus on a precise type of reception center
called “The Protection System for Asylum Seekers and Refugees” (SPRARs).
These centers represent the second reception level, usually hosting refugees
56In the same Italian context, Mastrorocco and Minale (2018) detect a decrease in the share
of votes for the center-right coalition as a result of the introduction of the digital TV.
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and asylum seekers coming from the first reception level. In Italy, there are
three types of refugee centers that form part of the first level of reception:
CPSA (“Centri di primo soccorso e accoglienza”, i.e., First aid and hospi-
tality centers), CDA (“Centri di accoglienza”, i.e., Hospitality centers) and
CARA (“Centri di accoglienza per richiedenti asilo”, i.e., Reception centers
for asylum seekers). The Italian central government manages CPSA, CDA,
and CARA, and municipal governments do not participate in these centers’
management. The first level of reception’s scope is to identify the migrants
who have just arrived in Italy, provide the first assistance, and give them the
possibility to apply for asylum. While waiting for the outcome of their ap-
plication, asylum seekers are usually redistributed in second-level centers –
among which the most common are the SPRARs.
Following the Arab Spring, in 2011-2013, the Italian central government
opened a type of temporary center (ENA, Emergency North Africa) to host
the increasing number of migrants from North Africa. Besides, since 2014,
the Italian government introduced another type of center, the CAS (“Centri
di accoglienza straordinaria”, i.e., Centers for extraordinary reception). The
Italian government introduced CAS to deal with the refugee crisis and the
associated increasing number of asylum seekers who have arrived in Italy in
recent years (Figure 4.1). The provincial offices (“Prefetture”) of the Home
Office manage CAS centers, and municipalities do not have powers. SPRAR
and CAS centers have become the two main kinds of reception centers used
in Italy in the last years. More in detail, CAS centers have provided roughly
75-80 % of all places available in reception centers. SPRAR centers approx-
imately 15-20 %.57
As anticipated in Section 4.1, we focus the analysis on SPRAR centers
primarily for two reasons. The first is data-related, as we can exploit a de-
tailed dataset on SPRARs’ presence and characteristics (Gamalerio, 2019;
Gamalerio et al., 2020a) (See Section 4.3). The second is linked to the fact
that SPRAR centers can potentially produce interactions between natives and
57As an example, in April 2018, over a total of 173,150 refugees and asylum seekers, CAS
centers were hosting 138,503 individuals and SPRAR centers 25,657 (sources: Openpo-
lis and Documento di Economia e Finanza (DEF), 2018, Italian Ministry of Economy).
Besides, as reported by the 2018 “Atlante SPRAR”, in the same year, SPRAR centers
have provided a total number of available places equal to 35,881, which have allowed
SPRAR centers to host a total number of 41,113 immigrants.
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immigrants that fulfill the conditions of the contact theory (Allport, 1954).
Specifically, according to this theory, the direct contact between natives and
immigrants can lead to a reduction in prejudice and anti-immigrant attitudes
under the following four conditions: equal status between the two groups,
common goals, intergroup cooperation, and authority support.
We think that the contact generated by SPRAR centers meets these con-
ditions for a series of reasons. First, SPRARs are medium-small centers
directly opened and managed by municipal governments.58 Hence, local
authorities must agree with the opening of the centers and support and en-
courage the interaction between the local population and the asylum seekers.
Second, municipalities tend to employ the migrants hosted in public utility
works, which fosters interaction between the refugees and the local popula-
tion. Examples of these public utility works are providing support to the local
elderly population (e.g., buy medicines and food, throw the rubbish, provide
technological support, pay the bills) and kids (e.g., take them to school), or
helping in cleaning and re-qualifying public spaces such as parks and com-
munal vegetable gardens.59 Third, SPRAR centers provide job market ori-
entation services to refugees and asylum seekers, who may be hired by local
firms and become work colleagues and friends with people in the local com-
munity.60 Fourth, it is easy to find anecdotal evidence that describes how the
opening of SPRAR centers has helped many towns keep alive local public
services like schools, especially in areas with a declining population.61
58When the Italian Home Office wants to allocate refugees and asylum seekers through the
SPRAR program, it issues a tender. Table 4.A1 reports the timing of the tenders involved
in our analysis. During this time span, local governments decide whether to submit a
bid to open a SPRAR center on their territory. Winning municipalities are then allowed
to open a SPRAR center and receive fiscal grants from the central government. These
grants fund the SPRAR centers’ activities, among which we find Italian language courses,
health support, and job market orientation.
59For more information on the activities developed by SPRAR centers and the interaction
between natives and refugees see the various editions of the “Atlante SPRAR” published
over the years in the SPRAR web page.
60The “Atlante SPRAR” reports that, in 2018, 9845 migrants hosted through the SPRAR
program participated in a professional training course. In the same year, 5363 refugees
and asylum seekers found a job. SPRAR refugees and asylum seekers’ main employment
sectors were industry, agriculture, and food services.
61An example of this anecdotal evidence can be found in the article “Sono i profughi a far
rivivere borghi abbandonati” from Linkiesta on 22/11/2014 (in Italian).
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Thus, the features and the activities developed by SPRAR centers seem
to fulfill the contact theory conditions of equal status, common goals, in-
tergroup cooperation, and authority support that may lead to a reduction in
anti-immigrant attitudes and voting behavior. For this reason, we think that
SPRAR centers represent an exciting testing ground.62
Municipalities usually locate SPRAR centers in two types of buildings.
First, municipalities can open SPRARs using flats that are available at the
municipal level. These flats can be owned by both private citizens or by the
municipal administration. Second, municipalities can locate SPRAR centers
in group accommodation buildings such as homes for the disabled, elderly,
orphans, and drug addicts. These are buildings that can potentially accom-
modate groups of people. As described below, we exploit the heterogeneous
presence of group accommodation buildings at the municipal level to build an
instrument for the opening of SPRAR centers (Steinmayr, 2020). Table 4.A2
describes the evolution over time of the share of SPRAR centers opened in
the two different types of buildings, as described by the official SPRAR report
published every year (“Atlante SPRAR”).
As mentioned, we study the role of the reception center’s size as one
of the main heterogeneity mechanisms. The number of places available in
SPRARs usually is the outcome of the interaction between municipalities and
the Home Office. A municipal government willing to open a SPRAR needs to
indicate in the bid the number of places that it intends to provide in the center.
However, as Table 4.A3 reports, the Italian Home Office usually establishes a
minimum and a maximum number of places that centers can provide. These
numbers changes across tenders, and they usually depend on the size of the
municipal population. As described in more detail in Section 4.5, in the em-
pirical analysis, we exploit this institutional setup to analyze the role of the
size of the reception center in affecting the natives’ voting behavior.
62As described in Section 4.1, in a robustness check, we include CAS centers within the
treatment variable. Even though we have less detailed data and information on CAS
centers, the paper’s baseline results do not change when we also consider CAS centers
within the treatment. Besides, as an additional robustness check, we show that the paper
results do not change if we include as covariates a series of control variables that cap-
ture the presence of all the other types of reception centers in a municipality. All these
robustness checks allow us to deal with the fact that SPRAR centers do not represent the
only type of reception center in Italy.
166
We focus our analysis on the SPRAR centers opened in the period 2014-
2018, which are the years during which the refugee crisis became more in-
tense, as shown by the increasing number of asylum seekers who arrived in
EU countries (Figure 4.1). In these years, also the number of municipali-
ties that started to participate in the SPRAR program grew considerably. As
shown by Table 4.A4 and Figure 4.2, both the number of municipalities that
entered the SPRAR program and the number of places made available and
refugees hosted increased intensively starting from 2014.
4.3. Data
In our analysis, we use data coming from different sources. The first im-
portant dataset concerns the presence and characteristics of SPRAR centers.
These pieces of information come from a detailed and rare dataset, recently
used in the same Italian context (Gamalerio, 2019; Gamalerio et al., 2020a).
This database contains comprehensive information on the SPRARs opened in
both the period of interest of our analysis (i.e., the years 2014-2018) and the
years before 2014. The data sources are the Italian Home Office, the official
web page of the SPRAR program, and the “Briguglio archive”, which reports
different migration documentations. Specifically, we exploit information on
the municipalities that bid for a center, the winning municipalities, the places
available in any specific center, and the fiscal grants received.
Simultaneously, data on first-level reception centers (CPSA, CDA, CARA)
comes from the Italian Home Office. The data on the presence of CAS and
ENA refugee centers comes from the Openpolis foundation. The source
used by Openpolis to reconstruct the presence of CAS and ENA centers at
the municipal level is the National database of public contracts (Banca dati
nazionale dei contratti pubblici) of the National Anti-Corruption Authority
(ANAC, Autorit‘a Nazionale Anti-Corruzione). Besides, Openpolis has used
the web pages of the Home Office’s provincial offices. As described by Open-
polis, given the difficulty in obtaining data from the Italian Home Office’s
provincial offices, it is unclear whether this dataset on CAS and ENA centers
contains complete information on all these types of centers opened at the mu-
nicipal level. Moreover, this dataset does not report information on the size
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of the reception centers.63
To construct the dependent variables of the analysis, we download the elec-
toral outcomes for 2008, 2013, and 2018 national elections from the Italian
Home Office website (“Archivio storico delle elezioni”). We use this data to
calculate the change between elections in the vote shares of far-right parties,64
of political parties in the center of the Italian political spectrum,65 of the Five
Stars Movement,66 and to calculate the change in the electoral turnout. We
use data for the election to the Chamber of Deputies only.67
Data on the group accommodation buildings comes from the Italian Sta-
tistical Office and the 2011 Census. Specifically, we collect information on
the presence at the municipal level in 2011 of group accommodation build-
ings such as homes for the disabled, elderly, orphans, and drug addicts that
can potentially accommodate groups of people. We use this data to build
the instrument used to implement the identification strategy described in Sec-
tion 4.4. It is worth highlighting that, using the 2011 Census, we are records
the presence of group accommodations built before the years of the refugee
crisis.
We also use data from the Italian Communications Guarantor Authority (in
Italian “Autorità per le Garanzie nelle Comunicazioni”, AGCOM) to distin-
guish between municipalities with low and high access to broadband internet.
This data reports information at the municipal level on households’ share with
access to broadband Internet and information on the Internet speed measured
in Mbps for all the municipalities. The year of reference for the AGCOM
data is 2018.
63For a very recent and comprehensive dataset on CAS, see Campo et al. (2021).
64We code as far-right the following political forces: Lega Nord, Fratelli d’Italia, Casa
Pound, La Destra, Forza Nuova, Fiamma Tricolore, Rinfondazione Missina.
65We define centrist political parties the center-left Partito Democratico and the center-right
Forza Italia (the party led by Silvio Berlusconi). These two political forces have been the
main center-left and center-right parties for most of the Second Italian Republic years.
66The Five Stars Movement is a relatively new political party founded in 2009 by the co-
median and activist Beppe Grillo in cooperation with the web entrepreneur Gianroberto
Casaleggio. This party represents today one of the leading populist European parties, and
the (short) experience in forming a government together with Lega in 2018 has hardened
its position on immigration policies.
67This is because there is a minimum age for voters to elect the Senate. Thus, votes for the
Chamber of Deputies are a preferred measurement of citizens’ political preferences.
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Data on municipalities’ characteristics comes from the Italian Statistical
Office (ISTAT). More in detail, we collect information on the municipal popu-
lation, the area in squared kilometers, the altitude, the unemployment rate, the
average income per capita, the location of the municipalities, the types and
number of buildings, the number of no-profit association, the age structure of
the municipal population, the level of education of the local population, and
the share of immigrants. Data on the mayors’ characteristics comes from the
Italian Home Office (“Anagrafe degli Amministratori Locali”). Specifically,
we collect information on the gender, age, level of education, political ori-
entation, and election date of the mayors of all municipalities in the dataset.
We use these municipal and mayoral characteristics as control variables in
the analysis below.
The final sample contains 7627 Italian municipalities, for which we have
data on all the relevant variables for our analysis. Table 4.1 reports the de-




This paper aims to study the effect of the opening of refugee centers on the
voting behavior of natives. We implement the analysis studying the effect
of the SPRAR refugee centers opened in the period 2014-2018. During this
period, the European refugee crisis started and escalated, with more than one
million refugees and asylum seekers arriving in Europe in 2015 alone. Fo-
cusing on the period 2014-2018 enables us to study how voters’ attitudes
changed straight after the arrival of new refugees and asylum seekers when
migration became a salient topic in politics and the media. Besides, as we can
see from Table 4.A4, most of the centers opened starting from 2014, when the
SPRAR program increased in size to deal with the rising number of refugees
and asylum seekers arrived in Italy.
We develop the empirical analysis using the sample of all Italian munici-
palities for which we observe the electoral outcomes of the national elections
run in the years 2013 and 2018 (i.e., the national elections just before and
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just after the refugee crisis). We start the analysis by estimating the following
OLS model:
Yi = α0 + α1OpenS PRARi + αkXk,i + ϵi (4.1)
where Yi captures two main dependent variables. The first is equal to ∆% f ar−
right18 − 13 = (% f ar − right2018) − (% f ar − right2013), which is the change
in the vote shares for far-right parties between the 2018 and the 2013 national
elections in municipality i. The second dependent variable is∆%ForzaItalia+
PD18 − 13 = (%ForzaItalia + PD)2018 − (%ForzaItalia + PD)2013, which is
the change in the vote shares for centrist parties between the 2018 and the
2013 national elections in municipality i. Besides, we also look at the Five
Stars Movement’s vote shares and the electoral turnout.
The treatment variable is OpenS PRARi, a dummy variable equal to 1 for
the municipalities that opened at least one SPRAR refugee center in the years
2014-2018 (i.e., between the 2013 and 2018 elections). The vector Xk,t con-
tains municipal and mayoral characteristics potentially correlated with both
the dependent and the treatment variables. We cluster the standard errors at
the local labor market level.68
Since the decision of opening a SPRAR center is endogenous, to deal with
the potential biases in the OLS analysis, we turn to an instrumental vari-
ables (IV) approach. Similarly to Steinmayr (2020), we instrument the treat-
ment variable OpenS PRARi with the presence at the municipal level of pre-
existing group accommodation. The source of these buildings is the 2011
Census, implying that we are catching structures already present before the
refugee crisis. More in detail, we consider buildings such as homes for the
disabled, elderly, orphans, and drug addicts that can potentially accommodate
groups of people.
68Labor market areas (LMAs) are 611 sub-regional geographical areas where the bulk of
the labor force lives and works and where firms can find the most of the labor force
necessary to occupy the offered jobs. Given their homogeneity in terms of population
characteristics, we believe that clustering the errors at this level is the most natural choice.
However, the results are also robust if we cluster the errors at higher spatial units, such
as at the provincial level.
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We start the IV analysis by running the following first stage regression:
OpenS PRARi = γ0 + γ1GroupAccommodationi + γkXk,i + ui (4.2)
where GroupAccommodationi is equal to 1 if municipality i was reported to
have at least one group accommodation building in the 2011 Census. Hence,
we run the following second stage regression:
Yi = β0 + β1OpenS PRARiˆ + βkXk,i + ηi (4.3)
where OpenS PRARiˆ is the predicted value of OpenS PRARi obtained from
equation 4.2. The IV approach needs two main assumptions to be verified.
First, it needs a strong first-stage regression, such that GroupAccommodationi
correlates strongly with OpenS PRARi. The maps in Figure 4.3 provides a
preliminary visual representation of this assumption. In the analysis below,
we formally test for the presence of a strong first-stage regression. Second,
the exclusion restriction assumption requires an exogenous instrument that
can affect the dependent variable only through its effect on the endogenous
treatment variable.
One might be concerned that our instrument is not exogenous and that the
characteristics of municipalities with and without group accommodations are
different. The presence of fixed effects at the municipal level and the ex-
tensive set of controls we introduce into our equation limit these concerns.
What is actually crucial for our identification strategy is that the the instru-
ment has an effect on voting only through SPRAR centers. We formally test
this hypothesis in the reduced-form model described in Section 4.4.3. Reas-
suringly, we show that the presence of these buildings does not correlate with
the change in vote shares between the 2008 and 2013 national elections. In
contrast, their presence correlates with the vote shares between the 2013 and
2018 elections. This evidence suggests that our instrument correlates with
the dependent variables only during the refugee crisis period when the group
accommodation buildings could host refugees and asylum seekers.
Given these considerations, we are confident that the main parameter of in-




Tables 4.3 and Table 4.4 provide the main results of the analysis, namely the
effect of the opening of a refugee center at the municipal level on the vot-
ing outcomes at the national elections. Specifically, Tables 4.3 focuses on the
change in the vote shares of far-right parties. In contrast, Table 4.4 reports the
results obtained using as a dependent variable the change in the vote shares of
the moderate parties. Finally, we study the impact of the opening of SPRAR
on the vote shares of the Five Stars Movement and the electoral turnout: re-
sults on these outcomes are reported in Tables 4.5.
Tables 4.3 and 4.4 follow the same structure: in column 1, we report the
coefficient estimated by an OLS regression. In column 2, we display the
reduced-form model’s coefficient, obtained regressing the dependent variable
on our instrument. Columns 3 and 4 report the coefficients of the IV analysis
implemented, respectively, with and without municipal and mayoral control
variables. As described in more detail in Subsection 4.4.3, columns 5 and
6 look at the pre-trends, providing evidence on the validity of the exclusion
restriction assumption of our instrument. The bottom Panel of Tables reports
the coefficients and the F-statistics of the first stage.
We begin our analysis by looking at the effect on radical parties. The co-
efficient in column 1 of Tables 4.3 shows that SPRAR centers’ opening dur-
ing the 2014-2018 period negatively correlates with the change in the vote
shares of far-right parties between the 2013 and 2018 national elections. Pre-
cisely, the presence of a SPRAR refugee center is associated with a change in
the vote shares of extreme right parties that is approximately 0.7 percentage
points lower.
As explained above, opening a SPRAR refugee center is endogenous to
the mayor. Hence, to identify a causal effect, we run the IV model described
in equation 4.3. As shown in the bottom panel of Table 4.3, the first stage
is strong both with and without control variables, and group accommodation
buildings and SPRARs positively correlate. Figure 4.3 provides a visual rep-
resentation of this positive correlation. The coefficients of the IV analysis
reported in columns 3 and 4 confirm the result of column 1. The municipali-
ties that opened a SPRAR during the 2014-2018 period experienced a change
in the vote shares of far-right parties, which is approximately 7 percentage
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points lower than in municipalities that did not open a SPRAR center in the
same period.
The results of Table 4.3 indicate that the opening of SPRARs hurt the elec-
toral performance of extreme right. Given this evidence, it is interesting to
investigate if other political forces benefited from the opening of the refugee
centers, absorbing the vote shares lost by the far-right parties. For this reason,
in Table 4.4, we repeat the same analysis for the moderate political parties
(i.e., Partito Democratico and Forza Italia).
Columns 1-4 of Table 4.4 report the results of this analysis. The coefficient
of the OLS analysis is small, negative, and not statistically different from
zero. In contrast, the IV analysis coefficients in columns 3 and 4 are positive
and statistically different from zero. More in detail, the coefficients show
that the municipalities that opened a SPRAR refugee center during the 2013-
2018 period experienced a change in the vote shares of the centrist parties,
approximately between 3.8 and 5.4 percentage points higher compared to the
changed experienced by the municipalities that did not open a SPRAR center.
These results confirm that far-right parties’ electoral damage after opening a
refugee center mainly benefited the political forces that occupy the central
area of the Italian political spectrum.
In contrast with the results of Table 4.4, the coefficient in column 3 of Table
4.5 shows that the negative effect of SPRAR refugee centers on the electoral
performance of far-right parties did not benefit another important force in
the Italian political arena, the Five Stars Movement. In fact, this party has
never taken a clear line on immigration, so, a priori, we had no expectations
about this outcome. Simultaneously, the coefficient in column 6 of Table 4.5
indicates that the opening of SPRAR centers during the 2014-2018 period did
not affect significantly the electoral turnout at national elections.69
The OLS and IV coefficients in Tables 4.3 and 4.4 indicates the presence
of a positive bias in OLS estimates when the dependent variable is the vote
shares of radical right and a negative bias for the centrist parties. These biases
69Results in this section focus on the intensive margin – i.e., changes in vote share. However,
results are in line if we look at total votes to party x divided by the number of eligible
voters (extensive margin). This analysis, together with the null result found on the elec-
toral turnout, rules out the mobilization/demobilization effect and reinforces the idea that
the effect is driven by people switching their vote.
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are consistent in terms of sign and magnitude with the ones described by
Steinmayr (2020) for the case of Upper Austria (where a 4 percentage points
decrease in the political support for far-right parties was found). We can
explain these biases in two ways.
First, even though the dataset on SPRAR centers is detailed, we cannot ex-
clude measurement errors. As explained by Gamalerio et al. (2020a), in some
cases, municipalities open SPRAR centers together, through municipalities’
unions. These unions are local organizations introduced by groups of munic-
ipalities that aim to produce public goods together. In these situations, we
have coded all the municipalities in the union as treated – i.e., as if they all
had opened the center. However, this is not always the case, and some munic-
ipalities may have not received the refugee hosted in the center opened by the
union.70 Thus, these situations may create a measurement error that might
lead to an attenuation bias, which the IV estimates tend to correct.71
Second, as described by Gamalerio (2019), many municipal governments
are opposed to the opening of refugee centers on their territory for electoral
reasons. Hence, the mayors from centrist parties who do not open SPRAR
centers may attract right-wing voters’ votes, subtracting the votes from radi-
cal right. This far-right voters movement could lead to a negative correlation
between the opening of SPRAR centers and the vote shares of centrist parties.
Hence, the OLS coefficient would be negatively biased for centrist parties and
positively biased for extreme right parties.
4.4.3. Robustness checks
This section describes a series of tests that we run to check the robustness of
our main results. First, we provide evidence on the validity of the exclusion
70In some cases, using web resources, we could check which municipalities within the union
effectively opened the SPRAR center and coded the treatment variable accordingly. Be-
sides, we have checked that our results are robust to dropping from the analysis munici-
palities that opened a SPRAR center through a municipality union.
71In Section 4.4.3, we repeat the analysis using CAS refugee centers or a combination of
CAS and SPRAR refugee centers as the treatment variable. As explained in Section 4.3,
data on CAS centers are incomplete and characterized by measurement error. The fact
that we observe the same attenuation bias in the analysis with CAS centers seems to
reinforce the role of measurement error in biasing OLS estimates.
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restriction assumption of our instrument. Additionally, we show that the main
results are not due to differential pre-treatment trends in electoral outcomes
between municipalities that opened a SPRAR center and municipalities that
did not. Second, we show that our results do not change if we add to the
analysis control variables that capture the presence of other types of refugee
centers at the municipal level. Finally, we show that we get similar results
repeating the analysis using CAS refugee centers or a combination of CAS
and SPRAR refugee centers as treatment variables (see Subsection 4.2 for
more information on other types of refugee centers).
We report the results of the first robustness check in columns 5 and 6 of
Table 4.3 for far-right parties and columns 5 and 6 of Table 4.4 for centrist
parties. Columns 5 of Tables 4.3-4.4 show that the instrument does not corre-
late with the change in the vote shares of far-right and centrist parties between
the 2008 and the 2013 elections. In contrast, columns 2 of Tables 4.3 and 4.4
show that the instrument negatively correlates with the change in the vote
shares of extreme right between the 2013 and the 2018 elections and posi-
tively correlates with the change in the votes shares of centrist parties. This
evidence indicates that the availability of group accommodation buildings at
the municipal level started to correlate with the voting behavior only during
the refugee crisis, namely when these buildings could host refugees and asy-
lum seekers. By contrast, this correlation was not in place in the previous
years when the migration inflows’ magnitude was lower. Figure 4.4 provides
a graphical visualization of this evidence. Besides, in columns 6 of Tables
4.3 and 4.4, we repeat the analysis using as a dependent variable the change
in the vote shares of far-right and moderate parties between the 2008 and the
2013 elections. Both columns show how the treatment does not correlate with
these past dependent variables. Thus, we can confidently exclude that the IV
results are due to differential pre-treatment trends in electoral outcomes.
In Table 4.A5, we repeat the analysis adding as controls a series of vari-
ables that capture the presence of other types of refugee centers at the mu-
nicipal level. More specifically, we control for dummy variables capturing
the presence of first-level reception centers (CPSA, CDA, and CARA), CAS
centers opened before and after 2014, and ENA centers. We also control for
a continuous variable taken from the 2011 Census that counts the number of
refugee centers hosted in the municipality’s province. Besides, we control
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for dummy variables equal to 1 for municipalities that have developed ser-
vices that supported the activity of CAS and ENA refugee centers opened
in other municipalities. As we can see from Table 4.A5, adding these con-
trol variables to our analysis leaves the results unchanged. This robustness
check rules out the possibility that our results could be due to other types of
refugee centers in the territory of the municipalities that opened a SPRAR
center between 2013 and 2018.
Finally, in Tables 4.A6 and 4.A7, we repeat the analysis using CAS refugee
centers (Table 4.A6) or a combination of CAS and SPRAR refugee centers
(Table 4.A7) as treatment variable. As described in Section 4.2, CASs and
SPRARs represent the main types of refugee centers in the Italian context.
However, as illustrated in Section 4.3, data available on CAS centers are in-
complete and likely to be characterized by measurement errors. Additionally,
we do not have information on the CAS centers’ size, making it possible to
develop the heterogeneity analysis described below only for SPRAR centers.
For these reasons, we have decided to focus the main part of the analysis on
SPRARs. However, as a robustness check, we repeat the analysis including
the information available on the presence of CAS centers at the municipal
level in the treatment variable. Tables 4.A6 and 4.A7 confirm our results. In-
deed, municipalities that underwent the opening of a CAS center or the open-
ing of a CAS and/or a SPRAR center between 2014 and 2018 experienced
a smaller change in the vote shares of far-right parties than in municipalities
that did not open any refugee center in the same period.
4.5. Channels
This section explores two mechanisms that can explain the decrease in the
support for the far-right parties pictured in Table 4.3. Specifically, we focus
on the size of the center and the exposure to the Internet.
4.5.1. The role of the size of the center
We start by investigating how the baseline effect of SPRARs changes along
with the size of the refugee centers. To develop this analysis, we collect data
on the yearly number of places made available by the SPRARs opened in the
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period 2014-2018. As shown in Figure 4.2, this number has been growing
in recent years. Figure 4.2 also shows how the number of places available
correlates with the total number of refugees and asylum seekers hosted in a
specific year.
The number of places made available in a SPRAR center is usually the
result of the interaction between the municipal government and the Italian
Home Office. A municipal government that bids for a SPRAR center needs to
indicate the size of the refugee center that it wants to open. However, as Table
4.A3 shows, the Italian Home Office usually establishes a minimum and a
maximum number of places that can be made available. These numbers have
been changing across tenders, and they typically depend on the municipal
population.
To study how the baseline effect changes along with the centers’ size, we
add to model 4.3 a variable measuring the number of places in SPRARs ev-
ery 1000 inhabitants (Number S PRAR places), made available in the period
2014-2018.72 Given that this variable is different from zero only for munici-
palities with SPRARs, there is no need to interact the variable with the treat-
ment OpenS PRARi, as such interaction term would be perfectly collinear
with Number S PRAR places. We standardize this variable by subtracting
its minimum value calculated across the municipalities that opened SPRAR
centers in the period studied.73 This standardization allows us to interpret the
coefficient of OpenS PRARi as the effect of a SPRAR center with the smallest
size encountered in the data. The coefficient of the variable Number S PRAR
places tells us how the effect changes when we add an extra-place above its
minimum value.
The limitation of this exercise is that, as described above, municipal gov-
ernments have a role in deciding the number of places in SPRAR centers. The
interaction between Number S PRAR places and GroupAccommodationi is
72For those municipalities that participated in more than one tender in the period studied,
we kept the maximum number of places across tenders. For those municipalities that
opened the SPRAR center through a union of towns, we divided the number of places
equally across the municipalities within the union. The heterogeneity analysis results do
not change if we drop the municipalities that opened the center through a union.
73More in detail, the smallest dimension for a SPRAR center found in the data is 0.02 places
every 1000 inhabitants. The maximum size is 199 places every 1000 inhabitants, and the
average size is 5.7 places every 1000 inhabitants.
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thus potentially endogenous. To deal with this issue, we exploit the rules de-
scribed in Table 4.A3. More in detail, we repeat the exercise instrumenting
Number S PRAR places with the formal maximum number of places (Max
S PRAR places) that the municipalities could potentially pick depending on
the tender in which they participated and on the dimension of their popula-
tion.74 For the municipalities that did not open a SPRAR center, we fix Max
S PRAR places as equal to the average of the caps imposed by the different
tenders.
Results of these exercises are reported in Table 4.6. More in detail, Col-
umn 1 displays the paper’s baseline result, which we use as a point of refer-
ence. In column 2, the endogenous variables are OpenS PRARi and Number
S PRAR places, and the instruments are GroupAccommodationi and its in-
teraction term with Number S PRAR places. In column 3, the endogenous
variables are OpenS PRARi and Number S PRAR places, and the instruments
are GroupAccommodationi and Max S PRAR places. The results in columns
2 and 3 of Table 4.6 show that the effect of a SPRAR center with the smallest
size is negative, and it is similar to the baseline effect in column 1. The posi-
tive and statistically significant coefficients in front of the variables capturing
the SPRAR centers’ size indicate that this negative effect becomes smaller
when the center’s size increases.
Figure 4.5 provides a graphical representation of this evidence. The neg-
ative effect of SPRARs becomes smaller when the size of the centers in-
creases, and it eventually becomes positive above a certain threshold. More
specifically, we find that SPRAR centers’ effect on radical right vote shares
becomes positive and statistically different from zero for a number of places
every 1000 inhabitants equal to 28. This result is consistent with the evidence
provided by (Vertier & Viskanic, 2019) for France. This evidence indicates
that, when the dimension of the refugee group becomes too big, natives could
perceive refugees and asylum seekers as a potential threat for their economic,
cultural, and social dominance, as suggested by the “realistic group conflict
theories” (Campbell, 1965; Dustmann et al., 2019; Lahav, 2004; Quillian,
1995; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999; Taylor, 1998). The policy implication is that
74This number is the one indicated in column 3 of Table 4.A3. For example, for a mu-
nicipality with 25,000 inhabitants that opened a SPRAR center during tender 2, Max
S PRAR places is 30. We used the maximum number across tenders for municipalities
that participated in more than one tender in the period studied.
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governments should try to allocate refugees and asylum seekers through more
diffuse and smaller refugee centers.
4.5.2. The role of the Internet
The second mechanism that we investigate in this paper is the role of access
to broadband Internet. As shown by recent literature (Bellucci et al., 2019;
Chan et al., 2016; Falck et al., 2014; Gavazza et al., 2019; Guriev et al., 2021;
Müller & Schwarz, 2018, 2020; Petrova et al., 2020; Romarri, 2020; Schaub
& Morisi, 2019), the Internet and social media can have a significant effect
on voting behavior and the attitudes of natives toward immigrants. Based on
the evidence in the existing literature, we can expect the negative effect of
SPRAR refugee centers on voting for far-right parties to be smaller in areas
with greater Internet exposure. To evaluate the role of broadband technology,
we use data from AGCOM, measured in 2018. We use three different mea-
sures for access to the Internet at the municipal level. These measures allow
us to distinguish between municipalities with low access and high broadband
access.
The first measure provided by AGCOM is the average speed (Mbps) of
broadband Internet at the municipal level. We distinguish between munici-
palities with an average speed below the median and municipalities with an
average speed above the median. Panel A of Table 4.7 reports the results of
this exercise. The other two measures used in the analysis are similar to the
ones used by Campante et al. (2018). Specifically, these two measures fol-
low two categorical variables provided by AGCOM. The first variable is the
share of households with access to broadband with speed above 0 Mbps. The
variable can take six values in the following brackets: 0 %, 1-50 %, 51-75
%, 76-85 %, 86-95 %. and above 95 %. The second variable is the share of
households with access to broadband with speed above 2 Mbps, and take six
values in the same brackets. We divide the municipalities between those with
values of the categorical variables below and above 4 (i.e., with at least 76 %
of households with broadband access).75 Panel B and C of Table 4.7 report
75We tried to divide the sample using other values of the two categorical variables, and we
got consistent results. We selected the value four because this is the one that allows us
to get a strong first stage for both samples. The strong first stages enable us to get more
reliable IV estimates.
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the results obtained using these two measures for broadband internet access.
We find that municipalities with low Internet access drive the negative ef-
fect of SPRAR refugee centers on extreme right’ electoral performance. The
coefficient in column 2 of Panel A of Table 4.7 is negative, statistically signif-
icant, and with a bigger magnitude than the one of the coefficient in column
3. Besides, the coefficient in column 3 of Panel A is not statistically differ-
ent from zero. The results in Panel B and C provide a similar picture. The
coefficients in column 2 are negative, statistically significant, and with a mag-
nitude approximately double of the coefficients in column 3. None of the two
coefficients in column 3 of Panel B and C are statistically different from zero.
The results in Table 4.7 indicate that the direct contact between refugees
and natives on voting outcomes is significant only in municipalities with low
access to broadband Internet. The fact that this effect is smaller and not distin-
guishable from zero in municipalities with high broadband access indicates
that the Internet can reduce the impact of direct contact on the attitudes of
natives toward immigrants. This evidence is consistent with recent literature
(Bellucci et al., 2019; Guriev et al., 2021; Müller & Schwarz, 2018, 2020;
Petrova et al., 2020; Schaub & Morisi, 2019) which shows how the Internet
and social media had an important role in explaining the surge in hate crimes
toward immigrants and the increasing support for far-right parties with an
anti-immigrant agenda. The results in Table 4.7 are connected with the results
provided by Bellucci et al. (2019) who, using data from Italy, show that in
places with higher broadband access, natives support more anti-immigration
parties when they expect more migrants to arrive. However, differently from
them, we show that the macro-level exposure provided by the Internet can
also interact with actual migration inflows, besides that with perceived levels
of migration by part of natives.
In conclusion, the evidence in Table 4.7 suggests that the macro-level ex-
posure that works through the salience of the migration issue in the media
can offset the effect of the micro-level exposure fostered by the direct contact
between natives and migrants. As suggested by the literature, this is likely
to happen through social media and the Internet’s role in diffusing fake news
and supporting populist and radical political parties’ electoral campaigning.
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4.6. Conclusion
This paper shows that hosting refugees can hurt the electoral performance of
far-right and anti-immigration political parties. It also shows how the effect
can vary with the size of the immigration inflow and the exposure to the
Internet. The results of this paper call for future research for three reasons.
First, this paper focuses on one type of refugee center – i.e., SPRARs.
SPRARs are medium-small refugee centers that, based on the anecdotal evi-
dence, seem to work properly in terms of integration of the migrant popula-
tion host and interaction between migrants and natives. As described above,
we also show that our results do not change when considering another type
of center, CAS refugee centers, within our treatment variable. CASs are, on
average, bigger than SPRARs, and, following the anecdotal evidence, they
do not seem to work well as much as SPRARs. Unfortunately, as already ex-
plained, the data on these centers used in this paper are incomplete. Specifi-
cally, the dataset may not contain information on all the CASs opened across
Italy, and it does not contain information about the characteristics of the cen-
ters. It would be interesting if future research could replicate the analysis for
CASs, especially looking at the centers’ characteristics. This analysis would
allow researchers to study how the effect of these centers changes along with
their features.76
Second, we develop the analysis using data aggregated at the municipal
level. A goal for future research could be to collect data on the exact location
of refugee centers within the municipal territory. This kind of data could
potentially allow the researchers to investigate further the mechanisms behind
the impact of refugees’ reception on the attitudes of natives toward migrants.
Finally, we have studied the Internet’s role only by looking at the accessi-
bility to broadband. We think that future research should dig more into the
mechanisms behind the role of the Internet and its interaction with immigra-
tion inflow, for example, looking at the role of social media and fake news
and how they interact with immigrants’ presence.
76For a very recent and interesting working paper on this analysis, see Campo et al. (2021).
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Asylum-seekers in EU Countries (thousands). Source: Eurostat.
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# places # refugees
Sources: Gamalerio (2019) and SPRAR report “Atlante Sprar”, published on the SPRAR
webpage sprar.it. The graph reports the number of places made available and the number of
refugees and asylum seekers hosted every year from 2006 up to 2017.
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Figure 4.3: Location of Sprar refugee centers and group accommodation buildings
SPRAR refugee centers
Group accommodation buildings
Sources: Gamalerio (2019) and 2011 Census. Municipalities in white not included in the
analysis because of missing data.
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Figure 4.4: Reduced form coefficients
Each point represents the estimated coefficient of the reduced form, with 95% c. i. shown.
All the regressions include macro area fixed effects, municipal and mayor controls.
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Number of places in SPRAR centers
The Figure shows how the coefficient of SPRAR centers’ effect on the vote shares of far-
right parties changes with the size of the SPRAR center. The y-axis reports the change
in far-right parties’ vote shares between the 2013 and 2018 national elections. The x-axis
reports the number of places every 1000 inhabitants made available in SPRAR centers. The
dot captures the magnitude of the effect for a different number of places, and the blue vertical
lines the 95% confidence intervals. The coefficient for baseline refers to SPRAR centers with
the smallest number of SPRAR center every 1000 inhabitants.
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Appendix B: List of Tables
Table 4.1: Summary statistics – Variables of interest
count mean sd min max
Dep. Variables - Vote change between 2013-18 elections:
Far-Right 7627 17.800 7.569 -12.950 63.636
FI + PD 7627 -16.708 6.584 -55.328 23.070
5SM 7627 3.787 10.160 -35.326 46.818
Turnout 7461 1.672 4.006 -43.258 41.212
Variables of interest:
Open Sprar 7627 0.189 0.392 0.000 1.000
Dummy Accommodation (2001) 7627 0.401 0.490 0.000 1.000
Number of place in Sprar 7627 5.477 43.066 0.000 1941.176
Average Internet Speed 7627 9.328 3.528 0.000 17.268
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Table 4.2: Summary statistics – Controls
count mean sd min max
Controls:
Open SPRAR before 2013 7627 0.027 0.161 0.000 1.000
% small buildings (2011) 7627 0.790 0.104 0.169 1.000
% not used buildings (2011) 7627 0.055 0.052 0.000 0.685
No profit organisations 7627 0.006 0.004 0.000 0.067
Population (2011) 7627 7619 40890 30 2617175
Surface (kmq) 7627 37.193 50.373 0.121 1287
Altitude 7627 341.115 280.963 0.000 2035
Unemployment rate (2011) 7627 0.105 0.063 0.008 0.422
% of college over total population 7627 0.074 0.028 0.000 0.291
% foreign pop (2011) 7627 0.059 0.042 0.000 0.367
Income per capita 7627 11879 3170 3267 34320
% younger than 14 (2011) 7627 0.131 0.027 0.000 0.237
% older than 65 (2011) 7627 0.228 0.058 0.055 0.620
Distance to closest capital city 7627 230 13 0 209
Female mayor 7627 0.138 0.316 0.000 1.000
Age of mayor 7627 52.395 9.700 25.286 84.857
Mayor graduated at university 7627 0.473 0.453 0.000 1.000
Far right Mayor 7627 0.034 0.160 0.000 1.000
Year term 7627 2.304 0.649 0.000 3.857
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Table 4.3: Refugees reception and voting for far-right parties
Dep. Variable: ∆ % far-right 18-13 ∆ % far-right 13-08
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Open Sprar -0.674∗∗ -7.868∗∗∗ -7.316∗∗ 0.611
(0.265) (1.672) (2.924) (2.417)
Accomodations -0.430∗∗∗ 0.036
(0.136) (0.143)
Model Ols Red. Form IV IV Red. Form IV
F-Test 80.87 17.61 17.61
First Stage 0.111∗∗∗ 0.059∗∗∗ 0.059∗∗∗
Controls: Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes
N: 7627 7627 7627 7627 7627 7627
Instrumental variable: presence of group accommodation buildings. All regressions include
macro-area fixed effects. Municipal controls: population, population squared, area, altitude,
unemployment rate, average income per capita, distance from capoluogo, SPRAR already
open before 2013, % of small buildings, % of empty buildings, number of no profit associa-
tion per capita, % people aged >64, % people aged >15, % foreign population, % of people
with college education. Mayors controls: gender, age, dummy equal to one if mayor has a
post-graduate education, dummy equal to one if mayor belongs to the far right, year of the
electoral term, year of the electoral term squared. Standard errors clustered at the local labor
market level in parentheses. Significance levels: ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table 4.4: Refugees reception and voting for centrist parties
Dep. Variable: ∆ % FI + PD 18-13 ∆ % FI + PD 13-08
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Open Sprar -0.0755 3.803∗∗ 5.453∗ -5.583
(0.308) (1.706) (3.050) (4.480)
Accomodations 0.320∗∗ -0.328
(0.162) (0.258)
Model Ols Red. Form IV IV Red. Form IV
F-Test 80.87 17.61 17.61
First Stage 0.111∗∗∗ 0.059∗∗∗ 0.059∗∗∗
Controls: Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes
N: 7627 7627 7627 7627 7627 7627
Instrumental variable: presence of group accommodation buildings. All regressions include
macro-area fixed effects. Municipal controls: population, population squared, area, altitude,
unemployment rate, average income per capita, distance from capoluogo, SPRAR already
open before 2013, % of small buildings, % of empty buildings, number of no profit associa-
tion per capita, % people aged >64, % people aged >15, % foreign population, % of people
with college education. Mayors controls: gender, age, dummy equal to one if mayor has a
post-graduate education, dummy equal to one if mayor belongs to the far right, year of the
electoral term, year of the electoral term squared. Standard errors clustered at the local labor
market level in parentheses. Significance levels: ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table 4.5: Refugees reception and other political outcomes
Dep. Variable: ∆ % 5SM 18-13 ∆ % Turnout 18-13
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Open Sprar 0.364 -1.276 -0.283 -1.717
(0.351) (2.807) (0.179) (2.512)
Accomodations -0.075 -0.066
(0.164) (0.094)
Model Ols Red. Form IV Ols Red. Form IV
F-Test 17.61 16.27
First Stage 0.059∗∗∗ 0.059∗∗∗
Controls: Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N: 7627 7627 7627 7162 7162 7162
Instrumental variable: presence of group accommodation buildings. All regressions include
macro-area fixed effects. Municipal controls: population, population squared, area, altitude,
unemployment rate, average income per capita, distance from capoluogo, SPRAR already
open before 2013, % of small buildings, % of empty buildings, number of no profit associa-
tion per capita, % people aged >64, % people aged >15, % foreign population, % of people
with college education. Mayors controls: gender, age, dummy equal to one if mayor has a
post-graduate education, dummy equal to one if mayor belongs to the far right, year of the
electoral term, year of the electoral term squared. Standard errors clustered at the local labor
market level in parentheses. Significance levels: ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table 4.6: Refugees reception and voting for far-right parties – Size refugee centers
(1) (2) (3)
Open Sprar -7.316∗∗ -6.733∗∗∗ -6.745∗∗
(2.924) (2.560) (2.642)
Number Sprar places 0.406∗∗ 0.397∗∗
(0.177) (0.201)
F-Test 17.61 13.01 11.33
Mun. Contr.: Yes Yes Yes
N: 7627 7627 7627
IV Regressions. Dependent Variable: ∆ vote share far-right
2018-2013. Instrumental variables: a) in column 1, the
instrument is the presence of group accommodation build-
ings (GroupAccommodationi); b) in column 2, the instru-
ments are GroupAccommodationi and its interaction term with
Number S PRAR places; c) in column 3, the instruments are
GroupAccommodationi and Max S PRAR places. All regres-
sions include macro-area fixed effects. Municipal controls:
population, population squared, area, altitude, unemployment
rate, average income per capita, distance from capoluogo,
SPRAR already open before 2013, % of small buildings, %
of empty buildings, number of no profit association per capita,
% people aged >64, % people aged >15, % foreign population,
% of people with college education. Mayors controls: gender,
age, dummy equal to one if mayor has a post-graduate educa-
tion, dummy equal to one if mayor belongs to the far right, year
of the electoral term, year of the electoral term squared. Stan-
dard errors clustered at the local labor market level in parenthe-
ses. Significance levels: ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table 4.7: Refugees reception and voting for far-right parties – Internet
Panel A: speed broadband internet
(1) (2) (3)
Open Sprar -7.316∗∗ -11.41∗∗∗ -1.244
(2.924) (4.192) (3.358)
Sample All centers Slow internet Fast internet
F-Test 17.61 11.80 8.35
Mun. Contr.: Yes Yes Yes
N: 7627 3813 3814
Panel B: % households with broadband speed > 0 Mbps
(1) (2) (3)
Open Sprar -7.316∗∗ -11.49∗∗ -4.840
(2.924) (5.104) (3.187)
Sample All centers Low access High access
F-Test 17.61 10.92 11.53
Mun. Contr.: Yes Yes Yes
N: 7627 1602 6025
Panel C: % households with broadband speed > 2 Mbps
(1) (2) (3)
Open Sprar -7.316∗∗ -10.67∗∗ -4.460
(2.924) (4.575) (3.287)
Sample All centers Low access High access
F-Test 17.61 11.10 10.44
Mun. Contr.: Yes Yes Yes
N: 7627 2383 5244
IV Regressions. Dependent Variable: ∆ vote share far-right 2018-
2013. Instrumental variable: presence of group accommodation
buildings. All regressions include macro-area fixed effects. Mu-
nicipal and mayor controls: see Table 4.3. Standard errors clus-
tered at the local labor market level in parentheses. Significance
levels: ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Appendix C: Additional Tables
Table 4.A1: SPRAR tenders timing
Tender Year Date starts Date ends Date opens Years active
1 2013 04/09/2013 19/10/2013 29/01/2014 2014-2016
2 2015 23/05/2015 22/07/2015 04/12/2015 2016
3 2015-2016 14/10/2015 14/02/2016 31/05/2016 2016-2017
4 2016 27/08/2016 30/10/2016 19/01/2017 2017-2019
5 2017 - - - 2017-2020
Sources: Gamalerio (2019), Gamalerio et al. (2020a), Home Office and SPRAR. Descrip-
tion columns: 1) Column 1 indicates the number of the tender assigned for this paper; 2)
Column 2 reports the year in which the tender is issued by the Home Office; 3) Column 3
indicates the starting date of the tender; 4) Column 4 reports the deadline for application
to the tender; 5) In column 5, we find he date of opening of the refugee center; 6) The
refugee center is active in the years in column 5. The last row (i.e., tender 5) refers to
year 2017, during which the Italian Home Office accepted bids for SPRAR centers on a
rolling basis (see Ministerial Decree 10 August 2016, n. 200).
Table 4.A2: Types of structures used for SPRAR refugee centers (%)
Type 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
Flats 75 80 82 83.1 83.8 86.2
Group Accommodations 25 20 18 16.9 16.2 13.8
Sources: Atlante SPRAR
194
Table 4.A3: Number of places in refugee centers by tender
Tender Minimum number of places Maximum number of places
1 15 places until 5000 inhabitants
25 between 5001 and 40,000
15 for all municipalities 50 between 40,001 and 200,000
100 between 200,001 and 1,000,000
150 between 1,000,001 and 2,000,000
250 from 2,000,001
2 10 places until 5000 inhabitants
20 between 5001 and 15,000
6 for all municipalities 30 between 15,001 and 50,000
40 between 50,001 and 200,000
50 between 200,001 and 500,000
70 from 500,001
3 25 places until 20,000 inhabitants
40 between 20,001 and 40,000
10 for all municipalities 50 between 40,001 and 200,000
100 between 200,001 and 1,000,000
150 between 1,000,001 and 2,000,000
250 from 2,000,001
4 10 for all municipalities 60 for all municipalities
5 10 for all municipalities 60 for all municipalities
Sources: Home Office and SPRAR. Description columns: 1) Tender is the number of
the tender assigned for this paper; 2) Minimum number of places: minumum number of
places for refugees and asylum seekers that needs to be guaranteed in the SPRAR center; 3)
Maximum number of places=maximum number of places for refugees and asylum seekers
that can be provided in the refugee center.
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Table 4.A4: Number of SPRAR municipalities
Year Stock Net change Entry Exit
2005 86 0 0 0
2006 141 55 60 5
2007 101 -40 8 48
2008 103 2 8 6
2009 127 24 33 9
2010 127 0 0 0
2011 172 45 51 6
2012 172 0 0 0
2013 172 0 0 0
2014 569 397 412 15
2015 569 0 0 0
2016 1184 615 615 0
2017 1227 43 154 111
Sources: Gamalerio (2019), Home Office and SPRAR.
Year=calendar year. Stock (column 2) indicates the total
number of municipalities that in a specific year have an ac-
tive refugees’ center in their territory. Net change (column
3) is equal to the net inflow of municipalities that enter the
SPRAR program in a specific year (i.e. net change=entry-
exit). Entry (column 4) is the number of municipalities
that enter the SPRAR program in a specific year (i.e. mu-
nicipalities that open a refugees’ center), while exit (col-
umn 5) indicates the number of municipalities that leave
the SPRAR program in a specific year (i.e. municipalities
that close refugees’ center).
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Table 4.A5: Refugees reception and voting for far-right parties – Control for first-
level reception centers
Dep. Variable: ∆ % far-right 18-13 ∆ % far-right 13-08
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Open Sprar -0.660∗∗∗ -7.868∗∗∗ -8.047∗∗ 0.211
(0.255) (1.672) (3.318) (2.493)
Accomodations -0.436∗∗∗ 0.0114
(0.136) (0.136)
Model Ols Red. Form IV IV Red. Form IV
F-Test 80.87 15.04 15.04
First Stage 0.111∗∗∗ 0.054∗∗∗ 0.054∗∗∗
Mun. Contr.: Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes
N: 7627 7627 7627 7627 7627 7627
Instrumental variable: presence of group accommodation buildings. All regressions include
macro-area fixed effects. Municipal controls: population, population squared, area, altitude,
unemployment rate, average income per capita, distance from capoluogo, SPRAR already
open before 2013, % of small buildings, % of empty buildings, number of no profit associa-
tion per capita, % people aged >64, % people aged >15, % foreign population, % of people
with college education, first level reception center, CAS refugee center (since 2014), CAS
refugee center (before 2014), ENA refugee center, migrant centers at provincial level (Istat),
CAS services (since 2014), CAS services (before 2014), ENA services. Mayors controls:
gender, age, dummy equal to one if mayor has a post-graduate education, dummy equal to
one if mayor belongs to the far right, year of the electoral term, year of the electoral term
squared. Standard errors clustered at the local labor market level in parentheses. Significance
levels: ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table 4.A6: Refugees reception and voting for far-right parties – CAS Only
Dep. Variable: ∆ % far-right 18-13 ∆ % far-right 13-08
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Open Cas from 2014 0.387 -7.650∗∗∗ -12.60∗∗∗ 0.977
(0.243) (1.466) (4.727) (4.094)
Accomodations -0.438∗∗∗ 0.034
(0.136) (0.143)
Model OLS Red. Form IV IV Red. Form IV
F-Test 169.64 19.13 19.13
First Stage 0.114∗∗∗ 0.035∗∗∗ 0.035∗∗∗
Mun. Contr.: Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes
N: 7627 7627 7627 7627 7627 7627
Instrumental variable: presence of group accommodation buildings. All regressions include
macro-area fixed effects. Municipal controls: population, population squared, area, altitude,
unemployment rate, average income per capita, distance from capoluogo, CAS already open
before 2014, % of small buildings, % of empty buildings, number of no profit association
per capita, % people aged >64, % people aged >15, % foreign population, % of people
with college education. Mayors controls: gender, age, dummy equal to one if mayor has a
post-graduate education, dummy equal to one if mayor belongs to the far right, year of the
electoral term, year of the electoral term squared. Standard errors clustered at the local labor
market level in parentheses. Significance levels: ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table 4.A7: Refugees reception and voting for far-right parties – SPRAR and CAS
Dep. Variable: ∆ % far-right 18-13 ∆ % far-right 13-08
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Open Sprar and/or Cas -0.247 -5.508∗∗∗ -5.133∗∗∗ 0.410
(0.219) (1.089) (1.854) (1.686)
Accomodations -0.432∗∗∗ 0.034
(0.136) (0.143)
Model OLS Red. Form IV IV Red. Form IV
F-Test 152.21 33.84 33.84
First Stage 0.158∗∗∗ 0.084∗∗∗ 0.084∗∗∗
Mun. Contr.: Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes
N: 7627 7627 7627 7627 7627 7627
Instrumental variable: presence of group accommodation buildings. All regressions include
macro-area fixed effects. Municipal controls: population, population squared, area, altitude,
unemployment rate, average income per capita, distance from capoluogo, SPRAR already
open before 2013, CAS already open before 2014 % of small buildings, % of empty build-
ings, number of no profit association per capita, % people aged >64, % people aged >15,
% foreign population, % of people with college education. Mayors controls: gender, age,
dummy equal to one if mayor has a post-graduate education, dummy equal to one if mayor
belongs to the far right, year of the electoral term, year of the electoral term squared. Stan-
dard errors clustered at the local labor market in parentheses. Significance levels: ∗ p < 0.1,




On an early summer night in 2019, the vessel Sea-Watch 3, carrying 42
migrants rescued off the Libyan coast, forced the blockade of the Italian navy
and docked at the port of Lampedusa after more than 17 days of waiting and
agony for the migrants on board. Twitting vehemently, the most important
representative of the Italian far-right, the then Minister of the Interior Matteo
Salvini, attacked several times Captain Carola Rackete, immediately arrested
after the unauthorized boarding. This event, followed by media worldwide,
perfectly sums up how extreme the level of polarization on immigration has
become. In this dissertation, I focused on the three main elements of the
story: support for the far-right, immigrants, and the media.
Understanding what drives individuals to vote for parties or individuals
who have often used violent rhetoric toward women and minorities and en-
acted discriminatory laws is critical. Simultaneously, it is crucial to compre-
hend what tools these political forces use to gain consensus and, even more
relevant, the consequences of having these parties in power.
This dissertation attempted to provide answers to the points listed above.
Using different empirical techniques and analyzing different European set-
tings, I aimed to enlarge the knowledge on the causes and consequences of
the political success of far-right parties, how the new media influence citi-
zens’ opinions, and which political parties have been advantaged (or harmed)
from the recent paradigm shift in the communication process. The unifying
theme of the chapters was the focus on immigration – and, more specifically,
on the relationship, analyzed in various aspects, between natives and immi-
grants.
I started by asking whether the ability to access a potentially unlimited
and relatively affordable medium of information – the Internet – changed the
knowledge that natives have about migration patterns in their own country.
Indeed, surveys and academic literature have found a strong misperception
of natives, who vastly overestimate the number of foreigners in the country.
Besides, natives think immigrants are culturally and religiously more distant
from them and are economically weaker – less educated, more unemployed,
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and more reliant on and favored by government transfers – than is the case
(Alesina et al., 2018). The second chapter of my dissertation, “Does the In-
ternet change attitudes toward immigrants? Evidence from Spain”, showed
that people exposed to the early Internet (from 2008 to 2012) are associ-
ated with a better knowledge of the (national) migration trends; additionally,
the possibility to go online is responsible for an overall improvement in atti-
tudes toward immigrants. The analysis, set in Spain, exploited a unique and
confidential survey dataset and combined a difference-in-differences method
with an instrumental variable approach. In the second part of the analysis, I
demonstrated that access to the Internet generates a decrease in the political
support for the traditional Spanish right-wing party using both survey data
and real electoral outcome.
Having extreme parties (or individuals) in power is no longer a remote
possibility but a reality. This is the case both at the national and local levels.
Understanding the effects on economic and social outcomes of these gov-
ernments is both essential and underdeveloped in the literature. In the third
chapter of my dissertation, “Do far-right mayors increase the probability of
hate crimes? Evidence from Italy”, I aimed to contribute to this emerging
research area by focusing on the effect of electing local politicians on hate
crimes against immigrants. Hate crimes are soaring in many countries, and
many argue that a close relationship exists between the increased support
for extremist parties and acts of violence toward immigrants and other mi-
norities. To empirically test this hypothesis, I used an RD approach, and I
focused on the Italian context, where the presence of candidates belonging
to anti-immigrant parties is significant and widespread in the territory. As a
main result, I showed that in municipalities where extreme right-wing may-
ors are elected, the probability that a hate crime occurs is significantly higher.
Municipalities with higher Internet access drive this effect; additionally, I
demonstrated that the election of an extreme right mayor generates a change
in behavior also in the surrounding municipalities.
One element that many argue has contributed to the success of far-right
parties is the recent refugee crisis that European countries have faced, pri-
marily as a result of the Arab Springs and the violence that has resulted from
them. Anti-immigrant parties have exploited this abnormal arrival of asy-
lum seekers to increase the fear of natives and gain votes. However, this
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technique has not always proven successful. In the fourth chapter of this dis-
sertation, “Is this the real-life or just fantasy? Refugee reception, extreme
right voting, and broadband internet”, we studied the effect of a specific pol-
icy of relocation of asylum seekers in Italy (SPRAR) that involves opening
medium-small centers and offering refugees the opportunity to interact with
members of the local community. This micro-exposure to refugees had sig-
nificant consequences on the voting choices of natives: using an instrumental
variable approach, we showed that support for far-right parties is reduced in
municipalities where a SPRAR center has been opened. However, this micro-
exposure effect is smaller in higher macro-exposure areas to migrant news –
i.e., in higher Internet exposure areas.
There are three takeaways from this dissertation. First, it is essential to
point out how easily the Internet can convert from a medium that increase
the population level of awareness (Chapter 2) to an echo chamber that raises
citizens’ fears (Chapter 4) and pushes them to behave violently (Chapter 3).
If this has been proven to be true for traditional media, such as newspapers
and TV, this issue is even more delicate with the possibility of going online,
considering the highly self-segregated news platform provided by the Inter-
net. This opens the door to potential strands of research on the supply of
extremist parties and the characteristics of their representatives (Gennaro et
al., 2021). A natural question is why non-extremist parties have failed lately
to offer equally charismatic leaders. Besides, since there is an emerging con-
sensus that populists have pursued successful communication strategies, of-
ten via social media and the Internet, an additional related question is why
mainstream parties are not able to follow suit.
Second, as we expect more and more extremist parties to come to power
in the near future, careful analyses of their governments’ impact are crucial.
These should focus on traditional economic outcomes, such as investments,
trade, and wages. However, as demonstrated by the third chapter, these anal-
yses should also assess the effect of extremist governments on elements that
ensure freedoms essential to democracies, such as the independence of media
and judicial bodies and the quality of their bureaucrats (Bellodi et al., 2021).
It is pivotal to monitor whether these administrations are responsible for dis-
crimination in labor access, health care, and education. At the same time,
future research should focus on how mainstream governments can defend
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themselves against the threat of the arrival of extremist parties.
Lastly, a final thought on the management of refugees and, more generally,
migration policies in Europe is necessary. Despite being a controversial topic,
the evidence suggests that the aggregate economic impact of immigration on
receiving countries is likely to be positive (Peri, 2016). However, to disman-
tle extremist parties’ rhetoric, which associates the presence of migrants with
negative social repercussions related to crime, the drain of social welfare ben-
efits, and cultural differences, two elements are necessary. First, increase the
level of awareness among the local population. Second, as highlighted by
the fourth chapter, implement reception policies that generate integration and
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